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ABSTRACT
The Suffering South offers a cultural history of a yellow fever epidemic that swept
through the Mississippi Valley in 1878. It argues that the yellow fever narratives created
during this epidemic constituted a discursive attempt by Southerners to renegotiate
Southern identity and social hierarchy following the Civil War and Reconstruction. White
Southerners, in particular, used the epidemic as an occasion to foster a return to a more
traditional foundation of white supremacy and patriarchy as the basis for Southern identity
and belonging. The narratives written by these Southerners, in which they described their
experiences with yellow fever and the effects of its epidemic ravages, thereby illustrate an
explicit attempt to culturally redeem the South following the successful political
Redemption of the region.
Using themes and stock characterizations of heroes and villains that would have
been readily familiar to a generation of Southerners who had lived through the Civil War
and Reconstruction, these narratives presented the idealized Southerner as white and male.
In turn, they castigated non-native outsiders, racial and ethnic minorities, and women who
went outside of the prescribed social norms of their race, class, or gender. These narratives
also acted to justify the racial disparity in the distribution of the relief generated by the
national humanitarian response to the epidemic’s incredible scope and severity. In doing
so, Democratic Redeemers directed money, medical attention, and rations away from
African American communities in the South as evidence of their belief that these
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Southerners did not deserve equal access to aid as a right of citizenship. Finally, the
memory of the epidemic continues to rely on these traditional primary sources which
present the experience of yellow fever in 1878 through the written memories of white
Southerners. The efforts to solidify the patriarchal, white-supremacist basis for Southern
identity and belonging implicit in these sources continues to effect the historical narrative
presented in commemorations and official histories.
Yellow fever can be understood, then, not only as a physiological disease, but as a
cultural construction encompassing a set of ideas that helped to maintain hierarchies of
belonging and identity in the South. This dissertation thus follows in the steps of
historians who have studied epidemics and other natural disasters to illuminate social and
cultural hierarchies of power. It likewise examines how relief and public health efforts
reinforced those hierarchies in the epidemic’s immediate aftermath and builds on the work
of memory scholars to illustrate how the collective memory of the event continues to either
reinforce or challenge those hierarchies over time.

iv

INTRODUCTION

A dark Nemesis of gloom and despair has hovered over the fair Sunny South; the cry of distress was
wafted on every breeze, and lisped by every tongue; thousands of hearthstones have been made
desolate; the orphan’s cry and widow’s wail were heard throughout the land, and lonely, lacerated
hearts will roam o’er this wide earth, homeless, hopeless, and comfortless!1
—J. P. Dromgoole, M.D.
This dissertation presents a cultural history of the yellow fever epidemic which devastated
the Mississippi Valley in 1878. Between the months of June and December, yellow fever spread to
over two hundred communities across eight states, resulting in more than 100,000 cases and
approximately 20,000 deaths. In their attempts to understand the trauma of the epidemic and to
create meaning out of so much suffering, Southerners produced countless narratives about the
disease and its effects. These yellow fever narratives, which detailed Southerners’ experiences of the
epidemic and their understanding of yellow fever, constituted a discursive attempt to reconstruct
Southern identity following Reconstruction.
Betraying the social and cultural attitudes of their authors, yellow fever narratives were
redolent with attempts to describe the destruction of Southern communities, the criminal
behavior of outsiders seeking to take advantage of the chaos for personal gain, and the fears of
many white Southerners that black residents would rise up and overtake them in their moment of
weakness. These themes mirrored narratives that depicted Radical Reconstruction as an attack on

1

J. P. Dromgoole, Yellow Fever: Heroes, Honors, and Horrors of 1878. (Louisville, John P. Morton and Company, 1879),
7; Aristides Agramonte Yellow Fever Collection, John P. Ische Library; Yellow Fever Collection, Benjamin L. Hooks
Central Library.
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the traditional Southern way of life. Popular medical ideas about yellow fever further incorporated
social designations of race, ethnicity, class, and gender which Southerners used to justify a social
hierarchy that privileged native-born whites. These narratives, popularized by the immense tragedy
of the epidemic, played a key role in informing a larger cultural discourse about the future of the
South following Reconstruction.2
This dissertation is not a traditional history of medicine, if medicine refers to the attempts
of humans to diagnose, treat, and/or cure disease. Nor is it a history of public health or any
attempts by humans to curb disease through sanitation or quarantine. It is not a history of yellow
fever as a disease, its etiology, its ravages on the body, or its spread from one place to another.
Neither, really, is it a history of the epidemic itself. There is little in these pages that takes the
reader through the events that led to one of the most destructive medical disasters in the history of
the United States. Instead, its principal concern is understanding what the epidemic meant to
those living through it. It is a history, in short, of the social and cultural meanings Southerners
assigned to the 1878 yellow fever epidemic and the consequent implications for identity,
belonging, and citizenship in the post-Reconstruction South.
I have titled this dissertation “The Suffering South” for a number of reasons. After the
Civil War and Reconstruction, white Southerners consciously created an image of Southern
identity built upon the theme of suffering. Granted, the Lost Cause did not become a movement
of memorializing and commemorating this account of suffering until the 1890s, but Southerners
were already adept at communicating a narrative of communal suffering as a vital component of
the identity of the white, Confederate-supporting South. In 1878, with the region in the throes of
2

Yellow Fever Commission, Conclusions of the Board of Experts Authorized by Congress to Investigate the Yellow Fever
Epidemic of 1878 (Washington, D. C.: Judd & Detweiler, 1879), 32-34, Pamphlet, Aristides Agramonte Yellow Fever
Collection, John P. Ische Library.
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the worst medical disaster the nation had yet experienced, these white Southerners incorporated
the theme of Southern suffering in their yellow fever narratives to again maintain that their
regional identity and experience was unique and that their culture would prevail despite repeated
attempts to stamp it out. Yet they also relied on their narratives of suffering to encourage support
and relief by a national relief campaign that encouraged sectional reconciliation. In the postbellum
years, Southerners used the theme of suffering as a persistent, unifying motif to the history of the
South while Americans throughout the nation likewise viewed the South as a distinctive region
with its own identity. The theme of suffering was therefore an important ingredient in fashioning
post-Reconstruction Southern identity and belonging.3
Scholars that study individual and communal trauma have shown that suffering is integral
to identity formation and the rebuilding of communities. Historians of disaster, moreover, have
shown that traumatic events offer a window onto the complex relationships between individuals
and also between people and the state. Disasters create narratives that show where people turn for
help in a crisis, how networks of communal solidarity sometimes compete with state-sanctioned
relief, and how these relationships of rescue were constantly negotiated and renegotiated. These
negotiations have important implications for identity and belonging during and after disasters.
Historians of disaster further recognize that the breakdown of established norms allows survivors

3

James C. Cobb, Away Down South: A History of Southern Identity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) argued
that the communal suffering of defeat and Radical Reconstruction were a necessary impetus to the creation of a
unique Southern identity. Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2008); Carol Emberton, Beyond Redemption: Race, Violence, and the American South After the Civil War
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Charles Reagan Wilson, Baptized in Blood: The Religion of the Lost Cause,
1865-1920 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980); W. Fitzhugh Brundage, The Southern Past: A Clash of Race and
Memory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005); Edward J. Blum, Reforging the White
Republic: Race, Religion, and American Nationalism, 1865-1898 (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 2005).
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and spectators to imagine new ways of recreating the physical and social structures that have been
destroyed. The 1878 yellow fever epidemic was no exception. Indeed, it exemplifies these patterns.4
Examining the dual effects of disaster and disease calls attention to several culturally
constructed ideas about social relationships, identity, belonging, and citizenship. Charles
Rosenberg, a pioneer in the social history of medicine, argued that epidemics provide a natural
“sampling device” that allows historians to analyze social interactions and performance of identity
that operate continuously yet may not be explored or explained in traditional primary sources.
Epidemics create a proliferation of written sources that reveal social significance assigned to
bodies. Rosenberg further wrote that “A disease is no absolute physical entity but a complex
intellectual construct, an amalgam of biological state and social definition.” Any cultural history of
disease should therefore be sensitive to the social meanings attached to individual bodies,
meanings that often have racialized, gendered, and class implications for identity and belonging.5
That being said, I may have been overly ambitious when I began this project, particularly in
my assumption that source material would be abundant and easy to analyze. I was surprised to find
that, in some respects, the amount of normally available source materials actually contracts during
epidemics of this magnitude. The 1878 epidemic was so devastating and widespread that it
effectively paralyzed many of the organizations that traditionally create and disseminate

4

Jacob A. C. Remes, Disaster Citizenship: Survivors, Solidarity, and Power in the Progressive Era (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 2016); Karen Sawislak, Smoldering City: Chicagoans and the Great Fire, 1871-1874 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1995); Andrea Rees Davies, Saving San Francisco: Relief and Recovery After the 1906 Disaster (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2012); Kai T. Erikson, Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community in the Buffalo Creek Flood
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976); Eric Klinenberg, Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2002); Rebecca Solnit, A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities That Arise in
Disasters (New York: Viking, 2009); Julia F. Irwin, “Disaster of War: American Understandings of Catastrophe,
Conflict, and Relief,” First World War Studies 5, 1 (2014):17-28.
5
Charles Rosenberg, Explaining Epidemics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 109-110; Charles Rosenberg,
The Cholera Years: The United States in 1832, 1849, and 1866 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962), 5, footnote
8.
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information. Newspapers closed as editors and printers sickened and died. Mutual aid and
benevolent organizations failed to meet a quorum and suspended activities for the duration of the
epidemic. Citizens fled the cities in terror as the disease spread, incapacitating governments and
civil organizations. Those left behind struggled with the colossal task of coordinating medical care
for the sick, burial of the dead, and relief for the destitute. While every effort was made to record
important information during the epidemic, much of the source material presents as long lists: of
the dead, of the sick, of the number of supplies, of the subscriptions toward relief. Overworked,
sick, and desperate people had little time to write extensively about their experiences or their
emotional responses during the epidemic.
Dealing with these silences in the archives led me to focus on what has been remembered
and on how this memory has constrained the history of the epidemic. The yellow fever narratives
that do survive attempt to instill order and meaning to the devastation. Furthermore, many of
these narratives implicitly attempted to recreate Southern society by reinforcing antebellum social
norms of belonging and identity. While alternative memories of the epidemic exist, popular
memory is dominated by a particular group of white Southerners that supported a patriarchal,
white-supremacist South. Drawing on these sources, this project evolved to focus on identity,
belonging, and memory in order to reflect the concerns of the authors who wrote the narratives
that have survived.
My focus on “yellow fever narratives” builds on the work of literary scholar Cynthia L.
Ragland, who has specifically tied the yellow fever narratives of the 1790s to the emerging national
consciousness and identity of the Early Republic. Ragland explains that the “Letters, diaries,
autobiographies, medical records, city reports, sermons, jeremiads, histories, medical treatises,

5

political tracts, court documents, and newspaper items,” describing the epidemics of the 1790s “all
framed the published or unpublished material into narratives” that mirrored existing literary
genres—particularly the Indian captivity narrative. Rife with themes of captivity, victimization, and
redemption, Ragland claims that both genres illustrate an ongoing and profound concern for the
future of colonists’/citizens’ way of life and their project of nation-building.6
Just as Ragland argues that the 1790s represent an important analytical moment for
assessing national identity—what she refers to as an “early national identity crisis”— I argue that the
1878 epidemic presents a similar historical moment for assessing Southern identity and national
reconciliation after Reconstruction. Whereas Ragland successfully demonstrates that yellow fever
once held great significance to U.S. national identity, the 1878 epidemic was a pivotal moment in
reconstituting a particular version of Southern identity following Redemption.7
Beginning in the 1820s, yellow fever had increasingly become associated with the regional
identity of the southern United States. Americans in northern states, believing themselves to have
abolished yellow fever for good, considered the disease to be a Southern problem, representative of
the backwardness of Southern life. Southerners, in the meantime, invested the disease with a host
of cultural meanings that reinforced the antebellum social hierarchy. Following Reconstruction
and Redemption, many white Southerners utilized the meanings associated with yellow fever to
reinforce a social hierarchy based on patriarchal white supremacy and a Southern identity that
idealized white manhood while denigrating African American citizenship.8
6

Cynthia L. Ragland, “Urban Captivity Narratives: The Literature of the Yellow Fever Epidemics of the 1790s,” in
Colonial and Post-Colonial Incarceration, ed. Graeme Harper (New York: Continuum, 2001), 86-104.
7
Ibid.
8
Todd L. Savitt and James Harvey Young, Disease and Distinctiveness in the American South (Knoxville: University of
Tennessee Press, 1988); Natalie Ring, The Problem South: Region, Empire, and the New Liberal State, 1880-1930 (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 2012); Jo Ann Carrigan, The Saffron Scourge: A History of Yellow Fever in Louisiana, 17961905 (Lafayette, LA: Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1994).
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To tell this story, my dissertation focuses principally on the experiences of residents of two
cities: New Orleans and Memphis. For several reasons, these cities provide valuable case studies.
Both had the highest morbidity and mortality in the United States during the epidemic. They were
also cities poised to be New South metropolises, with large populations of ethnic and racial
minorities. The experiences of those in Memphis and New Orleans therefore provides a glimpse of
how Southerners in the worst-ravaged cities understood the disease in terms of Southern identity
and the ordering of the social hierarchy.
During and after the epidemic, the thirst for knowledge about the disease fueled the ability
of these two cities—whose devastating experience was unquestioned—to shape the discourse of
Southern identity through their yellow fever narratives. New Orleans, further, was widely
recognized as the yellow fever capital of the United States. Many Americans, north and south, saw
its physicians as the American experts on yellow fever. Consequently, New Orleanians’ social and
cultural attitudes and assumptions about yellow fever were exported to the rest of the nation along
with their medical knowledge. Their understanding of acclimation, stranger susceptibility, and
African American immunity, for example, were widely-held tenets of yellow fever theory
throughout the South.9
While New Orleans was larger and more influential in the medical community, Memphis
suffered the highest mortality in 1878. Whereas New Orleanian narratives tended toward the cold
detachment of medical observation and theory bred through long familiarity with the disease,
Memphian narratives were redolent with heartbreaking stories of suffering and chaos as the city
was overwhelmed by the number of sick and dead. Memphians’ gripping narratives captured the
attention of popular audiences throughout the United States. Furthermore, themes prevalent in
9

Ibid.
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Memphis’s yellow fever narratives—especially the descriptions of fear, chaos, and the breakdown of
government, economic, and social structures—occurred across the Mississippi Valley as the disease
spread. Memphians were certainly not the only Southern community to experience the social and
human destruction of yellow fever on a crippling scale.
Admittedly, the experiences of urban residents in New Orleans and Memphis during the
epidemic may not be generalizable across the largely rural South. And yet it was a more modern,
industrialized, urban version of the South that acted as a prerequisite for the spread of yellow
fever. Southern urban growth surpassed that of the Northern states during the first half of the
nineteenth century and long before the development of New South rhetoric, antebellum
Southerners imagined industrial and urban growth as a prerequisite to liberating the region from
what they viewed as Northern economic exploitation. The 1878 epidemic in particular was so
widespread and devastating because of the concentration of people into these urban centers
following the Civil War and the development of transportation infrastructure that crisscrossed the
region. Railroads and river traffic transported goods, people, and yellow fever to towns and cities
that had never before experienced the disease. The city thus symbolizes the tension between the
modernizing force of the New South and destruction, desolation, and death by disease or poverty.
The experience of yellow fever in these two cities may therefore be more representative than at first
imagined.10
When I began this project, I had not initially intended to write about Southern identity,
per se. But it quickly became apparent that the historical context of 1878 as an immediate post-

10

Kathleen C. Berkeley, Like a Plague of Locusts: From an Antebellum Town to a New South City, Memphis, Tennessee, 18501880 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991); Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After
Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) further argued that Southerners were moving into small
towns and villages in the postwar period and that the South could not be considered as rural as it had once been.
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Reconstruction moment could not be denied. While historians consider 1877 the official end of
the era of federal Reconstruction, it was not clear at the close of that year what exactly would
happen next. Would Southern Redeemers be able to roll back some of the Radical Republicans’
reforms? Would the North continue to influence Southern affairs? Would black participation in
social and political life continue in the same way that it had under Reconstruction? In 1878,
therefore, the future and identity of the South was still very much in flux. Republicans had
attempted to mold the South into a new society, embracing modernity and racial egalitarianism, by
coercion and force when required. Following Reconstruction, the South existed as “an ambiguous
place between past and future” wherein Southerners saw a chance to remake Southern society and
identity on their own terms.11
It was therefore necessary to contextualize these yellow fever narratives within the history of
Reconstruction, Redemption, and Southern identity. Of course, there is no single Southern
identity, nor can one classify Southerners as a single, homogenous group. The people who
inhabited the region were far more diverse than discussions of Southern identity suggest.
Furthermore, it is not really appropriate to speak of an African American community in Southern
towns and cities. There were myriad communities of Southerners with individual social, economic,
and political identities. What we imagine as Southern identity has always been contested, based on
a particular historical iteration and context. While I certainly recognize this fact, it is also my
contention—and one of the primary arguments of this dissertation—that the authors of yellow fever
narratives worked to define the South as a distinct region, to which certain people did or did not

11

Ibid.; K. Stephen Prince, Stories of the South: Race and the Reconstruction of Southern Identity, 1865-1915 (University of
North Carolina Press, 2014); Bruce E. Baker, What Reconstruction Meant: Historical Memory in the American South
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007); Quote is from Arthur Remillard, Southern Civil Religions: Imagining
the Good Society in the Post-Reconstruction Era (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011), 18.
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belong. The South was as much a cultural construction that existed in the mental landscape of
Americans as it did in the physical, geographic landscape. The 1878 yellow fever epidemic
therefore offers an unexplored moment of identity consolidation and cultural redemption
following the political Redemption of the South.12
Identity, moreover, is in part constructed by this concept of belonging. All imagined
communities operate, in part, on the basis of exclusion. Individuals and communities define
themselves in opposition to what they are not. Identity and belonging is elaborated in order to
define those who do not belong. I therefore argue that the version of Southern identity put forth
in the majority of 1878 yellow fever narratives promoted the belonging of native-born whites—
particularly men and women who uphold white-supremacist patriarchy—while excluding African
Americans, immigrants, and women who did not conform to traditionally prescribed social roles.13
Historians of medicine have shown how culturally powerful ideas about disease have
helped to create and maintain such hierarchies of belonging. Medical knowledge has portrayed
socially-constructed ideas about race and gender as physical, biological reality. Historians of public
health have likewise demonstrated that the fear of outsiders contributes to their medicalization
and that prejudice creates inequitable health outcomes for marginalized social groups. Themes of
identity and belonging in the yellow fever narratives of the 1878 epidemic therefore have real
12

Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1988); Ted Tunnell, Crucible
of Reconstruction: War, Radicalism, and Race in Louisiana, 1862-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1984); Justin A. Nystrom, New Orleans After the Civil War: Race, Politics, and a New Birth of Freedom (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2010); Michael Perman, The Road to Redemption: Southern Politics, 1869-1879 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1984). Jennifer Rae Greeson, Our South: Geographical Fantasy and the Rise of
National Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), describes the “discursive construct” of the South
as a symbolic region and identity. While it has multiple meanings to different people in different contexts, Greeson
argues that the South nevertheless evokes a concept that is readily identifiable, even to Americans who have never
been to the South and do not know any Southerners.
13
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York, Verso, 1991);
Trent Watt, One Homogeneous Nation: Narratives of White Southern Identity, 1890-1920 (Knoxville, The University of
Tennessee Press, 2010).
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consequences for the distribution of medical and relief aid as well as for reinforcing the social
divisions that perpetuate discrimination. This dissertation therefore contributes to a growing
scholarship in the social and cultural history of medicine that looks at ideas about bodies, in both
health and disease, in order to uncover larger sociocultural attitudes regarding race, gender, class,
and ethnicity.14
Yellow fever offers an ideal case study for this type of analysis. The meanings associated
with yellow fever include ideas about how the disease takes hold of different kinds of bodies. Jo
Ann Carrigan has argued that early medical theorists characterized yellow fever as a strangers’
disease, one that mostly affected newcomers and immigrants, a belief which fostered nativism. A
number of historians have likewise shown that imperialists built upon these ideas of the
susceptibility of European constitutions to justify African slavery. These social and cultural beliefs
helped to cement a particular social hierarchy and, in New Orleans, a municipal identity. Carrigan
argues that the cultural experience of the disease was integral to the development of a unique
Creole identity in the city with implications for the inclusion or exclusion of racial and ethnic
minorities.15
Historians have further used yellow fever to discuss a number of intellectual, political,
social, and cultural developments. Eighteenth-century yellow fever epidemics were integral to the
14

Amy L. Fairchild, Science at the Borders: Immigrant Medical Inspection and the Shaping of the Modern Industrial Workforce
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); John McKiernan-Gonzalez, Fevered Measures: Public Health and Race
at the Texas-Mexico Border, 1848-1942 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012); Natalia Molina, Fit to Be Citizens?:
Public Health and Race in Los Angeles, 1879-1939 Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Nayan Shah, Contagious
Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Alan M. Kraut,
Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes, and the “Immigrant Menace” (Baltimore: Beacon Press, 1996; Marli F. Weiner and Mazie
Hough, Sex, Sickness, and Slavery: Illness in the Antebellum South (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012); Peter
McCandless, Slavery, Disease, and Suffering in the Southern Lowcountry (New York: New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2011); Keith Wailoo, Dying in the City of the Blues: Sickle Cell Anemia and the Politics of Race and Health (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Jim Downs, Sick From Freedom: African-American Illness and Suffering
During the Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
15
Carrigan, The Saffron Scourge.
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development of tropical medicine as imperial powers sought to master New World disease
environments. The epidemics of the 1790s were particularly important as they were a major
challenge to the newly independent United States. The 1878 epidemic, in particular, was integral
to the development of public health infrastructure across the South, with subsequent debates over
state vs. federal authority. While yellow fever acted as a justification for the extension of federal
authority in the South to eradicate a number of diseases thought to be linked to Southern
backwardness, the disease also acted as a justification for American imperialism in Cuba. These
efforts—both national and international—cemented the alliance between public health initiatives
and political, economic, or cultural imperialism during the following century. These investigations
have all been integral to my understanding of yellow fever as, not only a physiological disease, but
as encompassing a discourse of ideas that help to construct individual, municipal, regional and
national identities, as well as hierarchies of belonging and authority.16
Thus, while this dissertation is about yellow fever, it is also—and more fundamentally—an
examination of identity and belonging in this moment in the post-Reconstruction South. More
pertinent than ideas about disease or medicine, specifically, are how the experience and the
understanding of yellow fever contributed to debates over the restructuring of postwar society.
Rather than advancing a singular narrative throughout the dissertation, each chapter instead
focuses on a different theme, discussing these themes in ever widening contexts. While each can
be read as a standalone analysis of yellow fever narratives a conceptual coherence binds them
together. The first two chapters offer discursive analyses of the yellow fever narratives, while the
16
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third shows how this discourse played out in action. The fourth chapter then argues that this
discourse—and its subsequent implications for identity—continues to demonstrate cultural power
through the memory of the 1878 yellow fever epidemic.

Chapter One, “The Epidemic Experience,” offers a close reading of the intensely personal
narrations of the 1878 yellow fever epidemic in Memphis. These epidemic narratives describe the
descent of Memphis into chaos and death as symbolic of the broader devastation of the social
sphere brought about by years of war and Reconstruction. The catastrophic tenor allowed the
survivors and authors of these narratives to imagine the rebuilding of the social hierarchy. The
characters they chose to idolize and those they chose to condemn presented a commentary on
Southern identity and society after Reconstruction with implications for the future of white
supremacy, gendered standards of behavior, and a fervent suspicion of outsiders. Chapter One
uses the model of Cynthia Ragland’s “Urban Captivity Narratives” to examine the yellow fever
narratives of 1878 in Memphis for themes of post-Reconstruction Southern identity and the
cultural redemption of Southern society. It argues that themes of destruction allowed Memphians
to rhetorically rebuild their society by supporting white supremacy, communal insularity, and
traditional gender relations.
Chapter Two, “A Silver Lining to Yellow Fever,” turns the focus to New Orleans, and
describes popular medical understandings of yellow fever and how integral they were to the
concepts of identity and citizenship in that city. The chapter pays particular attention to theories of
yellow fever immunity to illustrate a hierarchy of yellow fever susceptibility based on race and
regionalism. White, native-born New Orleanians relied on a belief in place-based immunity to
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further their claims of entitlement and privilege but it was unclear how they should treat the
immunity or susceptibility of African Americans. Theories of differential immunity therefore acted
as a useful discursive arena to negotiate the social hierarchy and to naturalize claims of belonging
or exclusion. Chapter Two expands Jo Ann Carrigan’s argument in The Saffron Scourge regarding
antebellum New Orleanians’ social and cultural beliefs about yellow fever immunity. Although
Carrigan argued that the medical community abandoned these beliefs following the Civil War, I
demonstrate that the traditional hierarchy of yellow fever immunity and susceptibility in the city
continued to be popular. It was merely reframed to reflect postwar concerns regarding the
belonging of American migrants, immigrants, and African Americans.
Chapter Three, “Relief after Reconstruction,” discusses the reconciliation of the nation
following Reconstruction. Implicit in the financial and medical aid given to the South by both the
federal government and by private citizens from northern states was the imperative for national
reconciliation. Philanthropists and relief workers characterized the epidemic as a national crisis
requiring an immense humanitarian campaign. Both Northerners and Southerners agreed that the
1878 yellow fever epidemic offered a moment when sectional antagonism was cast aside in favor of
national brotherhood. Yet this humanitarian spirit which, for a time, brought Northern and
Southern whites together in mutual affection was not equally extended to black Southerners.
Northern and federal aid followed traditional patterns of relief that allowed local authorities to
disperse aid as they saw fit; Southern Redeemers, in turn, allocated much of the relief to whites in
need, whom they saw as more deserving of aid. Chapter Three tests Edward Blum’s argument in
Reforging the White Republic that the epidemic provided a moment for white Americans to clasp
hands in the name of national reconciliation at the expense of black Southerners. This chapter
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builds on this argument by focusing on the Southern relief apparatus. It demonstrates that the
cultural themes described in the previous two chapters supported the racial disparity in aid.
Finally, Chapter Four, titled “Memory in Memphis,” investigates the fashioning of the
collective memory of the epidemic to discuss issues of identity and belonging that have continued
to the present. Of course, the stories we tell ourselves about the past help to shape our present
identity and those stories are always fashioned to serve the needs of those who tell them at the
moment they are told. For various reasons, Memphians have chosen the 1878 yellow fever
epidemic as an important narrative in the city’s history. While researching in the archives, I was
struck by the amount of commemorative material—folder upon folder of newspaper clippings,
photos of memorials, planned days of prayer and thanksgiving, and regular observation of
anniversaries—that showed repeated attempts to remind Memphians of the significance of the
yellow fever epidemic to the city’s history and identity. Chapter Four therefore discusses the ways
in which Memphians have used the memory of the epidemic and the consequent implications for
identity and belonging that persist to this day. Chapter Four is inspired by Lynette Boney Wrenn’s
description in Crisis and Commission Government in Memphis of the inauguration of the Taxing
District of Shelby County as a political coup by Memphis businessmen following the 1878
epidemic. It uses the methods of memory scholars, such as W. Fitzhugh Brundage, to illuminate
further ways in which Memphians have used the history of the epidemic to manipulate the city’s
politics, economics, and society.17
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CHAPTER ONE:
THE EPIDEMIC EXPERIENCE

On September 1, 1878, Reverend Charles C. Parsons wrote a letter to his dear friend and
spiritual adviser, Tennessee Bishop Charles Quintard, describing the state of affairs as yellow fever
raged in Memphis. “My dear Bishop, the situation is indescribable,” he lamented. “Why, it is a
perfect waste of death, and destitution, and desolation all around us here.” Amidst constant calls
to minister at the bedsides of the dying, the Reverend explained how impossible it was to properly
perform his vocation: “Our pastoral duties extend from one end of the city to the other, and
include all classes of people. It is incessant....Sometimes they pass away, or into a final state of
unconsciousness, before we can reach them....A large number of those to whom we minister are
utter strangers to us until we reach their bedside.” Parsons further complained, “People constantly
send to us, saying ‘Telegraph the situation.’ It is impossible.” No one, he argued, could understand
the depth of the disaster unless they witnessed the carnage firsthand. “Go and turn the Destroying
Angel loose upon a defenseless city,” he wrote. “Let him smite whom he will, young and old, rich
and poor, the feeble and the strong...silent, unseen, and unfelt, until his deadly blow is struck; give
him for his dreadful harvest all the days and nights from the burning midsummer sun until the
latest heavy frosts, and then you can form some idea of what Memphis and all this Valley is....”18
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In closing, Parsons assured the Bishop, “I am well, and strong, and hopeful, and I devoutly
thank God that I can say that in every letter.” Within a week of writing, however, Reverend
Charles C. Parsons was dead. Parsons’s letter, and his fate, were tragically typical. The 1878 yellow
fever epidemic in the Mississippi Valley inspired thousands of similar first-hand accounts of the
disaster and desperate attempts to explain to the outside world what had transpired. With over
5,000 deaths, and nearly all remaining Memphians contracting the fever, the suffering of Memphis
conveyed in these accounts captured both national and international attention.19
Through an analysis of these first-hand accounts of the epidemic in Memphis, this chapter
argues that authors of yellow fever narratives used the occasion of the epidemic to encourage the
restoration of traditional aspects of Southern identity and belonging after Reconstruction. More
specifically, the chapter examines two central conceptual threads that ran through yellow fever
narratives. The first half of the chapter examines how these narratives portrayed the breakdown of
society during the epidemic. It does so, more precisely, through a close reading of three main
themes: fear, disease, and death. The second half of the chapter then turns to themes of race, class,
gender, and nativity to argue that these same authors sought a return to traditional social norms
that reinforced a white-supremacist, patriarchal Southern identity. In doing so, these authors used
the epidemic as a metaphor for the destruction of antebellum Southern society and championed
Redemption.20
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While the narratives analyzed in this chapter all describe the experience of the epidemic in Memphis, many of their
authors came from other Southern communities. Because these narratives were written by a broader group of
Southerners, because so many across the Mississippi Valley had similar experiences with yellow fever in 1878, and
because of the popularity of these narratives across the nation, Memphis’s yellow fever narratives can be understood as
taking part in a broader conversation about the rebuilding of Southern communities. That being said, it is unclear
how representative the values expressed in these narratives were across the South or the nation. More research is
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In analyzing yellow fever narratives as experiential accounts that also speak to larger issues
of identity, this chapter draws on Cynthia Ragland’s examination of yellow fever narratives from
the 1790s. For Ragland, the similarity between the yellow fever narratives of the 1790s and the
Indian captivity narratives of the colonial period indicate a moment of “early national identity
crises.” Her analysis of these sources as “urban captivity narratives” unearths themes of the city
under siege, of the search for meaning during the ordeal—which tends to focus on sin and
depravity—that reinforce the values and beliefs thought to be destroyed by these epidemics, as well
as the prerequisite of public redemption to ensure that life will go on as before.21
This chapter offers a similar close reading of the yellow fever narratives of the 1878
epidemic. While accepting Ragland’s designation of yellow fever accounts as “urban captivity
narratives,” it analyzes these narratives for symptoms of a novel national identity crisis: that of postReconstruction Southern identity. Just as citizens of the 1790s expressed anxieties about the future
of the nation and national identity in their yellow fever narratives, so too did white Memphians in
1878 express anxiety about the future of the region and of the identity and culture of the South
following Reconstruction. Ragland’s yellow fever narratives described the destruction of everyday
life and society requiring the public redemption of sin to save the new republic from certain
annihilation. Similarly, the 1878 yellow fever narratives described a world turned upside down on
par with Democrats’ critiques of Radical Reconstruction. They further promoted a return to a

needed to determine how representative of Southern values these themes were and to what extent these narratives
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more traditional social hierarchy based on patriarchal white supremacy in order to culturally
redeem the South now that the political project of Redemption was complete.22
A broad range of caretakers wrote the majority of the personal accounts of the Memphis
epidemic. Most were published by professional medical doctors, though many personal letters sent
by volunteer nurses have survived. Doctors, nurses, and domestic missionaries—priests, pastors,
and nuns who sought to provide both medical and religious support—came from all over the
country, but particularly the Southern states, to aid those stricken with illness. In addition to these
medical narratives, newspapers provided daily reports of the mounting death toll and of the
deteriorating conditions in the city. Official histories of the epidemic, published in 1879, offered
further information on what life was like for those who experienced the epidemic in Memphis.
These narratives, written almost exclusively by white, middle-class Southerners, reveal an explicit
attempt to reinforce an imagined Southern identity along traditional axes that privileged
antebellum hierarchies of race, class, gender, nativity, and religion.
The people who experienced the 1878 epidemic of yellow fever recognized the
extraordinariness of their circumstances. The breakdown of the city—socially, economically, and
politically—meant that the traditions and mores that governed the daily lives of Memphians could
no longer be counted upon to regulate behavior. Residents watched as government officials and
religious leaders abandoned them in their time of greatest need. Bonds of affection between family
members and neighbors were forgotten in the pursuit of individual safety and survival. Death was
ever-present. Focusing on individuals’ recollections of sensory experience—what Memphians saw,
heard, smelled, and felt—these authors therefore narrated the descent of the city into chaos and
death as a way to explain and understand the breakdown of society. Besides being rich with
22
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sensory description, the narratives are extremely poignant, revealing the emotional as well as
physical suffering that Memphians experienced.
Authors of yellow fever narratives then used their accounts of the epidemic to discuss how
their society should be rebuilt after the collapse. They did so by casting certain characters as heroes
or villains. The heroes of yellow fever narratives invariably represented an idealized vision of
Southern manhood or womanhood. Villains represented the elements of Southern identity that
should be purged from the social body in order for Southern society to be reconstituted along
traditional antebellum social hierarchies.
Authors of yellow fever narratives may or may not have consciously intended their
reflections to contribute to this broader rhetorical reconstruction of Southern identity. While
many authors specifically offered advice on what should change in their society, others simply
sought to make sense of their experiences and to justify their actions during the epidemic. Yet all
of these narratives offered descriptions of the breakdown of everyday life and characterized
particular groups or traits as helpful or hurtful to the survival of the region.
These narratives make more sense, then, if positioned within a larger saga of civil war,
Reconstruction, and Redemption. The descriptions of the epidemic itself—told in themes of fear,
disease, and death—were readily familiar to a region of people that had just come through the
destruction and displacement of war. Descriptions of the influx of foreign healers and the dangers
of an unruly mob of black citizens, likewise, closely mirrored Southern Democrats’ descriptions of
Reconstruction. This is particularly true for the narratives that portrayed nurses as individuals
seeking to gain at the expense of the suffering South—putting these figures on par with the
infamous image of the Northern carpetbagger. In order to safeguard the political project of
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Redemption, a cultural redemption of the South was necessary wherein Southerners took back the
right to recreate their society, culture, and identity as they saw fit. Authors of yellow fever
narratives took part in this negotiation over what Southern society should look like after the
epidemic was over and most sought to reinforce an imagined identity harkening back to an
idealized antebellum past.23
These yellow fever narratives, most of which were intended for publication, also offered the
entire nation a way to experience the tragedy of the 1878 yellow fever epidemic and take part in
the rhetorical reconstruction of Southern identity. Yellow fever narratives, capturing the daily
horrors experienced by those who remained in Memphis, were purposely emotive—evoking feelings
of sadness, pain, fear, revulsion, pity, contempt, compassion, and tenderness. Their authors sought
to transfer their own emotions to their readers. Their sensory descriptions transported the reader
to the sick-room or to the deserted streets of Memphis. They were explicitly voyeuristic, allowing
their readers to experience the epidemic, albeit second-hand. The popularity of these narratives
during and after the epidemic further allowed their authors to export their particular visions of
Southern society and identity throughout the nation.
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Fear and Flight
Yellow fever narratives generally began with a discussion of the fear the disease generated
across the South. Once yellow fever appeared to spread beyond a given port of entry—usually New
Orleans—anxious communities along river and rail routes watched with a growing sense of
foreboding as the disease inched toward their homes. At the first sign of a suspicious case of fever,
residents fled in panic, prostrating the local government and economy. For this reason, yellow
fever was particularly damaging to the social fabric of communities—even when the disease was
relatively mild. In 1878, however, the disease was especially virulent, eliciting far more fear and
alarm than usual. Yellow fever narratives described the chaotic rush of residents fleeing their
communities and the attendant consequences of the breakdown of government and civil
institutions, communal solidarity, and bonds of familial love. Evacuees faced further hardship as
they were shunned by those who feared they would spread the disease via their clothing or luggage.
Memphis refugees who gathered in camps outside the city were likewise subjected to harsh
conditions. Those displaced from their homes and lives by yellow fever may have escaped the
horrors of the plague-ridden city, but they watched helplessly from afar as the foundations of
everyday life were destroyed.

Yellow fever was the most feared disease in the nineteenth-century American South. The
mystery of its etiology and the gruesomeness of its symptoms made an indelible impression on
those who witnessed the disease’s ravages. While endemic diseases such as malaria, hookworm, or
tuberculosis, killed far more Southerners each year, news of a yellow fever outbreak inevitably
resulted in terror and flight. Recognizing that a mass exodus often followed a confirmed case of
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the disease, physicians, public health officials, and newspaper owners regularly colluded to conceal
suspicious cases until absolutely positive that an epidemic was underway. They knew that the fear
of yellow fever regularly incited panic and prostration of business.24
In the 1870s, the medical community—from country doctor to university professor—
believed that yellow fever was infectious. And while individual, sporadic cases were not
uncommon, an epidemic required a tainted atmosphere of large enough proportion that a
significant number of people sickened. While nineteenth-century physicians did not consider
yellow fever to be a contagious disease—spreading directly from person to person—they believed
that whatever poison caused yellow fever could be carried in the clothing or baggage of people who
had come into contact with the sick. Further, yellow fever’s advance along transportation routes
was undeniable and citizens feared anyone or anything that had journeyed through the tainted
atmosphere of infected regions.25
In fact, some physicians considered the fear associated with yellow fever medically
significant, guaranteed to worsen epidemics. Dr. J. P. Dromgoole, one of the first to publish an
official history of the epidemic, explained that “Psychical depression (what is popularly
denominated the “yellow-fever scare”) is an important factor not only in the spread of the disease
but in the percentage of mortality. Any sudden change in the habits or mode of life is inadvisable.”
He blamed the breadth of the disaster in 1878 on the extent of the anxiety caused by yellow fever
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and on the urge to flee that this fear produced. Medical authorities like Dromgoole thus attempted
to mitigate the damage done by flight, for beyond the medical disaster of lives lost, yellow fever was
associated with the social, political, and economic desolation left in its wake. Yellow fever
narratives thus generally began with a description of the breakdown of society due to fear and
flight.26
When the first official case of yellow fever was reported to the Memphis Board of Health in
1878, a city-wide panic immediately followed, triggering a massive evacuation of the city. Roads
and railway lines were choked with Memphians attempting to flee to safety. An Episcopal nun
remembered, “Thousands left on the trains,...escaped in carriages, wagons, carts, and even on
foot....On any road leading out from Memphis, could be seen a procession of wagons, piled high
with beds, trunks, and small furniture, carrying also, the women and children. Beside these walked
groups of men, some riotous with the wild excitement, others moody and silent from anxiety and
dread.”27
The train stations became madhouses as people were refused admission onto trains already
loaded beyond capacity. A refugee who finally made it out of Memphis wrote back from Louisville,
“We were unable to get standing room on the trains on Wednesday and Thursday, but we left on
Friday, at midnight....We were nearly crushed in obtaining our places. At last the over-crowded
train moved off amid the loud and heart-rending cries of those left behind. I was told that a child
26
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and an old person were trampled to death near us on the platform.” With every available train
filled to capacity, the railroad companies supplied additional cars and, eventually, more trains. But
they were incapable of meeting demand. Despite aisles and platforms filled with standing
passengers, men attempted to climb into open windows, brandishing weapons to silence any who
tried to hold them back.28
John Keating, owner and primary editor of the Memphis Daily Appeal newspaper,
complained that “The ordinary courtesies of life were ignored; politeness gave way to selfishness,
and the desire for personal safety broke through all the social amenities. If there was no positive
indecency exhibited, there was a pushing, noisy, self-asserting, and frenzied rudeness, that was not
abashed even in the presence of refined, delicate, and sensitive women.” Keating complained
bitterly of the breakdown of etiquette and hospitality that the fear of the disease engendered.
“There was only one thought uppermost,” he disparaged, “and that was increased to an
inexpressible terror.”29
According to Keating, “The cars of the trains for several days went out literally packed to
suffocation with people.” A Catholic priest, D. A. Quinn, claimed that “In the short space of three
days not less than thirty thousand people fled the city, going North, East West—wherever they had
friends—anywhere from the ravages and reach of the Scourge.” Any who had the means to do so
thus fled within a week of the first official death in Memphis for they knew that once citizens of
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nearby towns and cities learned of the cases in Memphis, quarantines would impede their ability to
travel. No one wanted to be trapped near the city in case the fever became epidemic.30
Thousands of refugees descended upon neighboring towns, overwhelming hurriedly
enacted quarantines against passengers and freight traveling from Memphis. Some fearful residents
consequently took matters into their own hands, creating unofficial quarantines and barricades
enforced by armed men. Residents destroyed roads and railroad tracks and burned bridges. These
so-called “shotgun quarantines” were often all that protected fearful citizens from refugees who
might spread the disease. The unofficial quarantines and extra-governmental actions on the part of
fearful citizens failed, in most cases, to stop the disease’s spread. As the epidemic worsened, they
further hampered the delivery of medical assistance and relief.31
A minority of evacuees were desperate enough to attempt escape by steamboat. However,
most were aware of the folly in this. As cities and towns along the Mississippi quarantined river
traffic, riverboat passengers could be trapped, unable to debark, especially if any showed signs of
illness. The John D. Porter, for example, traveled up the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers for two
months, denied a landing place because she was rumored to have yellow fever aboard. Twentythree passengers died before the ship was finally allowed to come into port. Keating claimed that
30
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“For the sake of humanity, men became inhuman. For the sake of saving those out of the fever’s
reach..., they denied a refuge to those who were fleeing from it.” Neither Christian charity nor a
sense of community among Southerners could override the intense fear associated with those who
might have come into contact with whatever poison caused yellow fever’s spread.32
In many cases, those trapped on trains faired little better. Packed into hot, crowded cars
with no food or water, trains sometimes traveled hundreds of miles before being allowed to stop
for provisions. T. L. Turner, a 15-year-old boy in 1878, later recalled a train of Memphis evacuees
that was stopped four miles outside of his hometown of Milan, Tennessee. Having received a
message pleading to be allowed to enter the town for food and water, men with shotguns rode out
to meet the train before it could approach. He described the Memphis refugees, hanging out the
windows of the train cars, “blackened tongues protruding from their cracked lips, and plead[ing]
for water; but fear was greater than pity.” The townspeople loaded tables with food and water
down by the river and watched from a hillside roughly a mile away as the refugees were finally
allowed to debark. Turner recalled that men, women, and children ran to the tables and into the
river, desperate for water. The passengers were then quickly forced back onto the train at
gunpoint. As Keating described, refugees in other places were likewise given few safe havens, for
fear and self-preservation overruled any sense of compassionate humanity. “To the cities of the far
north and the far west they fled,” he wrote. “Many of them to die on the way, like dogs, neglected
and shunned, as if cursed of God; or, to reach the wished-for goal, only to die, a plague to all
about....”33
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The thousands of Memphians who remained in the city for the duration of the epidemic
were not only surrounded on all sides by disease and death, but also experienced the unraveling of
city services. As a consequence of this mass exodus from Southern cities, local governments,
religious institutions, and businesses closed their doors. Evacuees who fled Memphis when yellow
fever first made its presence known included many important political and economic elites.
Enough of the city councilmen and aldermen fled with their families during those first days that
the Memphis general council was unable to meet the quorum required to assemble, effectively
terminating any chance that this legislative body might take steps to mitigate the medical disaster.
The Board of Health attempted to enact public health and sanitation measures intended to
confine the fever to the first infected district, but they lacked the financial resources or the political
power to meet the level of the crisis. Police and firemen fled. Newspapers roundly denounced
Protestant ministers for deserting their congregations. And in general, yellow fever narratives
claimed that the city was abandoned by the majority of upper- and middle-class residents, leaving
mostly the poor and working-class who did not have the means to escape.34
In this context of the dissolution of the municipal government, the few remaining public
officials and concerned citizens scrambled to organize the city’s response to the epidemic.
Coordinating medical care for the sick was the responsibility of the Howard Association, a
benevolent society that existed in most Southern cities and which labored only during yellow fever
epidemics. All other government functions and the coordination of non-medical relief fell to a
hastily-formed Citizens’ Relief Committee (CRC), made up of Memphis businessmen. Over the
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next several weeks, their duties included organizing refugee camps, keeping the peace, and
distributing relief donations.35
With the vast majority of the population evacuating and those who remained either sick or
engaged in relief work, private business and commercial activity that was not centered around the
epidemic dwindled. Keating recalled that “Business was almost as suddenly stopped as the fever
began. Stores and offices were hastily closed.” Those that remained open offered few services as
their employees sickened one by one. A volunteer nurse from Texas, Kezia DePelchin, wryly noted
that “money—the open sesame to almost every lock” ultimately proved useless in Memphis. The
city’s economy ordinarily centered around cotton, yet the fields remained white as snow as the
crop went without harvest. No one ventured into the city to bring farm products, even food.36
As travel routes clogged with evacuees and potential destinations prohibited Memphians
from entering, refugees who could not get far from the city camped in the nearby woods. The
CRC, in concurrence with the Mayor and the Board of Health, set up several refugee camps for
those who displayed no symptoms: Camp Joe Williams, Camp Smith, Camp Griffin, Camp Wade,
Camp Wright, Camp Duffy, and Camp Morris Henderson. Camp Father Mathew, set up
specifically for Irish Catholics, was run independently of the other camps, which were all supposed
to be under the supervision of the CRC. The federal government supplied these camps with tents
and rations in an attempt to depopulate the city and hopefully contain the epidemic. While
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Keating had earlier criticized Memphians for their disorderly escape, as a member of the CRC, he
began printing notices urging the rest of the population to decamp to the suburbs.37
But many medical authorities considered camps to be extremely dangerous, for yellow fever
was considered a distinctly urban disease, requiring an assemblage of unacclimated persons for its
propagation. Dr. Bennet Dowler of New Orleans explained that yellow fever “is known to be
connected...with aggregations of people in towns and villages, and it rarely attacks rural
populations unless they crowd together so as to become virtually towns.” These camps, at one
point housing up to 5,000 residents, certainly qualified as potential yellow fever breeding grounds.
Suburban residents, fearful that evacuating people from the infected city into nearby camps would
spread the fever to their neighborhoods, gathered in mobs to prevent the formation of Camp Joe
Williams and an orphanage set up for children of yellow fever victims. In the case of the camps, a
company of local militia was called in to force the angry residents to back down. The CRC, acting
as the only legitimate local government, was forced to compel the local residents to accept these
yellow fever refugees. They then stationed the militia permanently in the camp to take charge of its
operation for the duration of the epidemic.38
Camp Joe Williams eventually housed a large contingent of residents from the “infected
district” of Memphis’s Poplar, Washington, and Adams Streets. The evacuation was directed by
armed police and supervised by the Citizens’ Relief Committee. Upon arrival, any clothing and
bedding residents had brought with them was gathered together and burned, by order of the
surgeon in charge, in the belief that textiles were a principle mechanism in spreading the disease
37
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from one locale to another. Among so many people, it was inevitable that some had contracted the
disease before being evacuated and there were several cases that were treated in the camp’s
hospital. But, on the whole, the camps’ inhabitants were lucky. Yellow fever did not spread among
the population, while many of those who ventured back into the city sickened soon after.39
Camp life, however, was not easy. The camps were run like military installations with
morning reveille at 5 A.M. and evening taps at 10 P.M. Refugees were expected to work to earn
their room and board. Camp commanders separated them into gangs assigned cleaning and work
details: digging ditches, pitching tents, and clearing and disinfecting potentially infected spaces and
refuse pits. Because the majority of refugees in Camp Joe Williams were from Memphis’s workingclass neighborhoods along the wharf, the camp’s surgeon-in-charge considered them well-suited to
manual labor and he believed they “readily accommodated themselves to camp life.” Given that
“All infractions of the rules were punished, and no excuses allowed in mitigation of offenses,” this
ready accommodation may have been promoted more by fear than anything else. Camp Joe
Williams’s Order No. 1 clearly stipulated that “every soul within its jurisdiction must cheerfully
comply” with its rules and regulations, “or be driven from its limits.”40
At the risk of expulsion—a death-sentence given the situation in the city—and the fact that
rations were only given to individuals registered as “bona fide residents of the camps,” most refugees
adapted themselves to life in the camp system. The correspondent from the Memphis Daily Appeal
portrayed the camp residents as “well satisfied with camp life and rations,” and appearing “to enjoy
camp life to the utmost,” though, as this description was intended to encourage remaining
residents in the city to evacuate if they were well, it may not have been a reliable portrayal of camp
39
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life. At least one letter, attributed to a militiaman stationed at Camp Joe Williams, complained of
the conditions, describing lots of rainy nights, leaky tents, and unnecessary busy work. This letter
also hinted at mistreatment of camp residents and mismanagement of government rations by the
camps’ leaders. Notwithstanding the primitive conditions of some of these camps, the widespread
chaos outside of their limits ensured that few people volunteered to leave.41
Despite the fact that the Citizens’ Relief Committee in Memphis believed the evacuation
and camp system to have been a resounding success, the breakdown that yellow fever engendered
meant that evacuees, both those in camps and those who took refuge in northern states, also
suffered during the epidemic. While refugees may have escaped yellow fever and the hellscape that
the city became, they were forced to abandon their homes, their property, and often, family and
friends. During this forced isolation from their daily lives, businesses failed in their absence,
homes were looted, and property destroyed. While thousands of their acquaintances perished,
these refugees survived. But it would be unfair to say that they were not also victims. The fear of
yellow fever left them pariahs to the outside world. Even as many who fled to Northern cities
worked to raise money to contribute to the relief efforts aiding those back home, they knew they
may be judged harshly for their flight. As the epidemic raged in the city, they waited, praying for
frost in the hopes of returning to the city to pick up the pieces of their lives, fearing there might be
little left to return home to.42
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In the narratives they wrote about yellow fever, Memphians thus described the experiences
of evacuations, shot-gun quarantines, and refugee camps. In so doing, they illustrated that fear
contributed to the breakdown of society long before yellow fever took hold. Just the rumor of a
yellow fever case was enough to send frightened residents packing. As thousands fled, the local
government and economy collapsed. Basic human decency and care for others crumbled in the
face of desperate self-preservation. Narratives of the epidemic describe this descent into chaos at
the first sign of disease. Fear was an experience that all Southerners shared, even those who
escaped the disease or who watched its spread from afar. And as yellow fever spread, so too did its
destructive effects upon the institutions of the South. Regional and national networks of trade,
transportation, and information were fragmented in its wake alongside the ties of affection
between friends and family members. Nineteenth-century Southerners recognized that the most
problematic aspect of yellow fever was the fear that drove thousands to leave their homes—and
sometimes loved ones—behind in an effort to save themselves from the coming storm. Authors of
yellow fever narratives therefore began with this theme in order to describe the descent of
Southern society into chaos.

Suffering and Sickness
If themes of fear and flight narrated the breakdown of civil institutions and the intricate
customs of civility that ordered Southern society, the descriptions of the sick and the symptoms of
yellow fever narrated the descent of Memphis into an apocalyptic landscape. Yellow fever attacked
the bodies and minds of its victims and assaulted the senses and emotions of healers. While fears
of the disease were exacerbated by not knowing what caused its spread, the dreadful symptoms of
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yellow fever created outright horror in those unfortunate enough to witness or experience its toll
upon the body. The body suffers dreadfully during a case of yellow fever and witnesses to the
disease were forever haunted by the sights, sounds, and smells of the sickroom. Authors of yellow
fever narratives therefore described the disease’s effects on the body in detail, in part, as a way to
deal with and make sense of the experience of the epidemic but also to impress upon readers the
agony of that experience. If the fear and flight occasioned by rumors of yellow fever devastated the
foundations of Southern society, narratives of disease portrayed an attack on humanity itself.

Yellow fever’s fierce reputation lay in the ghastly, and very visible, symptoms that wracked
the sufferer. The disease began with a severe headache with sensitivity to light. This was followed
by acute prostration, muscle aches, back pain, and joint pain. As the patient’s temperature rose,
they began to shiver. A loss of appetite accompanied nausea or vomiting. Those lucky enough to
contract a mild case would begin to feel better after a few days. For the unlucky, this period of
recovery proved illusory as fever returned, quickly spiking to as high as 106 degrees Fahrenheit.
This second, more severe phase of the disease brought about its most horrific symptoms. As the
kidneys shut down, slowly poisoning the body, patients became delirious. Jaundice tinged the
patient’s skin and eyes yellow, giving the disease its name. The body bled from every orifice: the
nose, mouth, ears, eyes, any abraded surface of the skin, vagina, or rectum. As the stomach filled
with blood, the patient began to vomit the dreaded vomito negro or black vomit—a mixture of
partially digested, putrid blood, pieces of the stomach lining, and bile. Medical attendants
recognized the black vomit as the quintessential symptom of the disease. Seeing it, healers felt
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assured that yellow fever was in their midst. They also generally believed it to be the harbinger of
death.43
Kezia DePelchin, a volunteer nurse in Memphis, wrote numerous letters throughout the
epidemic narrating her travel to and experiences in the disease-stricken city. Her letters remain
some of the most poignant and forthright descriptions of what life was like for nurses in Memphis
and of the personal experience of the sickroom. Recalling the intense heat of a patient’s skin as she
raged with fever, DePelchin wrote, “her temperature was 105 ½....sometimes she would throw her
arms around me and thank me for waiting on her, arms that were like burning iron. Her breath on
my face was like the blast of a furnace.”44
The combination of intense fever and reduced kidney function caused patients to slip into
hallucinations and delirium. Because of this, patients frequently acted as if they were being
physically attacked by an invisible assailant. Texas physician Greensville Dowell described the
typical yellow fever patient: “very nervous, tremulous, easily excited, startles at any noise. This is
especially so in children....” Dowell claimed that a patient with yellow fever becomes “very restless,
sighs, halloos, screams, attempts to get up, falls about, half conscious, and can’t tell why he can not
lie still, nor can he give a reason why he cries out.” Because of this, yellow fever patients were
notoriously difficult to handle. DePelchin concurred. “It is one of the peculiarities of yellow fever
that the dying will try to get up,” she wrote. “Sometimes they will fight, anything to get away, and
43
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are very cunning in trying to get up when no is looking at them.” This was one reason male
patients were expected to be provided with male nurses who might have the strength to hold them
in bed by force if necessary.45
This delirium was not only trying for the nurses and doctors who were attempting to care
for their patients, it was also frightening. Beloved friends and family members suddenly became
cruel, attacking their caretakers verbally and physically. Or they grew terrified, convinced they were
being tormented by unseen devils. DePelchin described many instances of such erratic and wild
behavior, particularly in young patients, and of the difficulties in attending to more than one or
two patients at a time. For several days, DePelchin was stationed at an orphanage where she was
expected to care for a room full of sick children. Describing the delirium of some of the children,
she proclaimed, “such a pandemonium! I could have stood the noise, but I knew this would
perhaps cost some of them their lives....The fever crazes the children. I am so sorry for them.”46
Authorities on yellow fever insisted that absolute quiet and rest were required for recovery.
But DePelchin feared she could not possibly keep so many children calm by herself. She wrote that
“a boy [of] eleven years was wild. He would jump out of bed the moment I left him to wait on the
rest. If I turned round to administer medicine to the others, he was after me. I caught him round
the waist and carried him back to bed at least ten times before midnight.” Of another, she
proclaimed, “Lena, the dying child, sprang up two or three times and actually attacked the child in
the next cot. While I was giving medicine to one, she was nearly out the window. She looked
awful, her mouth was black, her limbs purple and trembling, she was muttering all the time.”
Attempting to calm the poor child, she recalled that she had heard the girl was German and that
45
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her parents had died of the fever two weeks prior. “I put my arms round her and…spoke to her in
German. She then laid her head in my lap. She lasted a few hours, then her sufferings were
over.”47
Because yellow fever is a hemorrhagic fever it causes massive internal bleeding. Authors of
yellow fever narratives recounted seeing patients bleed from every orifice of the body, a sight
burned into the memories of survivors. “The blood oozed from the mouth, eyes, nose, ears, etc….”
remembered Keating. “The eyes are red and glistening.” Dr. Dowell explained that “In spots over
the body blood will ooze out, [the] nose will bleed, blistered and cupped surfaces will bleed, and
show no disposition to heal.”48
The name yellow fever came from the jaundice that turned the patient’s skin and eyes the
color of saffron. Dowell explained that “In four or five days…patient’s eyes will become tinged with
yellow, and finally the whole skin will become yellow, like the yellowness of slight bruise or
contusion.” The name yellow fever was thus descriptive, as were other popular appellations: yellow
jack, bronze john, the saffron scourge. DePelchin wrote that one of her patients “began to turn a
bronze color, as if he was bronzed with a brush.” Of another patient, she wrote: “Sweet Jennie…her
lovely features were distorted, her fair skin was changed to a brazen hue. I laid her down, and in
that strange look this disease gives its victims, no one would have recognized the lovely girl....”49
Yellow fever thus attacked the bodies and minds of its victims to the point that loved ones and
friends no longer seemed themselves. They did not seem to recognize their caretakers or their
surroundings. There were reports of the sick—yellow skin and eyes bleeding—running through the
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streets screaming, flailing about naked, attacking their caretakers. To the authors of yellow fever
narratives, these stories portrayed yellow fever victims as possessed and terrifying.50
But no symptom incited more fascination, fear, or revulsion than the black vomit, which
gushed uncontrollably from the mouths of patients who experienced gastric hemorrhage. In the
more advanced stages of the disease, patients violently vomited partially digested blood mixed with
the acidic secretions of the stomach, said to resemble coffee grounds. Dowell described the first
signs of black vomit as “specks of blood and mucous, which will become blacker, and finally a
blackish brown-red, of the consistency of chocolate or coffee.” He wrote, “This is the pure vometo
pristo, or black vomit, which is the only positive sign of the disease, and I believe it is unlike any
thing seen in any other pathological condition.” Black vomit was thus a principle symptom in
distinguishing yellow fever from the many other fevers prevalent in the South and was a tell-tale
sign that warranted a call to quarantine.51
Those writing about their experiences with yellow fever exhausted many pages describing
this horrific symptom, as if fewer words failed to capture the horror that left such a powerful
impression upon caretakers and witnesses. “I have not seen any thing like it in my professional
life,” admitted Dowell. “This effusion may be in small quantities, leaving specks on the
handkerchief or on the bed, or it may come up involuntarily,...or there will be pint after pint for
hours….” Recounting the final day of one of her patients, Kezia DePelchin described the horrible
sight: “The bed was as if several bottles of ink had been thrown around. I threw my arms around
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her….I cannot describe how dreadfully I felt. I had so prayed for Jennie’s life. Was it aught that I
had done that God would not hear me?”52
While DePelchin feared that her own actions had somehow sentenced the girl to death,
healers’ descriptions of black vomit generally helped ensure to their readers that the disease in
question was yellow fever and justified their actions taken toward prevention and treatment.
Describing the dreaded black vomit impressed upon readers that little could be done at that point
to save the lives of their patients. In fact, many healers believed that once the patient presented
with black vomit, they should be given up for dead so that attention could be paid to less critical
patients. DePelchin related a quarrel between herself and one such healer, a nun in charge of the
orphan asylum. DePelchin depicted the ghastly symptom, both to explain the woman’s
anticipation of a child’s imminent death and to cast her behavior toward the child as deplorable
conduct for a Christian: “I went to the room, the dead child was just outside on the porch; the
living one was inside alone. Her hair was black, but not blacker than her mouth which was covered
with flies, attracted by the blood that gurgled up to her lips – and not blacker than the heart that
left her there to die.” Confronting the woman for her neglect of the young girl, whose sister’s
recently deceased body remained just outside her window, DePelchin berated her: “I come from
Texas, where you all look on us as a wild and reckless set. But I have yet to see such cruelty. A
frontier Indian would blush through his war-paint at such a deed.” Comparing the woman’s
behavior to an Indian, a symbol of wild savagery and paganism for most Americans, DePelchin
apparently got her point across; the nun reportedly “turned very pale and promised it should not
happen again.” Black vomit did not guarantee that a patient would die, but even if this girl was
unlikely to ever recover, DePelchin believed that it was the duty of a yellow fever nurse to give care
52

Ibid., DePelchin, Letter to Payne, October 6, 1878.

39

and comfort to the sick until death. To see any patient, let alone a young child, left for dead all
alone was not only guaranteeing the patient’s destruction, but was, in her mind, positively sinful.53
But the limitations of medical science were so widely known that healers understood they
were fighting a losing battle. Indeed, the Memphis infirmary would not accept any patients who
had been sick for longer than 24 hours, recognizing that their chances of bringing the patient
safely through the disease were drastically reduced after that. Any patients found sick after 24
hours were taken directly to the hospital where their level of care was much reduced. DePelchin
remembered that another nurse told her, “at the hospitals, they put [the patients] out in the cold
wind when there is no longer any hope; then they die quickly.” DePelchin wrote, “I shuddered as I
thought of it; they died fast enough.” Yet many healers came to believe that a quick death was
preferable to the horrendous suffering endured by yellow fever patients and witnessed by their
attendants.54
“O what is this hidden fatal chemistry,” Kezia DePelchin lamented, “that works inwardly,
turning everything to death, that silently gnaws the vitals and writes the Death warrant, not in red
like the laws of Draco, but with just as sure destruction. Its warrant is written in black, black as
midnight; the pure ice water is turned to ink color in a few minutes.” In a later letter, published by
the Houston Telegram, she proclaimed, “I have thought since I have been [in Memphis, that] the
ancients must have seen the yellow fever, and from the black vomit taken the idea of the river of
Death, being the black river Styx. There has been enough in Memphis to float the boat of
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Charon.” Yellow fever narratives thus described the plague-ridden city as an apocalyptic landscape
of disease and death from which there was no escape.55
Death was slow and agonizing for yellow fever victims, heartbreaking for caretakers who
could only watch helplessly. DePelchin described the moments before the death of one of her
favorite patients: “Jennie was now insensible, and we knew that the Doctor had given the mother
up the night before, though he still tried every remedy possible. By morning, both began that hard
breathing and screaming, the sure forerunner of Death....The Creole nurse said, ‘they pant like
two race horses;’ a race for life indeed it was, who should reach the end of their mortal career and
enter the pearly gates first.” DePelchin was very religious and she regularly spoke of her devotion
and faith as a necessary prerequisite to enduring such tragic scenes. Yet even she questioned what
Memphis might have done to invite divine judgment. “If this is a scourge,” she wrote, “truly ‘the
wrath of the Lord is a terrible thing.’”56
Beyond these horrific sights and sounds of the sickroom, several commentators remarked
on the unusually bad odor associated with the bodies of yellow fever victims, both before and after
death. Dr. J. B. Marvin of Louisville described it as “a most peculiar odor, difficult to describe, but
once recognized never forgotten, a dysenteric rotted hay or slaking lime smell, not cadaveric....” Dr.
Marvin Huse, also from Louisville, agreed, describing it as a “peculiar rotten-hay odor” exhaled
from the skin of patients. Dr. Welsh of Texas claimed that “the atmosphere of the cities and towns
where the epidemic raged, was offensive in the extreme. This is an odor so peculiar as that, to be
appreciated, it must be experienced. It is not confined to houses, but often pervades the
atmosphere of certain districts of the infected locality.” Healers complained that the scent lingered
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in their clothes despite their best attempts to eradicate it and even those not privy to the human
destruction in the city claimed they could smell it from miles away.57
Another disturbing smell that would be forever associated with the epidemic environment
was that of disinfectants. Sanitarians, believing the disease to be propagated by filth and the putrid
effluvia of decay, doused streets and buildings in a number of chemical caustics. The Memphis Daily
Avalanche described the process. “The sidewalk was black with carbolic acid,” the paper reported,
“and from streets and walls arose the smell of tar and lime almost stifling.” The smell further
added to the sense that Memphis had become an unrecognizable, alien environment. Quinn wrote
that “To a stranger the aspect of Memphis during the epidemic was most appalling. The principal
thoroughfares as well as the lanes, alleys, and side-walks, were saturated with lime, carbolic acid,
and other ill-odored disinfectants. The streets were obscured with smoke of ignited tar and other
evaporant combustibles, with a view to scatter or dissipate the spores.”58
DePelchin complained that the overuse of disinfectants only made matters worse: “The
fever was very malignant here, and so much carbolic acid was used. I told them it was too strong,
that the Doctors in Houston had said that must be the reason so many children died; pans full of
the horrible stuff were set in the rooms until the poor little creatures buried their heads in the
pillow to get rid of it.” Quinn agreed, calling the smell of the various items people used to ward off
the disease “disgusting,” “nauseous,” and offensive. These odors only added to the sensory
onslaught that survivors endured during the weeks they were trapped in the city.59
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These horrific sights, sounds, and smells of the infected city set it apart as a sensory
experience. Stories such as these, detailing the suffering of victims before death and the frustration
of ineffectual healers narrated the descent of the city into the chaos of death and destruction. The
suffering of the patient, both physically and mentally, made the disease particularly horrific to
behold. Victims became uncontrollable; sometimes their personalities changed. Delirium,
bleeding, the black vomit, and the intense jaundice all turned the body into a gruesome sight,
inspiring revulsion in those who witnessed the transformation. The smell of the bodies and of the
disinfectants further fostered the sense that familiarity, and hope, had been destroyed. The city, a
sign of civilization, and the body, the essence of shared humanity, became polluted with fear,
sickness, and death. Medicines and disinfectants only added to this poisoning of both body and
environment. The suffering of victims of yellow fever, their caretakers, and those displaced from
their homes was, for many, reminiscent of the destruction and disease wrought by the Civil War. It
seemed the South was being overrun yet again, but this time by a foe that could not be fought.

Death and Desolation
Yellow fever narratives thus recounted the collapse of Memphis by fear, disease, and death.
While themes of fear and flight narrated the breakdown of institutions and communities,
descriptions of disease symptoms related the physical and emotional suffering of victims.
Narratives further described the horrific, apocalyptic landscape that the city became with so many
patients crazed with fever. But a further aspect that contributed to the ultimate breakdown of the
city was death and desolation. After the chaos of evacuation and the frenzied attempts to organize
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relief and medical care, the city suddenly became a ghost town. Themes of loneliness and
heartbreak relate not only the fear and horror of those who experienced the 1878 yellow fever
epidemic, but of the depression of survivors and the resignation with which they waited for death.
Those who escaped or survived the disease were nevertheless broken by weeks of epidemic. These
themes of collapse in Memphis were repeated throughout the Mississippi Valley as yellow fever
spread across the South.60

Of all the cities that battled yellow fever during the summer of 1878, Memphis suffered the
worst. Those who remained to witness the carnage were overwhelmed with the magnitude of the
epidemic. Within days of yellow fever’s arrival, hundreds of Memphians were ill, leaving citizens in
a state of panic while officials scrambled to organize medical relief. Of the 20,000 people who
remained in the city, over 17,000 contracted yellow fever during the three-month crest of the
epidemic. More than 5,000 of these perished.61
On September 21, a telegram from Memphis was read aloud in Booth’s Theater in New
York City. It surmised the damage thus far:
Deaths to date: 2,250; number sick now, about 3,000; average deaths, sixty per cent of
the sick. We are feeding some 10,000 persons, sick and destitute, in camps and in the city.
Our city is a hospital. Fifteen volunteer physicians have died; twenty others are sick.
A great many nurses have died—many that had the fever before, and thought themselves
proof. Fever abating some to-day, for want of material, perhaps, and things look a little
more hopeful. We are praying for frost—it is our only hope.
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But frost would not come until the end of October. By mid-September, the epidemic had reached
its climax with over 200 deaths per day. The never-ending death and destruction weighed heavily
on those who remained to witness it, particularly as the scope of the disaster spiraled out of
control.62
So many died that undertakers could not keep up with the constant demands for burial.
John Keating, editor of the Memphis Daily Appeal, recalled the smell of “unburied bodies that were
emitting the moist noisome stenches, death-breeding and death-dealing.” He explained, “More
than 60 unburied bodies were found by the burial corps, hastily organized by the Citizens’ Relief
Committee. Many of these were put away in the trenches where the paupers and the unknown
sleep peacefully together.” Dr. William J. Armstrong, a Memphis physician who had elected to stay
while sending away his wife and seven children, wrote a letter informing his wife of the death of a
neighbor. “I do not know what was done with his body; probably it went to the Potter’s Field,” he
told her. “Numbers of good men and women have been buried publicly; [many] that would
surprise you.” Just as the yellow fever proved “no respecter of persons”—in Keating’s words—
overwhelmed burial corps transported bodies en masse to whatever sites were available. An
unknown number of these bodies were stacked in trench graves. Even people who had previously
purchased burial plots in Memphis’s Elmwood Cemetery were buried without ceremony or marker
among the poor and destitute. Ignoring class and station, and in many cases, individual identity
and accomplishment, proved a disrespectful end to these lives that left a lasting wound upon the
psyche of Memphians.63
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Worse was the state of the bodies when discovered. “Some of these were found in a state
little better than a lot of bones in a puddle of green water,” wrote Keating who described some of
the most memorable scenes of the horror he witnessed.
Two bodies were found…in so advanced a stage of decomposition that they were rolled in
the carpets on which they had fallen in the agonies of dissolution and were lifted into
boxes, in which they were hurried to the potter’s field and buried. Half the putrid remains
of a negro woman were found in an outbuilding near the Appeal office; the other half eaten
by rats, that were found dead by hundreds near by. A young gentleman, well known as a
merchant, died in his room alone, after, it is supposed, a 48 hour’s illness, and was only
traced by the gases from his body, which was found so far advanced in putrefaction that it
was with difficulty any one could be found to bury it.
It was not merely the magnitude of death or the sheer horror of the way in which people died, but
also the inhumanity with which the dead were treated and associated that eroded all sense of hope
and led those engaged in the work of relief and survival into every darkening pits of despair.64
The loneliness described, particularly by healers who worked tirelessly in the homes of
their patients, often with little knowledge of what was happening outside of the sick room, left too
much time for personal reflection. Dr. Armstrong wrote to his wife, “You cannot conceive of the
desolation of our good city. I do not suppose that one fifth of the white population are left in the
corporation....For squares, you will see only a family, now and then. So many are gone that
lonesomeness itself is lonely, making a loom that cannot be conceived of, nor described upon
paper.” Kezia DePelchin, likewise, eloquently wrote that “Memphis in Egypt, among the sands of
the desert, is not more lonely than this, her modern and beautiful namesake.” She described
walking “the length of Vance street...a distance of nearly a mile” and returning, having seen almost
no one in the city. “The beautiful houses along this street were empty or left to negroes,” she
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wrote. “The flowers flung their sweetness on the desert air, the jays screamed noisily; and later, as I
returned, the owls hooted in the parks. It put me in mind of the prophecies of desolation found in
the Bible. All is lonely.” The breakdown of the community was thus felt keenly, even by outsiders
like DePelchin, who could juxtapose the beauty and modernity of Memphis to its now-ruined
state. Keating similarly wrote of the “appalling gloom [which] hung over the doomed city. At night
it was silent as the grave; by day it seemed desolate as the desert. The solemn oppressions of
universal death bore upon the human mind, as if the day of Judgment were about to dawn.”
Biblical allusions impressed upon readers the helplessness of Memphians trapped in the ruined
landscape imposed by fate or God, witnessing the end of their world. 65
Human beings were not the only ones to suffer in this apocalyptic environment. Keating
wrote that “Even the animals felt the oppression; they fled from the city. Rats, cats, or dogs were
not to be seen. Death was triumphant.” E. Kate Heckel, another volunteer nurse from Texas and
friend of DePelchin remembered passing a small house on her way out from Memphis. “Death
had been there, doors and windows open showed how empty it was. Bedding and clothes in the
yard, but two little dogs in a kind of shed had been forgotten. They were chained, one was eating
the other though still alive and the poor half demolished brute was still trying to escape.” Repeated
sights like these added to the loneliness and horror of the epidemic to drain survivors of their
energy and hope. Reverend D.A. Quinn claimed that “The howling of dogs, the piteous mewing of
cats, and the lowing of cattle left behind by their owners, would almost convey an idea of the
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terrors of the last Judgment.” He wrote that the starving animals were digging open some of the
hastily dug paupers’ graves, a further injustice heaped upon the newly dead.66
But for Keating, who valued Southern male honor which demanded the care of women
and children, it was the death of these that hit closest to the heart. “Women were found dead,
their little babes gasping in the throes of death beside the breasts at which they had tugged in
vain,” he recalled painfully. “Others passed away after the labors of birth had supervened upon the
fever—mother and child being buried in the same grave.” He recounted how many times a Howard
Visitor or a neighbor would enter a room, only to see the entire family dead, the bodies of those
who had died first now partially decomposed.67
For Keating, those whose families had completely died out were perhaps lucky: “There
were no public evidences of sorrow. The wife was borne to the tomb while the husband was
unconscious of his loss; and whole families were swept away in such quick succession that no one
had knowledge of the other’s departure. Death dealt kindly by these,” he wrote. “In a week, father,
mother, and sisters and brothers were at rest, at peace. There was no mourning; no widows, no
orphans. The parents went first; in a few hours the children followed.” Worse was the future of
survivors who had watched their loved ones suffer and die and who now had to bear the burden of
being left behind. Reverend Quinn claimed that “the most pitiful and heart-rending scenes were
the cries and wails of bereaved mothers, wives, children, and husbands....The ravings of some
bordered on blasphemy, as they challenged the mercy of God to give them such a stroke.”68
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At a church home for orphans, DePelchin nursed a child whose mother came to see him.
The children had been brought to the home because both parents and a baby sister had been sick.
While the father and baby had died, the mother had survived and as soon as she could leave her
bed had come to see her two remaining children. “My heart ached when I looked at the stricken
woman, recalled DePelchin. “I tried to sympathise with her. ‘O hush,’ she said, ‘don’t say a word. I
would not have God hear me murmur for anything. He may take these two from me if I am
impatient.’”69
The story of this woman—too afraid to grieve lest God punish her family further—
showcased yet another theme of suffering for the survivors of Memphis: the suppression of
emotion. Keating explained that “The voice of prayer was lifted up only at the bed of pain or
death....Tears for one’s loved one were choked back by the feeling of uncertainty provoked by the
sad condition of another.” At one point, DePelchin tried to explain this sad silent grief. “The
hearses go alone without any other carriage,” she wrote. “The dead are taken quietly out and
placed in their narrow homes without a word. No one laughs and no one cries. No one seeks for
sympathy; for all know that every heart in Memphis has as much grief as it can stagger under.”70
Nowhere was this inability to grieve more obvious than at the burial site. Keating explained
that very few funerals were held for departed loved ones. “The luxuries of woe were dispensed
with. In most cases the driver of the hearse and an assistant comprised the funeral party.” In fact,
the largest funeral during the epidemic was that of Jefferson Davis, Jr., son of the ex-president of
the Confederacy. A mere fifteen mourners attended his burial.71
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The depression, loneliness, and suppressed grief all melded to put survivors and healers on
the verge of emotional breakdown. “We are doomed,” wrote Herbert Landrum, editor of the
Memphis Daily Avalanche newspaper. “It is hard, as we write in this dark, dismal night of death, not
to realize the full meaning of that brief sentence.” After learning that so many of her friends—
nurses she had worked with, volunteers with whom she had travelled to Memphis—had already
died of the fever, DePelchin remembered walking the lonely streets of Memphis. “I saw the cart
piled with coffins, as usual, and almost wished that one was for me, so bitter was my life
becoming,” she wrote. Many times throughout her narrative, she resigned herself to God’s will and
promised that she would work among the sick as long as He saw fit to keep her alive.72
DePelchin was not alone. Weary caretakers throughout Memphis, burdened by the sights
they had seen, resigned themselves to death. Responding to a letter from a friend offering to
volunteer his services in Memphis, Reverend George C. Harris advised the gentleman to wait.
“You may come when somebody will have to take our place while we go to the long rest,” he
answered. Dr. Armstrong likewise wrote to his wife, “there is nothing cheerful, hopeful, or that has
one ray of sunshine attached to it, in our whole city….Such a fearful plague, oh, none but
eyewitnesses can appreciate its horrors or can tell of its ravages.”73
Dr. Armstrong admitted that “We poor doctors stand abashed at the perfect uselessness of
our remedies....I feel sometimes as if my hands were crossed and tied and that I am good for
nothing, death coming in upon the sick in spite of all that I can do.” At first, his letters to his wife
were meant to assure her that he was safe and that he was holding up under the pressure. But as he
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narrated the city’s slow descent into death, his letters became more honest about the taxing nature
of his work. “I am lonely enough now and am afraid to sleep in the house alone for fear of being
taken sick at night,” he wrote in one letter. “Surely the United States never witnessed such a thing
before,” he added in another.74
Doctors took on greater and greater caseloads until they reached the point of exhaustion.
At that point, many sickened and died of the fever. Dr. Armstrong saw between forty-five and fifty
patients each day. He treated 127 cases in his ward before another doctor was assigned to help
him. Armstrong wrote that the work was mentally and physically exhausting. “I wish I could go to
some secret spot where there would be no burning heads and hands to feel, nor pulses to count,
for the next six months,” he wrote. “It is fever, fever all day long and I am so wearied of giving
directions....I do not know what to think or do....Nothing but distress and death on all sides and
everyone pulling at a poor doctor to come this way first.” He complained that the sixty dollars per
week provided to Howard doctors was not enough for their intense labor among the sick.75
The near constant work and horrific sights to which doctors were privy added to the
depression many experienced. As more of their colleagues fell to the disease many feared for their
own lives and for their families if they should not survive. Dr. Armstrong sent his wife twenty
dollars for the care of their seven children. He wrote, “I do hope you will exercise prudence and
economy in its use. If I am not spared to you, you will soon need a few Cents, where you now
think you must have Dollars.” After warning her of his concerns that she take care in the event of
his death, he wrote, almost in explanation: “Everything with me tonight is terribly blue. On every
side death and sickness.” Dr. Armstrong admitted that he sometimes regretted his decision to stay
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in Memphis as his family evacuated. “I do feel so often as if I can stay no longer,” he wrote.
However, he fought this feeling, believing that to flee now would prove him a coward. “‘Duty
points with outstretched finger,’ to the work before me and the little good...that I may accomplish
if I stay. But Oh! The End,” he proclaimed. Unfortunately, Dr. Armstrong would not live to see
his family again. Just as he feared, he contracted yellow fever during the height of the epidemic and
died ten days after he sent his final letter.76

Yellow fever thus created a new landscape for Memphians in 1878: one of fear, horrific
sickness, undignified death, and the descent of the city into chaos and desolation. Yellow fever
narratives illustrated these scenes in shocking and sometimes painful detail in order to impress
upon readers the breakdown of social order, the wild environment of the ruined city, and the
human destruction that engulfed survivors in an apocalyptic environment. Loneliness and
depression in the face of so much suffering only added to the feeling that the end was near. Some
healers resigned themselves to death, wishing only for an end to the misery they witnessed.
Describing intense fear, agonizing disease, and ubiquitous death, authors of yellow fever narratives
portrayed the collapse of the Mississippi Valley as it suffered the worst yellow fever epidemic in
history.
Narrating the breakdown of society in Memphis allowed readers to empathize and
remember their own wartime experiences of disease, death, desolation, and displacement. These
themes allowed victims and readers to share their experiences and to search for meaning in their
suffering. But narrating the breakdown of the political, economic, social, and physical structures
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that comprised everyday life for Southerners also allowed Memphian authors to imagine a rebuilt
city, a rebuilt South, and a rebuilt society.

White Supremacy
Having narrated the breakdown of everyday life due to the epidemic, authors of yellow
fever narratives turned to themes that they believed were vital to rebuilding the social hierarchy.
Many authors of yellow fever narratives in Memphis reinforced traditional cultural norms that had
ordered the antebellum social hierarchy. A vital theme to these narratives, therefore, was white
supremacy. In order to buttress the power of white Southerners, who wrote the majority of these
narratives, authors of yellow fever narratives depicted black Memphians as either naturally
subordinate to white authority or as dangerous criminal elements.
White Memphians engaged in organizing relief and medical care generally criticized the
actions of poor Memphians who were trapped in the city and struggling to survive. But they
specifically denigrated the vast majority of black Memphians—who vastly outnumbered the
remaining whites—and feared that mobs of black residents would overwhelm the city’s relief
apparatus. However, they praised a handful of black Memphians who supported the white power
structures of the Citizens’ Relief Committee and Howard Association and those who willingly
submitted to white authority during the epidemic. Further, the white authors of yellow fever
narratives wrote very little about the efforts of the black community to survive the epidemic.
Almost nothing is known about networks of communal solidarity or mutual aid in the black
community. Instead, authors of yellow fever narratives focused on legitimizing the official relief
apparatus controlled by whites. White authors thus ignored black Memphians’ experiences of the
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epidemic and if black-authored yellow fever narratives existed, Memphians have since discarded
them as illegitimate.

The Memphis Board of Health declared yellow fever epidemic in the city on August 23, ten
days after the first officially recorded death. By that time, 25,000 Memphians—nearly half the
population—had abandoned the city with another 5,000 evacuated to nearby camps. Memphians
who had the funds and connections to leave the city at the start of the panic did so: very few
members of the upper and middle classes remained. Those who did stay were actively working in
the Howard Association, the CRC, and various benevolent societies throughout the city. The
majority of the refugees in the camps were from the city’s working-class neighborhoods.77
The CRC’s leaders believed that the poor who were not sick or nursing should have
evacuated so they would not be a burden to the city under already dire circumstances. After all,
they had set up the camp system in order to get the poor and working class out of the city and
away from the infected districts. While at first denying that yellow fever existed in the city in the
hope of forestalling panic, the Board of Health had eventually campaigned to evacuate the
working-class neighborhoods along the wharves, the site of yellow fever’s entry into the city. The
Memphis Daily Appeal wholeheartedly agreed, stating, “Our only hope for an abatement of the
disease lies in the ability of the city government to compel the people—white and black—who still
remain here to leave for the camps.” The Appeal was owned and operated by John Keating, who
was also a prominent member of the Citizens’ Relief Committee. The newspaper therefore acted as
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a mouthpiece for the CRC in coordinating relief efforts, gathering and disseminating information,
and managing the public perception of what was happening in the city.78
Epidemic diseases such as yellow fever commonly reveal prejudice and discrimination
against ethnic and racial minorities in urban areas, as these groups often occupy neighborhoods
most severely affected by disease. In 1878, the epidemic devastated an area of the city known as
“the Pinch.” The area had been the first commercial district in Memphis but over the decades, as
people moved away from the commercial wharf, the neighborhood became the main immigrant
enclave of the city, eventually boasting a mix of Irish, Italian, Russian, Greek, and Jewish
inhabitants as well as African American freedpeople. The mortality rate in the Pinch was especially
high during the epidemic, particularly due to its proximity to the riverfront and its lack of public
sanitation services. The largely immigrant and African American neighborhood had been sorely
neglected by city officials who refused to spend public funds on water or sewer systems in that area
of town.79
Thousands of Memphians from these neighborhoods remained in the city for the duration
of the epidemic, either by choice or because they lacked the ability to leave. Approximately 20,000
Memphians were left behind in the city after the evacuation; 6,000 of these residents were white,
mostly poor Irish immigrants who succumbed to the disease in frightful numbers. Of Memphis’s
black residents, approximately 14,000 remained.80
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Unfortunately, we can never know exactly why people chose to stay in a city that was
quickly spiraling into chaos and death. Poorer people and those with fewer outside contacts to
help them escape often lacked the resources required to flee the city at the start of the epidemic.
Coming from the neighborhoods that made up the first infected districts, they may have gotten
sick before they had a chance to evacuate. But despite the creation of the camp system, which
promised a modicum of safety and sustenance, many chose not to evacuate despite being at risk of
contracting the fever. Because these people did not write of their experiences or motivations—or
because these sources have been lost with time—we cannot know exactly how they survived in the
city. But we do know that they weighed their options and chose to remain.
Those Memphians who believed they were acclimated—and therefore immune to yellow
fever—sought to leverage their alleged immunity to perform needed services during the epidemic
for higher wages. As discussed further in Chapter 2, popular medical belief assumed that people of
African descent were racially immune to yellow fever. Many black Memphians therefore chose to
stay in the mistaken belief that they were safe. They further sought to leverage their immunity to
gain work as nurses and police, guarding homes and personal property, and burying bodies.81
While black Southerners acquired responsibilities and opportunities during the epidemic it
was always with the expectation that they would defer to white authority. Given the generally
accepted wisdom that black people were immune to the disease, they were historically expected to
take on additional responsibilities during yellow fever epidemics in order to maintain order and
safeguard property for susceptible whites. Once things were back to normal, returning whites
expected black residents to willingly surrender any positions of authority or advancement they had
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gained during the crisis. While the epidemic created opportunities for black Southerners, they
quickly discovered that they were not immune to the disease and their population experienced
comparable rates of infection as whites.
Poor Memphians may have stayed to safeguard what little they owned. Those with few
possessions could not afford to leave them behind unprotected, particularly as personal property
was often destroyed by disinfection. The camps’ leaders burned clothes and bedding brought by
evacuees. Sanitarians in the city also burned textiles and furniture contaminated by the dead.
Survivors remembered the small burnt bundles that marked the homes of the recently deceased.
Residents feared that looters might make off with hard-won valuables, work tools, or livestock.
Perhaps some Memphians believed they would be treated poorly in the camps. The camp system,
segregated by race and gender, may have discouraged or disallowed certain people from entering.82
Those who existed on the periphery of the social hierarchy, particularly freedpeople, had
little incentive to trust the government, or in this case the CRC. In fact, it is likely that they
developed alternative modes of caretaking or mutual aid, separate from that of the white elite in
charge of the city. Most yellow fever narratives—written almost exclusively by white, middle-class
healers—disparaged black residents’ treatment of their neighbors. Yet the fact that so many of their
population survived suggests that the black community may have operated within their own
networks of solidarity to feed their members and care for the sick. While white elites may have
disregarded these efforts as illegitimate according to their own standards of treatment and
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behavior, they nevertheless reported that the vast majority of black Memphians survived the
epidemic while the vast majority of whites perished.83
As the city’s economy broke down, starvation seemed imminent. Dr. Armstrong wrote his
wife that there were “no butchering stalls, no groceries, no feed stores. We live on bacon and
coffee and milk.” DePelchin also complained about the lack of available food. She described how
one of the men from the Howard Association had gone into the suburbs and countryside looking
for food: “That is he would go near to a farm house as he dared, halloo, they would bring out what
they had to spare, a coop of chickens, a basket of eggs, etc., place them on the fence and he took
them, they who placed them there retreating to a safe distance”84
The Citizens’ Relief Committee devised a system to provide rations to the poor and
destitute in the community. The federal government agreed to send 40,000 rations along with the
tents used to set up the camp system. These rations proved a useful incentive to encourage people
to evacuate to the camps. For those who remained, the CRC coordinated donations of money and
goods that came from all over the country. Thousands of pounds of bacon, ham, beef, flour, bread,
crackers, beans, rice, coffee, molasses, and whiskey flowed into Memphis under the strict
supervision of the CRC.85
But not all of these provisions went to feed the sick and hungry of Memphis. As the
epidemic spread beyond the city limits, the Committee coordinated relief to several surrounding
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towns and villages. In addition, those Memphians who stood in line for rations each day were
judged as deserving or undeserving—only 4,042 Memphians were given rations by the CRC out of
the 20,000 residents who remained in the city. As Keating explained, the CRC had no interest in
running “a free lunch establishment.” They therefore instituted a system whereby citizens seeking
relief were required to apply to their ward committee, who would investigate the circumstances of
each case before rewarding ration tickets. Relief was given first to those who were sick or
convalescing. Up to two adults who were nursing a friend or family member could obtain relief
next. To those who were not sick or actively caring for the sick, the CRC refused aid. Of the poor
Memphians trapped in the city, the CRC generally looked upon any not listed among the sick and
their caretakers with suspicion and fear. And, of course, this system was open to prejudice,
particularly against the ethnic and racial minorities who made up the majority of those trapped in
the city.86
The CRC obviously feared the potential power of these starving and sick minorities who
vastly outnumbered them. The Memphis Daily Appeal published a letter to the editor on August
29th that broadcast a warning to those guarding the customshouse, seat of the CRC’s cache. The
letter was titled, “A FAIR WARNING TO MEMPHIS.” It began:
We, the poor class of Memphis, are well aware of the fact that the government has sent
provisions for us, and we can’t help the distress of the city. We desire to make an honest
living, and if something is not done for us we will take the law in our own hands. We can’t
starve, and don’t intend to as long as there is anything to eat in Memphis. If we could get
employment, we wouldn’t ask it of you. Give us something to subsist upon, and Memphis
shall be at peace; and if not, we will turn her up side down, if possible.
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The letter was signed, “IRISH AND NEGROES.” It is not clear who actually wrote the letter but it
caused quite a stir among the leaders of the CRC, who took the warning very seriously.87
Interestingly, the next day the Appeal officially retracted the letter, publishing an apology to
the Irish, stating, “We have no idea that an Irishman had anything to do with it or would
countenance the carrying into effect of the threat therein contained. Law-abiding, the Irish people
of Memphis have always been, and they can be relied upon in any emergency to protect the
property and secure the safety of the city.” The Appeal expressed regret for offending any Irish
residents and promised that the newspaper was ever the “friend and outspoken champion” of the
Irish. Significantly, the Appeal published no such apology or assurance to the city’s black
community, which also supposedly issued the threat. 88
Clearly the Appeal was concerned with the response of the Irish community to the
published threat and the implicit characterization of the Irish as poor, violent, and the likely seat
of the epidemic in the city. Many Irish immigrants had managed to move beyond the Pinch and
held prominent positions in the local cotton economy. But in the years immediately prior to the
epidemic, an important voting coalition of Irish, African American, German, and Italian residents
had blocked redeemer Democrats from political control and managed to elect an Irish mayor in
1874. The letter may have been an attempt to further destabilize the fragile relationship between
Irish and black Memphians in the city.89
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Regardless of who might have written the letter, or of their motives in writing, the black
residents of Memphis recognized their legitimate rights as citizens to the federal aid and Northern
relief being doled out by the CRC. Several narratives described the lines of black Memphians
outside of the CRC commissary, waiting for their fair share of the provisions sent for their relief.
Keating described the clamor of starving citizens for food: “At midday a noisy multitude of negroes
broke in upon the awful monotony of death, the dying, and the dead, clamoring each for his dole
of the bounty which saved the city from plunder and the torch. When these had gone to their
homes, now fast being invaded by the fever, the cloud of gloom closed down again and settled,
thick, black, and hideous upon every living soul.” The Appeal likewise described the “crowds of
Negroes” who “poured into the city from the country to, as they said, get their share of the
Government rations.”90
However, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, white Southerners in charge of relief
did not share black citizens’ conviction that they deserved equal rights to federal and Northern aid.
Instead, they criticized black Memphians’ demands for relief, believing they should work to earn
their share of rations. Dr. Dromgoole described the “solid line of closely-packed humanity” outside
each entrance to the CRC’s headquarters. “There were there all the shades of black, but not one
white man or women,” he claimed. “Negroes will not work, will not leave town, but lie about and
draw rations, and then get sick and become a burden intolerable. The fields are white with cotton,
but not a foot will they move. They give their sick no care, and seem to think they must be fed in
idleness and nursed with greatest care.” White relief workers thus denied black Memphians’ claims
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that they deserved relief based on their citizenship of the United States, rather than as payment for
their labor.91
The letter published in the Appeal and its subsequent retraction and apology further
denote that the CRC did not fear all desperate, starving, poor Memphians; only desperate,
starving, poor, black Memphians. The large number of African Americans in the city produced a
level of fear among the remaining white elite in charge of the CRC, which reacted to the letter—
and the increasingly unruly crowd outside of the CRC commissary—by posting an additional
militia unit to stand guard over the ration store. Given the loss of population and police, the CRC
feared they would be overrun with crime and looting either of the customshouse or of the many
homes that lay abandoned in the city. Keating recounted “the shooting of a ruffianly negro, who
attempted to intimidate a colored soldier on guard at the commissary department,” which, he
claimed “had the most happy effect” because “It proved to those who contemplated crime that,
though few in numbers, the men who were managing affairs could not be trifled with....” Keating
commended the Committee member who “assured all present that the shot....was merely the
prelude to what would certainly follow if any attempt was made to violate the public peace or
interfere with the business of...the Relief Committee....”92
In fact, Keating repeated several times threats of physical harm toward black residents in
his narrative. He wrote that “The colored nurses realized that any bad behavior would cause their
death. Lamp-posts were their dread, and had any of them been guilty of outrage or theft, their
speedy doom would have been settled,” implying that lynching remained a constant threat to any
black Memphian who crossed some unknown line of disrespectful or criminal behavior. Given
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this, it is not surprising that the majority of white-authored narratives complained constantly that
black Memphians were not willing to work.93
The leaders of the CRC clearly believed the now majority-black population was a major
threat to the city, second only to the fever itself, but they were hardly alone in this assumption.
Captain John F. Cameron, Commander of Camp Joe Williams, wrote a letter in September in
which he repeated the threat published in the newspaper. “No appeal will drive them from the
certain death which awaits them,” he wrote. “The pest has gotten among them, and Heaven only
knows who will bury their dead. So long as they can draw rations they won’t budge. Their leaders
demand pay, and if their demands are not acceded to, they threaten to sack the town.” Cameron
continued, “I have urged the committee to call upon the Governor to establish martial
law,…remove all the provisions from the city, and then let starvation and disease do their
legitimate work.” Thus he resolved that the fever’s spread among the black population was just
retribution for their audacity and argued, “These are no times for sentiment on the part of the
brave, worn-out Citizens’ Committee.”94
The leaders of the CRC, however, recognized that the black residents of Memphis greatly
outnumbered them. Furthermore, as the epidemic grew worse, they relied almost exclusively on
black policemen and militia to keep the starving in check. Eventually, they resorted to recruiting a
few upstanding members of the black community to serve on a Colored Citizens’ Relief
Committee in order to mitigate the growing resentment among poor freedmen. This further
allowed them to claim that the CRC was a biracial coalition after the epidemic, despite the fact
that the CCRC could do little more than present resolutions to the main body. The white men of
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the relief apparatus thus included black leaders in official meetings in an effort to ensure the black
community would “co-operate with the Citizens’ Relief Committee in the maintenance of law and
order.”95
When the epidemic was over, Keating and others actually praised the black community,
recognizing that their fears may have been exaggerated. Keating assured his readers that “This class
of the population, whatever they may have been to each other—and not a few of them were
inexcusably neglectful, and even brutally indifferent to each other’s wants and woes—were
deferential and respectful to the white race, and as soldiers, policemen, and nurses were earnest,
honest, and devoted.” Keating therefore reserved praise for black Memphians who upheld and
supported the white power structure in the city. For a Southerner who believed in white
supremacy, the fact that black citizens had proved “differential and respectful to the white race”
boded well for their ability to fit into post-Reconstruction Southern society.96
But the subtext to his praise was always that white Southerners would guarantee, through
violence if necessary, that black Southerners recognized white superiority. When newspapers
claimed that black nurses were raping their white female patients, Keating came to their defense:
“No charge ever made was so baseless, so wanton, so cruel, so unjust.” Yet he assured his readers
that “Not one of them attempted a crime that would have courted and been punished by instant
and merited death. Idle many of them were, and shiftless and thriftless, as is to be expected of
those who are in the A, B, C, of civilization; but they were neither cruel nor criminal in this
direction.” Each statement he made in praise of black Memphians carried with it criticism. And he
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presented the fact that black Memphians were innocent of these criminal acts, not because of their
high moral standing, but because of the fear of white retribution guaranteed in response.97

While not ignoring black Memphians outright—and while admitting their role in
safeguarding the city—Memphis’s yellow fever narratives otherwise largely ignored the experience of
the black community. Black Memphians were expected to care for sick whites as nurses and to
protect their property as domestic servants and policemen but the black community was generally
separated from whites. Very little information was recorded about their sick or dead. Little is
known about how they survived the near-starvation conditions with so few being awarded rations
by the CRC. Further, black Memphians were segregated from white society in their own hospital
and in their own camps with very little qualitative description of conditions. The yellow fever
narratives here analyzed, therefore, really represent the white memory of the epidemic, as will be
discussed further in Chapter 4. While black authors may have recorded their experiences, white
Memphians did not consider them important enough to preserve and they have thus been lost.
While the plight of the poor and the starving generated suspicion and fear among the men
in charge of the CRC, race took precedence over class in terms of who embodied the greatest
threat to their authority. The CRC’s ration policy enforced a hierarchy of legitimacy of those
requesting aid, placing people on a scale of belonging—of those worthy of help and those who were
not. Further, those kept on the margins of society, especially black Memphians, were treated as
outsiders whose experience was at best ignored and at worst actively silenced by the yellow fever
narratives that survive.
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Suspicion of Outsiders
Racial, and to a lesser extent ethnic, minorities were cast as villains in yellow fever
narratives in order to support structures of white supremacy in the post-Reconstruction South.
These narratives also reinforced fear and suspicion of outsiders. This distrust of outsiders extended
even to the volunteer healers that came to Memphis to succor the sick, particularly nurses, who
were not trained professionals but who came with practical experience wrought from previous
epidemics or from tending to Civil War casualties. Interestingly, the suspicion of outsider healers
was not applied to volunteer physicians, demonstrating a class component to this municipal
nativism.
Despite the fact that most volunteer nurses came from other Southern states, they were
frequently referred to as “foreign nurses” because they came from outside of the immediate
community. These nurses were widely disparaged and feared, especially if they were women,
immigrants, or non-white. Authors of yellow fever narratives generally depicted them as strangers
who came to enhance their own fortunes in the midst of the South’s suffering, akin to the
character of the Northern carpetbagger. In detailing their villainy, these narratives fostered distrust
of outsiders as a reaction to the loss of control over Southern affairs during Reconstruction.
Yellow fever narratives thus bolstered municipal identity, a concept that will be discussed more
fully in Chapter 2. They further contributed to the broader cultural support of Redemption by
urging Southerners to reclaim control of Southern affairs from dangerous, corrupt outsiders.

Over 4,000 healers worked as nurses in Memphis during the epidemic, with 2,995
employed by the Howard Association. Most of these nurses were from Memphis and its
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surrounding countryside. However, over 500 of these volunteers came from outside the city,
traveling to Memphis from twenty-six different states. Though the Howard nursing corps included
men and women of all classes and ethnic backgrounds, roughly two-thirds of nurses were white
men. The Howards further employed 111 physicians. At least one-quarter of these doctors lived
and worked in Memphis. The rest were mostly volunteers from other Southern cities.98
Kezia DePelchin and E. Kate Heckle—volunteer nurses from Texas—wrote regularly of the
suspicion, harassment, and disrespect heaped upon the nurses, many of whom had risked their
lives to provide aid to Memphians. This harassment generally came from doctors, other nurses,
patients and their families, as well as working-class Memphians, particularly domestic servants, who
resented the nurses’ encroachment upon their professional responsibilities. In general, the level of
mistreatment that nurses suffered directly correlated with their status as non-native outsiders, their
race, and their receipt of payment for their nursing services.99
The letters written by DePelchin and Heckle describe the level of nativism against outsiders
of Memphis. Describing an incident in which an Irish nurse was treated with suspicion by a
mother who had called upon the Howard Association to furnish a nurse for her sick child,
DePelchin explained that the mother claimed to “have heard such awful things of these foreign
nurses.” But the woman was not referring to the nurse’s Irish ethnicity when she called her a
“foreign nurse.” DePelchin clarified, “That is what they call us outside barbarians,” meaning that
anyone who was not a Memphian was considered a foreigner to the city’s residents and treated as
98
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such. Instead of being disrespected, the nurse chose to leave the premises, “very properly too,”
DePelchin agreed, “for the money for nurses was not paid by Memphis, but donated, probably by
the very city the nurse came from.”100
Citizens from throughout the United States and many foreign countries donated millions
of dollars for the relief of the South. Yet this money was part of the reason that volunteers who
came to nurse the sick were treated with such suspicion. Memphians generally believed that nurses
came for their own profit and cared little for the sick in their midst. The Howards paid foreign
nurses $4 per day; they paid Memphis nurses and all black nurses $3 per day. As the epidemic
raged, DePelchin complained of the way Memphians treated these foreign nurses. Despite the fact
that many had risked their lives and safety to travel to Memphis, she claimed, “The fact is some
think that we nurses are making such piles of money out of their necessities that they look upon us
‘with about as favorable eyes as Gabriel did upon the Devil in Paradise.’” And she was right, for
yellow fever narratives written by Memphians generally depicted these nurses as fiends who preyed
on the suffering victims of yellow fever.101
In many cases, these criticisms echoed complaints about foreign nurses that were prevalent
during the epidemic of 1873. Only five years earlier, Memphians experienced an influx of foreign
nurses whom they frequently described as at best, incompetent, and at worst, outright criminal.
Reverend D. A. Quinn reminded his readers that “The nurses received from five to ten dollars a
day,” during the 1873 epidemic, “and some of these were of questionable repute. Several Irish
families assured me they were robbed of everything during their sickness. Indeed, from the reckless
behavior of some, it appeared providential that more depredations than were reported did not
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occur.” Denouncing the alleged impropriety and criminality of foreign nurses, a hold-over from
the Reconstruction era, Memphians thus greeted foreign nurses with intense suspicion in 1878.102
John Keating argued that yellow fever was particularly “fatal to those whose energies had
been exhausted by debauchery” and Memphians, in general, believed that many of the nurses who
fell at their post were guilty of a variety of human failings. Keating claimed that “a few who came
to nurse died, leaving full trunks of silverware, bijoutere, bric-a-brac, and clothes, to prove how
industriously they could ply two trades” while others “made themselves notorious for lewdness and
drunkenness.” He further alleged that the deaths of an unknown number of Memphians could be
blamed on their nurses’ lack of care. “But the worst of them were cut short in their career,” he
assured his readers. “Only one or two escaped. Many were sent whence they came; many others, a
majority of them, died. They were taken in the midst of their transgressions.” The tragic cases of
volunteer nurses dying at their posts were thus sullied by the conviction that they reaped just
deserts for unhealthy lifestyles or outright criminal behavior. While nearly one-third of all nurses
in Memphis died of yellow fever; Memphians claimed death to be just punishment for the
transgressions of outsiders.103
The ubiquitous suspicion of nurses was not necessarily unfounded. There were hundreds
of reports of inappropriate and outright criminal behavior perpetrated by nurses and, to a lesser
extent, doctors who came to Memphis during the epidemic. Much of this behavior was believed to
be influenced by the alcohol furnished to healers for their patients’ use. Treatment sometimes
called for small amounts of alcohol such as champagne or brandy to be given orally or for whiskey
to be rubbed into the skin to aid in perspiration. Both DePelchin and Heckle wrote of seeing
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drunken nurses or at times suspected nurses of searching the homes of their patients for money or
alcohol. Mrs. Heckle wrote that she watched a nurse remove the rings from his patient’s hands
when he died, assured that he had every intention of stealing them. Reports such as these were so
numerous that the Memphis Daily Appeal published a request by the Howard Association that all
citizens of Memphis “watch and report to us all nurses who fail of their duty in the least particular,
or who give the least evidence of being addicted to drunkenness, neglect, or any other failing or
bad habit that would interfere with the proper performance of a duty to which the members of our
Association have pledged their lives.”104
It is plausible that people who had previously survived a case of yellow fever and who were
reasonably assured of their immunity might take advantage of this invulnerability to enter a
chaotic city in order to steal what they could. Yet many of the stories censuring nurses for indecent
or criminal behavior veered toward the absurd. Keating used anecdotes of wicked nurses to
condemn drunkenness, thievery, and a broad range of sexually immoral acts. He told stories of
nurses cavorting upon the bed of a patient covered in black vomit or engaged in drunken orgies on
the floor. He claimed that two male nurses were found drunk and in a state of undress together on
the floor next to the dead body of a patient who would have recovered if given proper care. “In the
whole range of human depravity there are few parallels to these cases. They illustrate the extremes
of degradation,” he fumed. “They sounded the lowest depths of vice, and shamed even the
standards of savage life.” These more sensational accounts of nurses’ behavior suggest that the
character of the foreign nurse was rhetorically useful in criticizing sin of all kinds.105
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The caricature of the drunken nurse became a symbol of the inhumanity and depravity
that was seen during the epidemic and a foil for attacking the immorality and licentiousness of
both Memphians and the outsiders in their midst. Portraying nurses as devils come to relish in the
macabre atmosphere of the plague-ridden city reinforced the epidemic as God’s punishment for
sin. Keating claimed that these foreign nurses “shocked decency and outraged humanity. They
were no better than the beasts of the field. Male and female, they herded together in vileness. They
made of the epidemic a carnival.” Such were the outrageous stories of a world turned upside
down.106
Responding to concerns about these foreign nurses and the trouble they were allegedly
causing, the Howard Association contemplated sending them away. On September 22, during the
height of the epidemic, the Howard Association published a notice asking that “all nurses who
came to Memphis from other cities and who are not now attending patients to come by the
headquarters...[to] receive their pay and transportation home.” Thus, fear of these outsiders led the
Howards to consider dismissing hundreds of nurses during a time that Keating referred to as “the
gloomy days of September, when the Fever pest gathered in two hundred victims a day.” With
nurses desperately needed—and patients dying for want of care—the Howards could hardly round
up foreign nurses and send them home. Further, most cities had quarantines against travelers from
Memphis, so they could not simply return these nurses back to where they came from. The only
thing they could do was send them to other infected cities that telegraphed the need for nurses.
Since the Howards did not evict all foreign nurses from the city, the notice published in the
newspaper may have been intended more to calm the overwrought fear of Memphians.107
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The 4,000 nurses, several hundred of them foreign, constituted a large proportion of the
20,000 people left in the city. With only 111 doctors, 200 people dying each day at the epidemic’s
peak, and roughly 3,000 sick at any given time, the city was a hospital. It is therefore not surprising
that Memphians feared the city’s vulnerability and imagined it to be ripe for the plucking by
criminals of all kinds. In some cases, the criminals in questions were not even nurses. Keating
claimed that “at one time...not less than two hundred tramps and thieves invaded the stricken city,
coming from no one could tell where, ultimately going no one could tell whither.” He admitted
that “They stole the badges of the nurses, and representing themselves as Howard employees,
gained entrance to homes where the fever had paralyzed all it had not killed.” Keating thus warned
Memphians not to trust foreign nurses because they may be criminals in disguise. The warning
further reinforced the belief that these outrages were perpetrated by outsiders who descended en
masse upon the helpless city. Keating repeatedly claimed that the Howard Association, in
conjunction with the CRC, did all they could to safeguard the streets. “The Howards used every
precaution,” he maintained, to prevent foreigners from carrying out their criminal acts and “finally
succeeded in weeding out the unreliable and incompetent nurses the epidemic brought forth.”108
Of course, one could not simply show up in Memphis and proclaim oneself a nurse. The
quarantines that kept the Howards from sending foreign nurses home likewise kept many people
from traveling to Memphis. Railroad companies offered to send physicians and nurses to cities
that telegraphed need for healers, but these individuals generally required letters of introduction
or physician endorsement to be accepted as nurses. Thus, while nurses did not have formal
educational or licensure requirements, they still required some form of official authorization that
they were acclimated, experienced, or at least respectable. Nevertheless, yellow fever narratives
108
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revealed that Memphians feared and reviled foreign nurses, regardless of their behavior or their
motives for volunteering.
This intense fear of outsiders was complicated by a class component, as doctors were not
treated with the level of suspicion reserved for nurses. Official histories of the epidemic recounted
how doctors labored bravely and at great personal risk to save Memphians from the grip of yellow
fever. And in general, even volunteer physicians from outside of Memphis were treated better than
nurses. At least, their help was more graciously accepted. “We can hardly find words with which to
express our sense of the debt of gratitude which our people owe to the physicians, those from
abroad especially,” wrote Dr. Dromgoole. “Neither money, medicines, supplies, nor nurses, would
have availed any thing to stay the tidal wave of fever, had not our local corps of physicians been so
heavily recruited...by some of the ablest doctors of the cities and states they represent.”109
While there were far fewer doctors, and it was perhaps more difficult for a criminal to
impersonate a physician, very few doctors were maligned as outsiders or accused of scandalous
behavior. Further, while a larger proportion of the doctors were from outside the community,
yellow fever narratives never referred to them as “foreign doctors.” Dromgoole stated that of the
physicians in the city, he knew that at least sixty-four volunteered to come to Memphis. “Twenty
[of the Howard physicians] are from Northern States.” he wrote. “The rest, sixty-three, including
nineteen Memphis physicians, are from Southern States.” While his tally did not include all of the
physicians on the Howard Association payroll, nor those unassociated with the Howards,
Dromgoole’s numbers nevertheless show that a significant number of physicians came from
outside Memphis, nearly a quarter of them coming from the North.110
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The theme of criminal nurses embodied the perceived destruction of the Southern way of
life. Motifs of immorality and savagery abound, painting the nurses as villains who personified all
of the aspects of Southern society that had deteriorated since the Civil War. While most of the
complaints against nurses were clearly exaggerated, and while some authors tried to disprove some
of the allegations, the caricature of the yellow fever nurse was nonetheless a useful rhetorical
strategy to elaborate the destruction of Memphian society from within and to argue for a return to
a more traditional way of life.
While some nurses certainly took advantage of victims of yellow fever, more risked their
lives to aid and succor the sick. Yet yellow fever narratives portray nurses as largely villainous
characters, particularly as so many came from outside the community. Perhaps their status as
outsiders left them ripe for scapegoating. But in the post-Reconstruction South, the caricature of
the outsider who swoops into a devastated Southern community for personal gain and plunder
while wearing the guise of someone come to help was too reminiscent of the carpetbagger to be
disregarded.111

Gender Norms
Yellow fever narratives described poor African Americans and volunteer foreign nurses as
dangerous criminals, intent on reaping unjust rewards from the destruction of Memphis. They
caricatured black residents as lazy underlings who demanded equal share to government rations
and foreign nurses descending on Memphis to satisfy their baser instincts of greed, corruption,
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and lust as symbols of all that was wrong with Southern society. However, yellow fever narratives
also produced characters that were paragons of Southern virtue, who stood in stark contrast to the
vice of those villains. The heroes of yellow fever narratives further displayed idealized gendered
traits. Physicians and relief workers symbolized the height of Southern manliness and honor as
they marched to meet the foe of yellow fever on a battlefield of disease and death. Wives and
mothers, as well as religious sisters, who asked no pay for nursing the sick, equally displayed the
virtues of nurturance and devotion of respectable Southern women.
For male healers, race, class, and professionalism separated physicians from nurses. While
both sets of healers came to the aid of their Southern brethren at great personal risk, the doctors’
corps was almost exclusively comprised of white, middle-class men. Yellow fever narratives
therefore presented these physicians as paragons of Southern manhood and described their
courage and self-sacrifice in militaristic language. They further contrasted the physician-soldier to
the cowardice of men who deserted their families to ensure their own preservation. These
characterizations had little to do with the actual men themselves, who were just as caught up in the
devastation of the city as everyone else. Instead, they portray a larger cultural dialogue on Southern
manliness.
Yellow fever narratives also juxtaposed female healers who received pay for their services to
those who did not. Memphians treated these nurses for hire—even paid volunteer healers who were
educated, middle-class, and white—as working women. While many of these nurses traveled to
Memphis motivated by purely altruistic impulses, they were nevertheless judged as going outside
the bounds of proper behavior for Southern ladies if they accepted pay for their work. In contrast,
Memphians praised women who nursed family, friends, and strangers for free. Yellow fever
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narratives proclaimed them paragons of womanhood for their display of traditionally feminine,
nurturing behavior. Interestingly, some yellow fever narratives also described these women in
militaristic terms in order to portray a united vanguard of romanticized hero-healers struggling to
save Southern life—literally saving the lives of Southerners from yellow fever as well as figuratively
saving the traditional Southern way of life from outside cultural influence.112

The most ubiquitous heroes of yellow fever narratives were white, middle-class, professional
men. Of these, physicians received the most praise as heroes and martyrs of the epidemic, followed
closely by the men of the relief apparatus and religious healers. Their class and education made
physicians and relief workers more appropriate as icons of male behavior than the nursing corps,
which was largely composed of working-class men, women, and ethnic- and racial minorities.
Working further in the doctors’ favor was the fact that they were virtually all white. Very few
Southern medical schools allowed African Americans to study medicine. Only one black
physician—educated in Cincinnati, Ohio—volunteered to work in Memphis. The Howards assigned
him to a largely black neighborhood in the city known as Hell’s Half-Acre where he treated
patients of his own race. Very little else is known of his experience in Memphis as most yellow
fever narratives fail to mention him. All other black healers nursed under the authority of a white
physician. With white male authority vested in the character of the heroic doctor, yellow fever
narratives presented physicians as the ideal representation of Southern manhood.113
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In furthering this image of the doctor as masculine hero, yellow fever narratives used
militaristic language to describe their work. They characterized the doctors as soldiers of the
battlefield marching to meet the foe of yellow fever, intent on saving the South from its ravages,
even in the face of death. Dromgoole described the physicians as a “noble army of martyrs.” The
Memphis Daily Avalanche likewise reported that these “Brave men are fighting the plague with a
heroism that can not be surpassed.” Keating declared that the doctor was “a noble example of
official zeal, professional enthusiasm, and manly independence....” Authors of yellow fever
narratives thus presented the doctor as the personification of bravery and masculinity.114
The men who directed the activities of the relief apparatus also achieved heroic status. The
Tennessee State Board of Health later proclaimed that “The entire management of everything was
in the hands of the Howard[s] and the Citizens’ Relief Committee, upon whose shoulders
devolved the labor of providing for the sick, feeding the well, burying the dead, and saving
property from fire and pillage. How well this duty was discharged by a little band of heroic souls,
the whole country knows!” Of the Howard relief workers, DePelchin at one point wrote that “the
ranks of the Howards have been thinned. Mr. Lonsdale fell at his post of duty, a faithful soldier.”
Dromgoole likewise told the story of a relief worker who, in response to a friend’s offer of
monetary support so that he could evacuate, replied, “I can not leave Memphis in her hour of
greatest trouble. As a man and a mason I must fight the battle!...bless you for your noble offer of
help, and...if worse comes to the worst, be a friend to my wife and children.” Dromgoole
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proclaimed that this “brave reply...should be chiseled in imperishable marble” as it showed the
selfless bravery and sense of duty of the relief workers.115
Despite the creation of a Colored Citizens’ Relief Committee meant to assist the CRC, the
relief apparatus was under the direction of white men. Even among the religious institutions,
mutual aid organizations, and benevolent societies, yellow fever narratives singled out white men
for commendation after the epidemic. A few narratives mentioned the CCRC and colored relief
societies but otherwise paid very little attention to their efforts.
William Walsh, Rector of St. Bridget’s Church, wrote in his “Report of the Father Mathew
Camp” that the heroic vanguard of physicians and relief workers included “Fifteen priests who
have died on the field of battle, to which the call of their ministry summoned them.” Quinn
echoed this language, claiming “No one shirked back to the rear ranks; every soldier of the church
stood in the van, and defied the arrows of death. This Christian squadron was not a heedless or a
headless body. It was capital, corporate, and well organized as an army, having inferior and
superior officers, guided by a vigilant Captain. All, even those who were bound to remain in the
city, fought like jaded disciples.” Authors of yellow fever narratives thus portrayed doctors, relief
workers, and religious healers as an army of white men battling for the survival of Memphis against
an invisible yet deadly enemy.116
Yet for all this language of physicians waging war against yellow fever, doctors and their
patients both recognized that medical men could not cure the disease in 1878, a fact which caused
great anxiety over physicians’ role in the epidemic. Dr. Dromgoole wrote that yellow fever “is the
most subtle scourge the world has experienced and baffles all medical experience.” Keating added
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that “whatsoever has been administered to the sick as a curative agent, based either on scientific
principles or empyrical [sic] notions, have all alike been barren of fruit. The sanitarian and
scientist, assisted by the charity and generosity of the educated masses, have failed to check its
fearful ravages, even under favorable meteorological conditions.” During the epidemic, physicians
therefore labored in a state of helplessness, well aware that they were unable to halt the disease.117
Many of the doctors sickened and several died of yellow fever, adding to their sense of
frustration. In one of her letters, DePelchin recounted an episode where she was censured by a
doctor while working at an orphan asylum for “giving two of the children small pieces of ice; he
became very angry, said a man died from congestion the night before from ice, and he talked pretty
hard about nurses in general, and me in particular.” Defending her actions, she called in the Sister
in charge and “asked her to please repeat the Dr.’s order of yesterday. She did so and to give small
pieces of ice was one….All the Dr. could say was ‘the orders of yesterday are not those of today.’”
Stunned by his refusal to admit that she had simply been following his directions, DePelchin
nevertheless explained, “I looked at him, could see his eyes were red and watery, and choked down
the sharp reply that trembled on my tongue. The next day the paper stated [this] Doctor had the
fever; he is very low now.”118
While physicians fought to maintain authority in the sickroom during the epidemic,
afterward they sought to defend their reputations in the yellow fever narratives they authored.
Physicians believed that it was imperative to regain the public trust after their ineffectiveness was
so plainly visible during the epidemic. Dr. W. C. Blackman told the Tennessee State Medical
Society in 1879 that physicians “can write and talk learnedly of epidemic and other forms of
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disease; but when in the midst of a visitation, when death is holding a high carnival, we are so
overwhelmed with our impotence, and the unsatisfactory result of treatment that we lose faith in
our boasted knowledge.” He warned that because some people survived yellow fever, “no matter
what remedial agents were employed, the ignorant and thoughtless give credit to whatever
treatment may have been used, and the charlatan rides into popularity.” Physicians feared that
their professional authority was threatened by non-professional healers, particularly lower-class
nurses who relied upon past experience with the disease to push their own modes of treatment.119
Doctors thus transformed nurses into convenient scapegoats upon which they blamed the
failure of contemporary medical knowledge. DePelchin at one point wrote that “The Doctors have
blamed the nurses. Some of the Nurses have cursed the Doctors; meantime Death holds his grim
Carnival, the dead carts are piled higher than ever, and the bell of Elmwood cemetery is tapping all
day long,” as the hearses traveled through its gate. The inability of healers to work together further
hampered the efforts to control the disease. While both doctors and nurses recognized this, each
blamed the other as they tried to justify their own actions. DePelchin laid the blame on “Human
nature; and especially man’s nature, [which] tries ever to lay the blame on some one else. If that
some one is a woman,” she wrote, “so much so the better.” Yet, she argued, “We were glad enough
to get a Doctor for the sick and I am not at all inclined to join in any tirade against them.”
However, many doctors roundly criticized nurses in their yellow fever narratives. Keating followed
suit, quoting many of the doctors’ complaints regarding nurses and claiming that “a great curse in
this city” was the fact that so many nurses refused to follow the doctors’ instructions.120
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Perhaps following the example set by Keating, Memphians showed physicians a level of
respectful treatment denied to nurses. DePelchin at one point complained that she was unable to
get a room at the Peabody Hotel. She wrote, “This Hotel would take in no one who had been out
nursing for fear they should bring the fever into the house,” Yet she complained, “I think [to]
myself, they do not want the nurses [yet] they take Doctors. As the Hotel is in the heart of the city,
the excuse is too transparent,” given that the infected districts had already surrounded the hotel
and a caretaker was not required to spread the fever there. E. Kate Heckle also complained of the
way nurses were treated at the Peabody compared to the doctors. She too was unable to get a room
after being out nursing. Upon entering a dining room set up for Howard volunteers, she wrote
that a man who worked for the hotel jerked her by the arm and rudely informed her that she was
not allowed in this room, that there was a separate dining room set up for nurses. “This, the
nurses’ table, was served with black coffee, meat, and bread so sour, I could not eat it,” she
complained. “I asked the waiter for a biscuit. He said no warm bread was allowed on that table.”
The best of the rations were to be kept for the doctors. In contrast to their treatment of nurses,
Memphians had nothing but praise for doctors, whom they lauded as heroes and martyrs of the
epidemic. The general populace not only echoed the doctors’ claims in their censure of nurses but
juxtaposed the character of the evil nurse—who symbolized the worst traits of contemporary
Southern society—with the heroic doctors—who epitomized the honor of traditional Southern
gentlemen.121
Yellow fever narratives further contrasted the heroic doctors who sacrificed their safety
and, in many cases, their lives to treat sick Memphians to perceived acts of cowardice and unmanly
behavior. John Donovan, a prominent Memphis businessman who was absent from the city when
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the epidemic struck, became a symbol of cowardice and indifference. “His wife, her babe, and a
larger child died,” in his absence, wrote Dromgoole. “Two other children were likely to die.” Yet
when Donovan was informed of the death of his loved ones, “instead of hurrying to their
assistance, he telegraphed to a friend: ‘Take care of my family.’” Dromgoole swore, “No
punishment would be too severe for this man.” Others agreed. John Donovan’s became a
household name as newspapers throughout the South published his story, along with tales of other
men who abandoned their kin and neighbors.122
Keating recalled “The fate of the Donovan family occasioned much comment, in which
Mr. Donovan, who was formerly held in high esteem and exercised considerable influence,
politically and socially in this community, was severely censured for positively refusing to return to
his family when notified that his wife and children were stricken down with the fever.” In a similar
story, a purportedly “rich man of Memphis” evacuated the city, leaving his home in the care of two
female servants, one white, one black. When one of the women got sick, “he sent a letter to the
colored woman, as follows: ‘Send the white woman to the hospital. Don’t use any of the sweet
milk; don’t use any of the eggs or chickens, but help yourself outside.’” The writer of the story
explained, “That last expression undoubtedly means, go to the Howards or the Relief Committee.
Comment is unnecessary.” Yellow fever narratives thus criticized men for abandoning or
neglecting those who depended upon them for support. Men such as these were universally
derided in yellow fever narratives which proclaimed them cowards and unworthy to be called men,
so unlike the brave doctors who traveled toward the pestilence to help strangers rather than toward
safety, thereby abandoning their dependents.123
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Yet despite the rhetoric that lauded doctors as heroes, when they became sick, physicians
suddenly joined the ranks of un-exalted patients. Doctors who were down with the fever were sent
to the Infirmary if they did not have a house in Memphis. As Heckle was stationed there as a
nurse, her letter provides a glimpse of how poorly physicians were treated before death. “One
young man, a druggist named Jarvis, was a raving maniac...obliged to be put under the influence of
Chloroform as he was an injury to the others,” she remembered. “He lay in the dead room, I know
not how long before death relieved him....I could hear him groan out there, and once went to
moisten his lips with toddy.” Reverend Louis Schuyler was another of her patients. She recalled
that he was deathly afraid of some of the nurses, whom she suspected tormented him when no one
was watching. She remembered when they moved him out to the dead room, an area outside
where they put patients they had given up for dead. According to Heckle, he thought that he was
being moved to a room where he would be less of a nuisance to others in his delirium and
requested that she go with him. “Of course I went but I must confess my courage failed me when I
got there and saw the state of affairs,” she wrote, the room then being “occupied by one corpse and
Dr. Bankson yet breathing.” She recalled, “I was so cold I had sometime to run to the kitchen to
warm. Poor Schuyler would call patiently ‘Nurse, don’t leave me.’ I returned as quickly as
possible.” No good to Memphians while sick, doctors were thus treated as ingloriously as most
yellow fever patients in Memphis. Yet, after the epidemic, these physicians were suddenly
remembered as “martyrs in a glorious cause” in death. Yellow fever narratives thus portrayed
doctors as heroic personifications of an idealized Southern identity regardless of how the doctors
acted or were treated during the epidemic.124
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In a similar vein, these narratives presented women who nursed the sick for free as heroic
characters, representing idealized female traits. Yellow fever narratives argued that these women
embodied the appropriate behavior norms of middle- or upper-class Southern ladies. The
treatment of these women stands in stark contrast to healers who accepted pay for their nursing
services, especially those who traveled to Memphis from outside communities. Memphians
believed that these women flouted the gender norms of Southern womanhood by working outside
the confines of the domestic sphere. Regardless of their class, education, or refinement and despite
the altruistic impulse behind their voluntarism, these women were nevertheless targeted for
condemnation and treated disrespectfully because they accepted pay for public work. Neither
middle-class status nor education kept these nurses from being characterized as working women
and thus outside the bounds of respectable female behavior.125
In the letters written by Kezia DePelchin, she made it a point to say several times that she
had not planned to accept any money for her nursing. In her first letter, as she readied to travel
from Houston, Texas to the yellow fever zone, she explained to her sister, “I take some money, and
some has been handed to me by friends to use for the sick I wait upon, in all over $50. There has
been a great deal of money sent to the fever districts wherewith to pay nurses; but I do not intend
to take pay as long as I have a dollar.” Despite her best intentions, by mid-September DePelchin
had exhausted her little fund. She wrote, “I see no way left but to draw money on my ticket as
nurse. This hurts my pride, but if I use it only for the needy, at least I am blameless before God.”
But the receipt of pay for her nursing hurt not only her individual pride; it also hurt her social
standing in Memphis.126
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Nurses who accepted pay for their services—even those employed by the Howard
Association, which depended completely on monetary donations—were assigned the status of
laborer. In another letter, DePelchin explained that “it has become the generally received opinion
that the nurses come for money only, and many a one who tried to fulfill their duty is snubbed
and made to feel as if they hold a subordinate position.” While working-class people may have
been used to being treated as subordinates—and many considered the wages paid to nurses a great
incentive to accept this treatment—DePelchin and her colleague E. Kate Heckle were surprised at
the lack of respect and rough treatment they received for their downgraded social position. The
women complained of being treated as servants by patients and their families and also of being
treated with resentment by domestic servants who saw them as intruding upon their small sphere
of authority. DePelchin remembered one domestic servant “who had no very exalted idea of
nurses, and treated us accordingly when she got the chance.” Their current position, as laborers in
the home, overrode the class-based respectability the women were used to receiving in their normal
everyday lives.127
Of course, stories such as these betrayed the nurses’ own class- and race-based prejudices.
DePelchin complained most about being treated disrespectfully by black domestic servants. After a
black cook was reprimanded by the owner of the house for not allowing DePelchin any food from
the kitchen, she wrote that the cook “changed completely; like all the darkeys, she looked on the
white nurses as taking so much away from them.” Nurses who worked in teams were generally
expected to follow socially predetermined hierarchies of gender and race. White male nurses
expected female nurses to be subordinate and white nurses in general gave black nurses the worst
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duties or called them in when patients became too unruly. DePelchin and Heckle both
complained of working with black male nurses, characterizing them as frightening and irrational.
Heckle especially disliked occasions when these hierarchies of segregation were not enforced.
Working in the Infirmary, she complained that she had no place to get away from the other
nurses, whom she described as “men of all nations and colors, and very rough.” She further
complained when the nurses sat down to eat dinner: “negroes and whites, male and female, ate at
the same table and the negroes were the first to set down.” Both Heckle’s and DePelchin’s yellow
fever narratives sought to reaffirm their white, middle-class womanhood as race, class, and gender
lines were blurred by the designation of “nurse” and as their affiliation with the Howard
Association marked them as women working for pay.128
In contrast, women who nursed without pay were treated with the respect due proper
Southern ladies and yellow fever narratives depicted women in their idealized roles of wives and
mothers as heroines of the epidemic. Dr. Dromgoole claimed that “Parents deserted children and
children parents, husbands wives, but not one wife a husband.” Keating further described a
woman who nursed her husband as having “proven herself worthy to be called wife.” Herbert
Landrum further described this act of womanly love: “By the bedside of the burning body, inhaling
the poison of the sick room, foul with that odor which tells the nature of the dread
disease, performing service which none other will do,” sat the wife and mother. “Wearing a smile
while the heart is breaking and lifting up the head when in the last agony, her person is befouled
by that most repulsive and horrible of all substances—black vomit—she sits and watches, and nurses
and cares for her loved one till he lives again or passes beyond her aid. The penalty of her service
of love is generally death.” Dromgoole and Keating both wrote just as eloquently of “the
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faithfulness of woman as a devoted mother, as patient, attentive wife, as a life-risking daughter,
sister, friend....” These figures all stood in stark contrast to the defamation of the paid nurses.
Yellow fever narratives thus depicted Memphian women, as opposed to outsiders, as doing their
womanly duty by devoting their care to their sick husbands and children, even unto death.129
Yellow fever narratives further pointed to the work of religious healers as similarly
appropriate examples of Southern womanhood. The Catholic and Episcopal nuns were praised in
several yellow fever narratives because they worked tirelessly, in many cases until death, for no pay
or expectation of earthly reward. Thus female nurses’ work among the sick had to be clearly
philanthropic or otherwise sacrificial—an act of loving nurturance in no way seen as self-serving—to
be considered heroic female behavior.130
The veneration of women who nursed for free was even applied to Memphis prostitute
Annie Cook who converted her brothel into a make-shift hospital for yellow fever victims. The fact
that she received no pay for her nursing, and the fact that she died of yellow fever and was
therefore prevented from going back to her old way of life, made her an acceptable martyr of the
epidemic and yellow fever narratives sang her praises. Dromgoole wrote of Annie Cook,
“Whatever her sins may have been, she has laid them all down with her life,” and he compared her
to Mary Magdalene. Cook thus offered a conversion story that yellow fever narrators could use to
shore up the distinction of proper Southern women, who, even if they were not nuns, showed true
Christian virtue by refusing to take pay for their care of the sick and whose nurturing instinct
outweighed that for self-preservation. Yellow fever narratives so idealized Cook as an example of
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white womanhood that her grave was later removed to the Howard Association plot in Elmwood
Cemetery, an honor not bestowed on any of the Howard nurses.131
Many yellow fever narratives also described these idealized female healers using militaristic
language. In a “Report to the Hebrew Hospital Association,” one yellow fever narrator wrote that
“Hardly had we experienced the effect of the peace following the scourge of 1873, when we were
compelled to listen to the trumpets from near and far calling to arms all able-bodied men and
women to fight an enemy far more dangerous and destructive than any experienced in the annals
of history—a battle where the implements used consisted not of musketry, but of knowledge.”
Quinn went so far as to refer to the Catholic nuns as “the ‘right wing’ of the Christian army,”
stating he would “consider it a serious injustice to overlook the virtues and valorous deeds of [this]
band of Catholic warriors.” Equating their work among the sick to the heroic work of their male
counterparts, he wrote that “no sooner does the bugle of war resound, or the foul breath of
pestilence diffuse its poisonous influence, than the rusty locks and iron bolts of the convent gate
are driven back.”132
Quinn further reminded his readers of the care and protection offered by the Sisters to the
Confederate soldiers during the War, warning Southerners not to forget “the kind hands that
bound their wounds, staunched their blood, and wiped their bespattered and parched faces.”
Quinn claimed that “There is still living in Memphis many a brave old soldier in broadcloth or
rags...who can never see a Catholic Nun...without associating her with the woebegone days of
Shiloh, Gettysburg, Fort Sumter, and Vicksburg.” This militaristic language and Civil War imagery
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reinforced the idea that these heroic healers were righteous Southerners fighting a battle to protect
the Southern way of life.133

Despite the fact that social divisions generally broke down during the epidemic, yellow
fever narratives consciously sought to reimpose them. To do so, they juxtaposed heroic
protagonists to villainous and dangerous outsiders. These heroic characters further reinforced
traditional ideas of Southern manhood and womanhood. Their male heroes personified
traditionally manly traits. They were likened to soldiers, exhibiting courage and sacrifice. They
showed responsibility in the care and protection of their dependents. And they exhibited authority
and professionalism as physicians and relief workers who managed the government and
administered aid. They were also generally white and middle or upper class. Female heroes
embodied the nurturing sacrifice of wives and mothers or religious figures. They accepted no pay
for their care as healers, implying that they were either middle or upper class and that they were
Memphians as opposed to outsiders. As yellow fever narratives contrasted these heroic figures to
villains who represented poor racial and ethnic minorities and outsiders who did not belong in
Memphis, they reinforced traditional social hierarchies of race, class, and gender.

Conclusion
Trauma expert Judith Herman explains that “The survivor is called upon to articulate the
values and beliefs...that the trauma destroyed.” The narrators of the 1878 yellow fever epidemic
were attempting to do just that. The themes of race, class, gender, professionalism, honor,
localism, and militarism that they explored in their narratives acted to reinforce the socio-cultural
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components these authors believed had broken down during the epidemic. By writing, they were
trying to right this wrong, to put the world back together again by reminding people of these sociocultural realities that oriented the world of late nineteenth-century Southerners. In doing so, they
reinforced traditional hierarchies of race, class, and gender in order to reconstitute Southern
identity along lines that privileged the authority of educated white men and circumscribed
appropriate roles for white women and African Americans.134
The popularity of these yellow fever narratives during and immediately following the
epidemic allowed their authors to export these ideas about Southern behavior and social hierarchy
throughout the country. While readers sought these narratives to learn more about the experiences
of Memphians with yellow fever, the characterizations of different social groups were able to subtly
influence the understanding of race and gender relations in the South. While the authors of these
narratives described events that happened in Memphis, they nevertheless used themes, motifs, and
characterizations that would have been readily familiar to a broader Southern audience. By
publishing these stories that juxtaposed martyrs who stood for traditional Southern values and
villains who sought personal gain in the destruction of the South, yellow fever narratives can
therefore be understood as part of the struggle for Southern cultural redemption.135
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CHAPTER TWO:
A SILVER LINING TO YELLOW FEVER

On August 28, 1878, Edwin Britton Jennings wrote a letter to his uncle in Little Rock
describing the epidemic of yellow fever then devastating New Orleans. The fever, he explained,
had spread to all parts of the city. Doctors were “run to death,” and some even refused to attend
new cases. He further described the exodus of terrified residents leaving the city, convinced they
would be yellow fever’s next victims. Despite being at risk of contracting the disease himself,
Jennings nonetheless insisted, “I am still in good spirits & have made up my mind to give Yellow
Jack a tussle if I should be one of the unfortunates.” Writing again six days later, he declared,
“Thank God! I still continue well. When I see so many of my friends down with the fever &
several having already died, it makes me sad indeed.” Despite this disheartening account, Jennings
nevertheless defended his decision to remain in the city: “I manage to keep my spirits up, for I
must take the consequences. It will never do to give up now….If I can only manage to pass through
this fearful epidemic all right I need have no fears as regards my future success in business.”136
Jennings’s comments raise some important questions. Why would a young businessman,
who recognized the risk to his life, choose to stay in New Orleans during a city-wide epidemic of
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yellow fever when most vulnerable citizens fled in terror? Also, why did he believe that staying in
the city would guarantee his success in business when yellow fever generally brought economic
prostration as residents fled and businesses closed for the season? Jennings did not stay behind to
tend the sick; nor was he one of the thousands who lacked the resources required to flee. Instead,
this chapter suggests that Edwin Jennings—and others like him—chose to stay because he believed
that gaining immunity would guarantee his successful integration into New Orleanian social and
economic life. As a recent migrant from Little Rock—and therefore an outsider (or stranger) to the
Crescent City—Jennings recognized the importance of yellow fever immunity in his path to
acceptance as a true New Orleanian.137
Jennings was not alone in holding this view. In the nineteenth century, yellow fever
immunity carried immense social and cultural importance for all New Orleanians—newcomers and
lifelong residents alike. Since its first major epidemic in 1796, New Orleans was beset by yellow
fever nearly every summer during what became known as the “sickly season” of July through
September. As a result, New Orleanians developed both a unique relationship to yellow fever and
a set of strongly-held cultural beliefs about immunity to the disease. By 1878, immunity had
become integral to New Orleanian identity. Acquiring immunity to yellow fever through infection
and survival, moreover, had come to be understood as a pivotal moment in a ritual of belonging
for all newcomers. Jennings’s decision to remain in the city during the epidemic of 1878 must be
understood in this context; he chose to remain in the hopes of gaining immunity and, by
extension, securing recognition as an adopted son of his chosen city.138
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This chapter analyzes the popular medical theories about differential immunity and
susceptibility to yellow fever that animated Jennings’s decision. It argues that New Orleanian
yellow fever narratives took part in a broader discussion about municipal identity by relying on
these long-held cultural beliefs about yellow fever’s ability to arbitrate belonging in the city. New
Orleanians explained differential mortality and morbidity by advancing a system of beliefs that
demonstrated yellow fever’s preference for a natural hierarchy of belonging and which also
happened to reinforce a particular social structure in New Orleans. The historical relevance of
these theories’ importance to New Orleanian identity allowed yellow fever narratives in 1878 to
use them as successful rhetorical devices to renegotiate the city’s social and cultural hierarchy after
Reconstruction.
Historian Jo Ann Carrigan first described the New Orleanian characterization of yellow
fever as a “strangers’ disease.” Focusing on the decades prior to the Civil War, her work on the
cultural significance of yellow fever for New Orleanians charts the nativist construction of yellow
fever theory in the wake of increased foreign immigration to New Orleans. The medical discourse
about yellow fever, Carrigan demonstrates, was closely correlated to social attitudes and prejudices
in New Orleanian society. As part of the elaboration of a unique Creole identity—a complex
construction which will be discussed in greater depth below—New Orleanian elites became widely
convinced that Creoles were inherently immune to yellow fever. As Carrigan argues, this theory
further naturalized their power in New Orleans by establishing Creoles as a privileged caste by
right of acclimation from birth.139
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Yellow fever theories also helped to cement the racial division of labor in New Orleans.
Kenneth Kiple, Virginia Kiple, and Peter McCandless have studied the role that the perceived
immunity of Africans and their descendants played in the Southern medical justification of
slavery. Theories of differential immunity and susceptibility to yellow fever, as this scholarship
suggests, played an important role in defining and elaborating racial categories for both black and
white New Orleanians. Shirley Thompson, for instance, points to the complicated racial
implications of yellow fever immunity for Creoles who sought to maintain their superiority by
emphasizing both their immunity and their whiteness.140
Together, this scholarship shows the central role that medical theories about yellow fever
played in defining social categories of race and ethnicity in New Orleans’s hierarchy of belonging.
For all its value, however, the existing historiography on theories of differential immunity has
focused almost exclusively on the antebellum period. Historians have argued that these theories
lost traction following the Civil War with the loss of slavery due to Emancipation, the decrease in
foreign immigration entering through Southern ports, and the waning support for these theories
within the elite medical establishment. This assertion certainly seems justified by an analysis of
elite medical sources.141
However, this chapter broadens the range of the literature, extending the examination of
popular medical theories of differential immunity and susceptibility into the postbellum era. It
illustrates the prevalence of these theories in public rhetoric during the 1878 yellow fever
epidemic, demonstrating that they remained prevalent well after the Civil War. Facing a
140

Kenneth F. Kiple and Virginia Himmelsteib King, Another Dimension to the Black Diaspora: Diet, Disease, and Racism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Peter McCandless, Slavery, Disease, and Suffering in the Southern
Lowcountry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Shirley Elizabeth Thompson, Exiles at Home: The Struggle to
Become American in Creole New Orleans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 24-66.
141
Carrigan, The Saffron Scourge, 259.

94

transformed social and political world, physicians, residents, and commentators wielded
traditional medical knowledge of yellow fever to promote a return to the antebellum social
structure these theories were originally created to uphold. Theories of differential immunity and
susceptibility found new expression in the post-Reconstruction context of 1878 when issues of
belonging and citizenship were highly contested. They further cemented the city’s distinctive
relationship to yellow fever and the role of immunity in the ritual of cultural belonging.
This chapter also contributes to an essential but understudied component of the disease’s
cultural history by showing how both popular and medical understandings of yellow fever became
associated with place-based identity. In the social chaos of the tumultuous postwar years, nativeborn white New Orleanians used yellow fever as a way to reaffirm a more traditional reliance on
Creole culture and a shared history as the basis of New Orleanian identity. Further, they sought to
place northern migrants, foreign immigrants, and freedpeople on a sliding scale of exclusion based
on their susceptibility to yellow fever and on their degree of cultural or biological difference from
the Creole norm. In so doing, they employed medical understanding as a tool to enforce
traditional definitions of identity and social stratification.142
By analyzing the 1878 epidemic, this chapter demonstrates that theories of differential
immunity and susceptibility to yellow fever presented Creole identity as the ideal to which all New
Orleanians should aspire. After demonstrating that New Orleanians fought to maintain traditional
notions of Creole immunity—despite changing attitudes among the medical elite—this chapter
moves into a discussion of various categories of migrants. American migrants, like Edwin Britton
142
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Jennings, as well as foreign immigrants, fit into a hierarchy of attainable immunity based on their
similarity to Creoles in physiology, culture, and lifestyle. New Orleanians further justified nativism
toward undesirable migrants by claiming that yellow fever victimized those who had physiological
and cultural traits that were inappropriate to life in Southern Louisiana.
The chapter then turns to theories of racialized immunity and argues that these theories, in
particular, were complicated by the racial tensions and ambiguities in the city following
Emancipation. Both physicians and the general public believed racialized immigrants and African
Americans were inherently immune or resistant to yellow fever. Yet, in 1878, debates over African
American resistance reflected the uncertain role of black citizens in the city after Reconstruction.
New Orleanians advanced claims of racial immunity based on whether they believed African
Americans could fit into the larger postwar society. Yellow fever theorists thus offered a socially
powerful set of ideas about disease that cemented a unique place-based identity in New Orleans
and offered a litmus test for those seeking membership.
Americans considered New Orleans as a primary center of knowledge about yellow fever.
New Orleanians were therefore able to export their popular medical ideas about the disease and
about its effects on various types of bodies. While yellow fever narratives from Memphis were
focused on portraying the experience of the disease, the breakdown of the city, and the
heroism/villainy of the characters, the yellow fever narratives created in New Orleans were focused
on understanding different aspects of the disease, its etiology, and its spread. Yet these narratives
played an equally important role in the negotiation of post-Reconstruction Southern identity. They
did so by elaborating theories that upheld a traditional municipal identity in New Orleans, and
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which suggested that the disease’s effects on different social groups was indicative of the nature
and degree of their belonging in the South.
A note on terminology: The concept of a creole, admittedly, is historically ambiguous.
Usually, the term creole applies to individuals who are fully or partially descended from white
European colonial settlers and who were born and raised in the colonies. Applied to language or
culture, the term also denotes the intermixture of European and indigenous cultural forms in the
colonial environment. The term also regularly connotes people of mixed European and indigenous
ancestry and, with the growth of African slavery in American colonies, potentially mixed-race
parentage as well.
In yellow fever narratives, however, the term Creole took on a distinct meaning, referring
specifically to whites whose families had lived in or around the city for a number of generations.
The concept of Creole immunity did not refer to “creoles of color” nor was it only applied to those
whose ancestors had settled in the region as European colonists. The term was specifically used, in
the context of yellow fever immunity, to refer to white individuals—presumed to be of European
lineage—who were acclimated from birth to the climate of Louisiana, especially to those born in
New Orleans. As the following sections in this chapter describe, New Orleanians developed the
Creole identity—with its attendant immunity to yellow fever—in order to distance themselves from
non-native outsiders and native-born African Americans.143
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Antebellum Antecedents
The New Orleanian yellow fever narratives of 1878 utilized theories of differential
immunity and susceptibility that were socially and culturally significant to generations of the city’s
residents. Over the years, the citizens of New Orleans elaborated these ideas—particularly during
times of social and demographic upheaval—to justify the antebellum social hierarchy of the city.
Given New Orleans’s colorful colonial history and its position as a major port, the city was a point
of contact for numerous cultures and nationalities. These theories were therefore highly complex—
and often contradictory—justifications of social relations between natives and newcomers.
Yet despite their complexity, these theories of differential immunity can largely be
separated into two types: immunity based on acclimation and immunity based on race. Early in the
city’s history, theories of acclimation—or acclimatization—first explained white death in colonial
environments and justified the introduction of African slavery. As the colony developed, however,
theories of differential immunity split into two camps—acclimation and race—which informed and
reinforced each other. Proponents of slavery in the nineteenth century elaborated ideas of racial
immunity to explain why black bodies seemed immune to the disease while the bodies of newly
arrived immigrants—or strangers—seemed especially susceptible. Creoles likewise elaborated the
theory of acclimation—now seen as largely distinct from racial immunity—to further argue that
native-born, Creole bodies were less susceptible to the disease than newcomers.

Prior to the colonization of Louisiana, European imperialists recognized that tropical fevers
posed one of the greatest threats to their colonial ambitions in the Western Hemisphere, Africa,
and Asia. White colonists were decimated by disease in tropical climates and their susceptibility
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jeopardized European conquest of these locales. Dominant medical theories of the time
maintained that health was dependent upon a delicate relationship between bodily constitution
and climate. Tropical fevers, according to such beliefs, were the inevitable result of colonists’
bodies operating under a wholly new and unfamiliar climatological influence.144
Recently arrived colonists from foreign lands therefore created the first theories of
strangers’ susceptibility to yellow fever to explain the high mortality rate among recent arrivals in
the colonies. They believed that, given a period of time, these immigrants would eventually adjust
to the climate and their bodies would undergo changes allowing them to survive in the New
World. This theory of acclimation explained why the mortality of newcomers—so high during their
first years in the colonies—seemed to reach a plateau of survival after a period of residence.145
Yet struggling new colonies could not wait for years to develop a population of seasoned
colonists. In order to safeguard white lives and imperial aspirations, colonies therefore relied
heavily on slave labor. They justified the importation of African slaves in part with the argument
that bodies indigenous to a tropical climate must be less susceptible to tropical diseases. Supporters
of African slavery held that African bodies were acclimated to a climate more similar to the New
World than Europe and might therefore labor in the colonies without experiencing the high
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mortality that overwhelmed white settlers. This medical justification of slavery contributed to a
growing conviction that African bodies were naturally immune to yellow fever.146
Eighteenth- and early-nineteenth century writers were not necessarily in agreement about
the immunity of Africans. There were many who considered newly imported African slaves
susceptible to colonial diseases. This can be seen in suggestions to slaveholders that they take extra
special care of their newly arrived slaves and in the fact that slaves who had already survived their
first years in the colonies commanded higher prices than those newly imported from Africa. The
expectation that Africans were inherently immune to yellow fever nevertheless grew with the end
of the African slave trade and the reliance on American-born slaves.147
With the rise of abolitionist sentiment in the first half of the nineteenth century, proslavery physicians in the United States helped to further medicalize theories of racial difference
that justified the continued subjugation of black people. By the 1850s, they had constructed an
elaborate theory of yellow fever immunity, which held that Africans were immune to the disease
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because of racially-based biological characteristics rather than their acclimation to a tropical
environment.148
Arguably the most well-known pro-slavery medical advocate at the time was Dr. Samuel
Cartwright—a Southern physician, educated in the North, who moved to New Orleans in the
1850s. In widely circulated medical publications, Cartwright argued that the African body was
created to withstand “hard labor in the hot sun [which] causes a rapid degeneration of the tissues
within the body of the white man,” but which “the peculiar construction of the skin” in black
bodies, aided by an “enormous liver,” was able to overcome. He wrote, “the summer’s sun in this
climate is too hot to enable any white man to labor long in it and live....This physiological fact, the
rankest abolitionism, which ever tried to push the happy negro from his stool in this Southern
climate...cannot deny.” Cartwright thus argued that the black body was not only well-suited for
labor in the service of whites but also that blacks were biologically intended for such labor. Any
argument against slavery, by extension, was fundamentally contrary to nature.149
He further claimed that white bodies were not built to withstand the rigors of agricultural
labor in the South and that slavery was thus necessary to the success of the plantation economy.
Building on these purported physiological differences separating black from white bodies,
Cartwright cited mortality statistics during the 1853 yellow fever epidemic in New Orleans to
further his argument in favor of the racial division of labor. Recently arrived immigrant laborers,
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he claimed, were decimated by yellow fever, not simply because they were unacclimated to the
environment, but because they were forced by poverty to toil under the brutal Louisiana sun,
doing the work meant for slaves. According to Cartwright, no amount of acclimation would allow
white migrants to take the place of black slave labor in the fields.150
Cartwright further claimed that yellow fever was a species of typhus, a class of diseases that
he attributed to poverty, malnutrition, and filth. He maintained that “whatever may be said against
American negro slavery, it has, at least, freed the slaves from every species of typhus. It has done it
by meat and bread, blankets, warm clothing, good fires, and by exacting no more than a reasonable
service in return, for all the substantial comforts of life.” Cartwright thus advanced a selfreinforcing medical justification for slavery: black people’s inherent resistance to the disease fitted
them for hard labor, while the condition of slavery—which supposedly provided for their every
need—transformed that natural resistance into complete immunity.151
The pro-slavery press echoed Cartwright’s claims, helping to spread his medical theories to
a broader popular audience. The New Orleans Weekly Delta, for example, insisted that the
condition of slavery safeguarded the black body from yellow fever. Arguing that black people who
remained in the South were immune while those who traveled North seemed to lose their
resistance to the disease, the Delta proclaimed that slavery protected the slave “as it exempts him
from a destructive disease, to which he would render himself liable by the exercise of his freedom.”
Such theories of black immunity solidified the racial division of labor in the South by justifying the
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subjugation of the black body and by arguing that abolition imperiled both black and white
health.152
Recognizing the social utility of these medical theories of immunity, antebellum New
Orleanians also advanced a claim that at first glance appears contradictory: that white Creole
populations also possessed inherent immunity to yellow fever. Yet in the case of Creoles, immunity
signified something wholly different than it did for African-Americans. Theories of Creole
immunity supported their social and cultural supremacy rather than their subjugation. Elite Creole
families observed that they had lived under the climatological influence of Louisiana for
generations and argued that their bodies had slowly acclimated to the region, making the nativeborn immune to the disease which continued to decimate recently arrived migrants from the
northern United States and Europe. This inherited immunity became part of the unique Creole
identity of native-born New Orleanians.153
Antebellum New Orleanians generally considered creole to be synonymous with native. For
example, in the 1841 novel The Quadroone; or, St. Michael’s Day Joseph Ingraham explained to his
readers that “The term Creole will used throughout this work in its simply Louisianan acceptation,
viz., as the synonyme [sic] for NATIVE. It has no reference whatsoever to African descent, and
means nothing more nor less than native....The children of northern parents, if born in Louisiana,
are ‘Creoles.’” According to Ingraham, New Orleanians referred to the native-born—of either race—
as Creole.154
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Antebellum yellow fever theorists generally followed this convention of defining Creole as
native. Dr. Bennet Dowler—writing after the 1853 epidemic in New Orleans—claimed that “In
Louisiana, every native, be his parentage what it may, is a Creole.” He claimed that, “Although the
word Creole in its usual acceptation means a white person, it applies to all races, as Creole
negroes; it even applies to the inferior animals, and things,” claiming that “a Creole chicken, egg,
or cow is worth nearly twice as much as one from a distant State....” In antebellum New Orleans,
therefore, creole meant native and native meant better.155
Following the Louisiana Purchase, native-born residents gradually cultivated and elaborated
this unique Creole identity—alongside medical theories of their immunity to yellow fever—to justify
the continued social and economic supremacy of traditional elites vis-à-vis encroaching American
and European immigrants. As Charles Gayarre’s 1866 History of Louisiana claimed, among
antebellum Creoles “there were even some who felt friendly to the scourge, as, in their opinion, it
checked that tide of immigration which, otherwise, would have speedily rolled its waves over the
old population, and swept away all those landmarks in legislation, customs, language and social
habits to which they were fondly attached.” New Orleanian Creoles, safe in their presumed
immunity from the disease, thereby began to view yellow fever as their ally, cutting the ranks of
newcomers that might threaten their position of privilege and power in the city.156
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The yellow fever epidemic of 1853—the worst in the city’s history—only added to the
nativist attitudes New Orleanians held for these newcomers. Creoles therefore focused on
developing the theory of their inherent immunity in order to justify their designation of yellow
fever as a strangers’ disease. New Orleanians further argued that the Creole lifestyle was the
healthiest and most appropriate for the region, implying that Creole culture was somehow natural.
This line of reasoning disregarded the fact that Creole culture developed as a blending of
indigenous cultures with those imported from Europe and further amalgamated with each
successive wave of immigration during the colonial history of the city. New Orleanian climate and
Creole culture, according to this logic, were so entwined as to be inseparable. Yellow fever thus
naturalized the Creole culture as the “right” one for New Orleans, acting as an external pressure
which selected against particular cultural attributes by targeting individuals whose lifestyle differed
from the norm.
But in proclaiming themselves naturally immune to yellow fever—and therefore superior to
these would-be migrants—Creoles simultaneously sought to avoid the implication that they were
not fully white. In order to dissociate their inherent immunity from that of black New Orleanians,
Creoles emphasized that native immunity was founded upon the concept of acclimation, which
allowed that white bodily constitutions could evolve to align with the climatological influences of
the region. According to this theory, Creole children who were born in the city, especially if their
parents were also acclimated, possessed immunity to yellow fever from birth. Yellow fever theorists
argued that black bodies, conversely, gained their immunity due to biological characteristics and
were further safeguarded by their condition of servitude. Therefore, when Dr. Bennet Dowler
claimed that “congenital city creolism, that is the constitutional modification incidental to the
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being born of Creole or thoroughly creolized parents, with continuity of city residence, exempts
the individual from yellow fever with nearly the same uniformity that vaccination prevents the
small-pox,” he imagined this immunity to be largely heritable yet distinct from the innate
immunity of black people. By the 1850s, this congenital immunity to yellow fever had come to be
widely accepted as a fundamental attribute to Creole identity.157
In the meantime, yellow fever theorists may have considered slaves born in Louisiana
doubly immune—by race and birth—but that designation was of far less consequence. While black,
native-born New Orleanians could also be considered Creoles, their immunity was nevertheless
different from that of white natives. Even George Washington Cable—who used the designation
Creole to refer to French descendants of either race—wrote in an article on “Flood and Plague in
New Orleans,” that during the yellow fever epidemic of 1853, “The pestilence had attacked the
Creoles and the blacks,” treating their purported immunity as distinct. Following the Civil War
and Emancipation, many New Orleanians insisted that the term Creole refer to white natives only.
In part, this was to ensure that the privileged status of the immune Creole support white
supremacy as well as municipal nativism. New Orleanians may still have used the term creole with
multiple racial connotations, but when it came to yellow fever theory, it was generally understood
that Creole referred only to whites.158
While New Orleanian Creoles elaborated theories of generational acclimation in order to
uphold their families’ social and cultural authority in the city—in a way that distanced their
inherent immunity from the racial immunity of black New Orleanians—they unwittingly allowed
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the possibility that generations of migrants could eventually claim the same sort of privileged
acclimation. Strangers who became acclimated through long exposure or who became immune to
yellow fever by surviving a case of the disease—a process known as “seasoning”—could also claim
privileged status in the city. Literally described as “creolization,” seasoning became an important
criteria of belonging, a ritual that migrants were expected to undergo if they hoped to be accepted
as New Orleanians. Dowler believed that “creolization in the city, with or without having had
yellow fever,” offered equal protection against the disease for those unlucky enough to have been
born elsewhere. This immunity, he argued, was usually acquired in less than ten years provided
migrants remained in the city for the duration. Importantly, Dowler believed that this
“creolization” might then be “hereditary or transmissible from parents to children,” a fact which
would allow children of migrants to claim membership in this privileged caste without requiring
them to undergo the ritual of seasoning.159
These antebellum beliefs about acquired immunity gained increasing relevance in the midnineteenth century as New Orleans grew as a central port of immigration to the United States. By
1850, the foreign-born population of the city swelled to 49 percent of approximately 100,000 free
residents, raising the white population of the city above that of the black population and making
New Orleans the second largest cosmopolitan metropolis in the United States. At the same time,
the influx of this large population of nonimmunes magnified the severity of epidemics, giving New
Orleans the reputation of being the preeminent “necropolis of the South.”160
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The high mortality among immigrants reinforced the belief that yellow fever targeted
strangers or outsiders while Creoles and black residents were relatively immune, a view that further
inflamed New Orleanian nativism. New Orleanian Creoles blamed the rising tide of immigrants
for the devastating epidemics of midcentury. Isaac Charles—an acclimated resident of New
Orleans—described these undeserving migrants in a letter to his cousin. “By far the greater part of
the victims are the Irish and the Dutch, who have just arrived from a country where the Climate is
totally different to ours,” he explained, “and if you could...see the miserable, filthy, loathsome
manner in which [they] live, you would not be at all surprised...that [yellow fever] should spread &
become as malignant as it does here.”161
The mortality among Irish and German immigrants led many Creoles to conclude that
yellow fever attacked those who were culturally dissimilar to Creoles or who were unlikely to
assimilate to the Creole way of life, reinforcing the view that acclimation was somehow linked to
culture. Creoles therefore argued that migrants who aspired to belong must not only remain in the
region during the sickly season but conform to the habits and lifestyle of New Orleanian Creoles
in order to ensure their best chance of survival, thus medicalizing the pressure for immigrants to
assimilate.162
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By the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, the social hierarchy of New Orleans was firmly
buttressed by an elaborate set of theories of differential immunity and susceptibility to yellow fever.
White Southerners crafted theories of racial immunity to yellow fever that reinforced the proslavery agenda. These theories naturalized the racial inferiority of black people by reinforcing
perceived organic differences between white and black bodies that suited blacks for slavery. They
justified the continued reliance of the Southern economy on slave rather than immigrant labor.
And they discredited abolition as a threat to public health. New Orleanian Creoles further
elaborated theories of acclimation immunity to justify the privileged status of white Creole elites in
the face of a growing multitude of outsiders seeking opportunity in the prosperous city. The
expectation that yellow fever was a stranger’s disease—and that epidemics were only really
dangerous to newly arrived, unacclimated immigrants—fueled nativist pressures for migrants to
undergo the ritual of seasoning and to assimilate to Creole cultural and behavior norms.

Creole Immunity
Though products of the antebellum era, theories of differential immunity and susceptibility
to yellow fever continued to resonate far later in the century. Despite falling out of favor in the
elite medical community, the theory of acclimation immunity remained important to the identity
and cultural prestige of New Orleanian Creoles. In 1878, in the wake of the intense social and
demographic instability that marked the era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, these theories
resurfaced in debates over the reorganization of the postbellum social hierarchy in New Orleanian
yellow fever narratives. These narratives continued to support the notion that Creoles were
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immune to the disease in order to buttress Creole cultural authority, to argue for the assimilation
of outsiders to Creole standards of behavior, and to support white supremacy.

Immunity to yellow fever, as the previous section described, had become a historically
significant component of Creole identity in the years before the American Civil War. By the
epidemic of 1878, however, many doctors had begun to rethink their faith in this attribute. In
1879, describing his medical education in New Orleans during the 1840s, nationally renowned
gynecologist and co-founder of the New Orleans School of Medicine Dr. D. Warren Brickell
recalled an important lesson that he had learned in his student days: “I was told by the gray heads
of the profession, that neither negroes, nor those born in the city, as we call them creole born, ever
contract yellow fever. These among other dogmas,” Brickell recalled, “were laid down and
universally accepted.”163
By 1878, as Brickell’s comments suggest, a sea change had occurred: elite New Orleanian
physicians no longer endorsed the principle of Creole immunity. While antebellum physicians had
been almost unanimous in teaching that native Creoles were immune to the disease, most elite
physicians now characterized these traditional theories as groundless and naive. As Dr. Stanford
Chaille, Dean of the Medical Department at the University of Louisiana, claimed “there are now
in New Orleans no physicians known to me, having experience and distinction, except Drs.
Mercier and Faget,” two physicians from established Creole families, “who uphold the old view” of
Creole immunity.164
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Elite physicians—those serving on the faculty of the city’s medical schools and overseeing
the city’s hospitals, medical societies, and medical journals—thus claimed that the assumption of
Creole immunity was outdated, superstitious, and potentially dangerous. These physicians
regularly cited both observational and statistical evidence demonstrating that New Orleanian
Creoles were in fact susceptible to yellow fever. The Homoeopathic Relief Association, for
example, described the 1878 epidemic as “attacking a class of residents—our creole citizens—who
had heretofore believed themselves exempt from its influences.” This fact, coupled with the
epidemic’s particular “virulence among children,” the Association noted, had “caused a greater
panic among our residents than was ever produced by any former epidemic.” Such findings were
confirmed by Dr. Chaille, who reported to the newly created National Board of Health in 1879
that a staggering 2,023 children under the age of ten years had perished during the three-month
crest of the epidemic. The high death toll among native-born New Orleanians, particularly the
city’s young children, was wholly unexpected and prompted special attention in both medical and
popular discussions.165
Further, while cases of yellow fever among natives of the city were still far less common
than in recently arrived strangers, elite physicians no longer held that native New Orleanians
became immune due to acclimatization. Instead, they looked for new theories to account for
disease patterns. Most notably, physicians argued that immunity to yellow fever was only
guaranteed by surviving a prior case of the disease. The perception of the higher susceptibility
among strangers, as Chaille argued, was simply due to the fact that the native-born most likely
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experienced the disease in a mild or otherwise undiagnosed form, resulting in a higher degree of
immunity among those who had lived in New Orleans for a number of years. He further pointed
to the fact that New Orleans had suffered from major epidemics of yellow fever almost biennially
throughout its history but that the city had been remarkably healthy since 1858, with only two
serious epidemics. This period of salubrity, he continued, had denied residents the chance to
acquire immunity by surviving an unrecognized case thereby explaining the unexpectedly high
number of yellow fever deaths among native-born New Orleanian children. Ultimately, Chaille
concluded, “Immunity from yellow fever cannot be gained through the influence of climate.” For
this reason, he asserted, “it is an abuse of language, due to past ignorance and misconception, to
continue to designate the acquisition of immunity from yellow fever, ‘acclimation,’ or
‘acclimatization.’”166
The experience of the 1878 epidemic, according to elite yellow fever researchers, had
exposed the fallacy of innate Creole immunity based on acclimatization. The medical profession,
they argued, should instead focus on crafting new epidemiological explanations. Of particular
concern was whether the disease was imported or indigenous to New Orleans; how best to prevent
the disease, either through quarantine or improved sanitary measures; and how best to diagnose
the disease and care for its victims. Very few physicians spoke of curing yellow fever, as this was
considered outside the realm of contemporary medical ability, but they made suggestions for
treatment and proper management to other doctors and to the lay public who provided nursing
care during epidemics.167
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Despite the conviction of these medical experts, the belief in Creole’s inherent immunity
to yellow fever nevertheless retained significant currency among many older doctors and non-elite
physicians, as well as the general populace. Dr. William Mandeville, Sanitary Inspector for the
Fourth District of New Orleans, lamented that “many physicians will never diagnose the illness of
a native as yellow fever.” He claimed, “There may be a few cases reported as yellow fever which are
not, but far more are reported some other disease by those who do not believe a native is liable.”
Mandeville was not the only physician to complain about this corruption of statistical data. The
Editor of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal explained that “The Board of Health have
constantly been of the impression that a large proportion of cases never were reported to their
office.” The Journal charged that the dearth of reliable data could be blamed, at least in part, on the
popular belief in Creole immunity. “This fact alone seriously impairs the value of statistics,” they
claimed, as “thousands of cases and many deaths have been withheld from the yellow fever roll” by
those who automatically discounted the signs of yellow fever in native patients. Thus, while elite
physicians on the Board of Health and on the faculty of the Medical Colleges rejected the notion
of Creole immunity, they nevertheless recognized that the theory remained prevalent among
everyday New Orleanian practitioners.168
Despite elite physicians’ evidence and arguments to the contrary, many New Orleanians—
both everyday practitioners and ordinary citizens—refused to abandon their deeply-held beliefs
about acclimation. Instead, they adopted a number of explanations that sought to maintain the
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notion of Creole immunity, further testifying to its social and cultural importance. For example,
many New Orleans citizens suggested that the epidemic had been caused by some disease other
than yellow fever. Arguing that New Orleanian natives should not be found among the death roll,
they blamed the devastation among Creole children on concomitant epidemics, fueled by the same
unsanitary conditions that fostered yellow fever. The New Orleans Bee, for example, expressed
doubts about the list of reported deaths furnished by the Board of Health because of the high
number of cases among native-born, Creole children, declaring it “difficult for us to believe these
children, double Orleanans [sic] both by reason of their birth and race [as Creoles], should be
victims of yellow fever.” Believing that these children should have been protected by their inherent
acclimation, the Bee’s editors considered these to be “very strange cases of death” and wondered,
“Can it be we have some other malady prevalent amongst us?” Reporters for The Daily City Item
agreed, claiming that the physicians they interviewed could not agree as to whether the prevailing
disease was in fact yellow fever or some other ailment. To support this view, they noted “that
yellow fever does not attack children born here, nor colored people whether born here or not;
whereas the existing fever is indiscriminate in its attacks.”169
While some New Orleanians wholly doubted the diagnosis of yellow fever, others amended
the theory of acclimation to explain the disease’s occurrence among the native-born. In some cases,
New Orleanians claimed that Creoles were for the most part exempt from yellow fever and that if it
did invade the native body, the disease took on a decidedly less lethal character. When yellow fever
deaths did occur among Creoles, these individuals attributed it to improper treatment or the
failure to follow strict rules of convalescence. According to contemporary medical advice, yellow
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fever patients were required to remain in bed for ten to fourteen days after their temperature
returned to normal. They were not to sit up or attempt to get out of bed and were to refrain from
eating any solid or rich foods, instead being fed mostly broth or milk. Yet as caretakers recognized,
it was extremely difficult to impose these rules on children below a certain age, a factor that might
result in a young patient’s decline. Excitation or fear could also cause a patient to take a turn for
the worse. Many of the deaths from yellow fever among sensitive or boisterous children, especially
young boys, were attributed to these causes.170
Still others argued that acclimatization was a process that occurred during the first several
years of a child’s life and that if children spent any length of time away from New Orleans, they
would be as prone to yellow fever as any stranger. The New Orleans Times quoted Dr. Armand
Mercier, a long-time proponent of the theory of Creole immunity, as having “never seen a case in
which a native of this city died of the disease” in thirty-seven years of professional practice. Times
reporters qualified his statement, however, by explaining that, “By natives he meant those who had
remained within an atmosphere where yellow fever existed. If a child or any one born in Louisiana
remained in another atmosphere long enough to lose their acclimation,” the paper concluded,
“they would of course be liable.” This argument claimed that the New Orleanian child must grow
up immersed in the culture and climate of New Orleans to sustain the privileged immunity
afforded by birth. Dr. C. Charles Turpin agreed, arguing that if one were to delve into the
background of those native-born yellow fever victims, it would be discovered that they had “from
time to time been absent from the city, and have, by such absence, lost their acclimatization.” This,
170
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he believed, was true for both children and adults. The argument that individuals who left New
Orleans might lose their acclimation also helped to explain the strikingly high number of cases
that occurred among the privileged classes who frequently avoided the summer heat by vacationing
in Northern or European cities.171
New Orleanians’ popular narratives of yellow fever in 1878 thus largely argued that Creoles
continue to be considered immune to the disease, despite elite medical arguments to the contrary.
As a historically significant component of Creole identity, New Orleanians maintained this theory
in the face of Creole sickness and death by creating a number of explanations that salvaged this
culturally important concept. The equivocation of the larger medical community on this issue
allowed a number of popular medical theories to proliferate in which New Orleanians justified a
number of social and cultural claims.

Yellow fever immunity therefore continued to be an integral component in the place-based
identity of New Orleans. The reaffirmation of acclimation immunity, despite medical evidence to
the contrary, further conveys a desire to reinforce a hierarchy of belonging. Immunity essentially
corporealized the relationship between New Orleanians and their city. Creoles were immune
because they belonged to the city in physical ways that marked their bodies as New Orleanian. Just
as they did after the Louisiana Purchase, theories of Creole immunity to yellow fever reified native
New Orleanian authority and provided a rhetorically useful way to set the terms upon which civic
belonging and citizenship were based. In the negotiation over what Southern society would be like
after Reconstruction, New Orleanian yellow fever narratives therefore argued that Creoles—
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meaning native-born whites—would continue to be at the top of the social hierarchy and that their
privileged status was both affirmed and ensured by their inherent immunity to yellow fever.

American Migrants
While the belief that Creoles were naturally immune to yellow fever was originally
postulated to justify Creole power and privilege in antebellum New Orleans, the ability to acquire
immunity meant that established residents could claim their own privileged immune status
alongside ancient Creole families. This partially explains why the theory of Creole immunity
continued to be popular in the postbellum period when traditional Creole families were a
minority in the city and were no longer a privileged caste. Extending the theory of acclimation
immunity to a broader population cemented its usefulness for all white New Orleanians who
sought to justify their belonging over that of newly arrived strangers.
Yellow fever’s historic designation as a stranger’s disease did more than reinforce nativism
against newcomers. Creoles argued that their privileged immunity proved their fitness for the
climate of New Orleans but also used it to reinforce the belief that their lifestyle—with its attendant
customs, behaviors, eating habits, and social norms—was the ideal lifestyle to guarantee acclimation
and eventual immunity. Theories of differential immunity and susceptibility therefore created a
hierarchy of who might assimilate and belong. Of the outsiders who migrated to New Orleans,
postbellum yellow fever theorists generally preferred American migrants to foreign immigrants—
particularly those from the Southern states.
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After the Civil War, New Orleans was home to migrants from all over the United States.
Some were Northerners hoping to participate in the rebuilding and Reconstruction of the South.
Others were Southerners who migrated to cities like New Orleans that had avoided physical
destruction during the War. But the city’s historic reputation as a yellow fever capital made
acclimation a central concern for those who intended to remain in New Orleans for any length of
time.
While 1878 yellow fever narratives revised theories of Creole immunity, they nevertheless
maintained the possibility of acclimation through continuous residence—a concept that surely
appealed to New Orleanians who did not have Creole ancestry as well as to migrants who intended
to make New Orleans their permanent home. These migrants faced a confusing array of advice on
how to negotiate their seasoning. Most of this advice was informal—medical in nature but not
necessarily supplied by physicians. It advised as to who was susceptible and why, who could acquire
immunity and how, as well as what the different kinds of immunity were and how long they were
expected to last. Collectively, these ideas suggested the existence of a continuum of immunity—a
continuum that also reflected the social organization of the city.
Judging newcomers for their desirability as citizens of New Orleans entailed placing them
on a hierarchy of yellow fever susceptibility. This susceptibility was used as a criterion for social
acceptance, tacitly employed to weed out undesirable migrants, with those most likely to adapt to
Creole culture seen as already possessing or most likely to gain immunity through acclimation.
Yellow fever theories thus performed a gate-keeping function in determining provisional
acceptance into the city’s social strata. Of course, gaining yellow fever immunity did not imply
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social equality but, being a requirement for acceptance, it was the first and most dangerous
prerequisite to assimilation.
For those lucky enough to survive their seasoning, immunity did grant a number of
economic and social privileges. Dr. Dowler claimed that acclimation “whether native or acquired,
is a practical distinction in the business of New Orleans” and acclimated residents of the city
found that their immune status presented them with greater opportunities. For example, during
the 1878 epidemic, the New Orleans Republican newspaper lamented that no city dependent on
commerce could thrive if forced to undergo a periodical quarantine. It argued, further, that “the
organization of all business as far as may be possible on the basis of acclimated agents” was the best
way to avoid the prostration of trade that ensued after the first rumors of yellow fever had spread
beyond the city. Pro-business interests had argued for decades that the constant influx of Northern
and foreign migrants fueled epidemics that sullied the city’s reputation and that quarantines had
cost the city billions of dollars in lost business. And while it was ultimately unfeasible to limit
hiring practices to only acclimated applicants, those who could obtain certification from a
respected physician that they had survived the disease were more likely to get a job, particularly
one vested with authority or responsibility. The New Orleans Times went so far as to claim that “If
an employee intends to make New Orleans his home, he may as well stay and go through his
modicum of yellow fever; if he does not intend to make it his home, he has no right to hold a
position.” Certificates of acclimation not only allowed migrants to obtain employment beyond the
manual labor market; they were required for acquiring life insurance or traveling to and from
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zones where yellow fever was endemic. Lack of acclimation, therefore, deprived a migrant of
desirable advantages of life in New Orleans.172
Many yellow fever narratives further argued that an attack of the disease gave the survivor
additional health benefits. The New Orleans Democrat—while not a supporter of inherent Creole
immunity by 1878—nevertheless believed that a resident could acquire immunity by surviving a
case of the disease. Further, they argued, “Those who are thus acclimated or vaccinated are not
only rendered impervious to the disease in future, but are actually improved and invigorated in
their general health during the prevalence of the epidemic. The air which proves so fatal a poison
to the unacclimated operates as a tonic and a strengthener to the acclimated. The latter invariably
have better health, more vigor, are less troubled with the ordinary ailments of the summer season,
when the epidemic prevails than when it is absent.” The Democrat thus argued that the disease
environment of New Orleans—so feared by newly arrived migrants—proved beneficial to those who
survived their seasoning and that periodic epidemics of yellow fever, once survived, routinely
strengthened the health of acclimated residents.173
Of course, to reap such benefits, migrants had to survive their seasoning. But migrants
needed to overcome two major obstacles: geographic distance and cultural difference. More
precisely, yellow fever narratives presented American-born migrants as more likely to survive yellow
fever than most foreign immigrants because of their potential to easily assimilate to Creole cultural
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norms. This was especially so for migrants from Southern states. Further, they argued that
Southerners, because of the proximity of their place of birth to New Orleans’s climatological
environment had less to fear from the disease than Northerners.174
While most yellow fever narratives insisted that New Orleanian Creoles were the only
group of whites who could be safely assured of their acclimation and inherent immunity, some
yellow fever theorists believed that other Louisianans, followed by migrants from other Southern
states, were most likely to survive the fever and become acclimated. Dr. John Gazzo claimed that
“natives of most Southern States are not subject to the fever in the continued form,” arguing that
they, alongside Creoles, were acclimatized through long exposure to the Southern climate. If they
did contract yellow fever, he continued, the case was usually mild and rarely ended in death.
According to Gazzo’s worldview, Southerners were most similar to New Orleanian Creoles. Their
relatively low susceptibility meant that Southern migrants, such as Edwin Britton Jennings, were
ideal candidates as New Orleanian transplants.175
Gazzo further argued that “Europeans and northern Americans, who have resided during a
period of several years in the State of Louisiana, are seldom attacked with yellow fever...the body
from long exposure to the climate has become creolized or acclimated.” Referring to the
acclimatizing process as becoming ‘creolized’ not only reinforced the central place of immunity in
the identity of the New Orleanian Creole but also the ability for migrants to become like Creoles
through a period of physical, and cultural, immersion. Yellow fever narratives therefore argued
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that migrants needed to commit themselves to the process of seasoning on more than a physical
level. They must also prepare by assimilating New Orleanian social and cultural norms.176
Gazzo was not alone in grouping migrants from the Northern states with foreign-born
immigrants as strangers. In the hierarchy of yellow fever susceptibility, any body originating from a
colder northern climate would experience a more arduous acclimatizing process. Further, the
widespread assumption that yellow fever was generally a “Southern disease” and the special
cultural relationship New Orleanians developed toward yellow fever cemented the generalization
that both Northern bodies and cultures were fundamentally different from their Southern
counterparts. This expectation of regional susceptibility was reflected in the yellow fever narratives’
division of the population into different categories of strangers with Northern-born American
migrants frequently considered foreign.177
Often these incidents revealed sectional antagonism with Northern “strangers” sometimes
coded to imply Northern “carpetbaggers.” But just as New Orleanians used theories of immunity
to make a wide variety of social claims, the charge of stranger was leveled at both Northern and
Southern migrants from each end of the political spectrum. Further, the ambivalence over whether
Northern migrants were easily acclimated Americans or unassimilable foreign strangers mirrored
the larger ambivalence with which many Southerners viewed Northerners following
Reconstruction. In some cases, Southerners labeled Northern agents as corrupt influencers and
carpetbaggers. But in others, they lauded Northerners as helping to inaugurate a New South. This
ambivalence was particularly prevalent in Southern cities, like New Orleans, that depended on
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Northern investment or tourism. While the push for Redemption demanded that Southerners
restore Home Rule by disavowing Northern political influence, these Southerners did not want to
alienate Northerners completely. Yellow fever narratives therefore reflected New Orleanians’
ambivalence toward Northern migration and presented acclimation as a process by which
Northern migrants could prove themselves respectful of Southern culture and autonomy.178
Though a migrant’s seasoning was an individual affair—with yellow fever the ultimate
arbiter of acceptance or rejection—migrants’ social behavior was also carefully scrutinized based on
expected communal responsibilities during epidemics. A letter published in the New Orleans Times,
written by a Mrs. M. T. Dugan, claimed that anyone could learn to nurse yellow fever patients with
but “a little care and attention.” She claimed, “It should be the duty of every one who intends to
make New Orleans his home to lose no time in learning how to take care of the sick,” implying
that an individual’s behavior during epidemics should also be relevant in determining his or her
suitability as a New Orleanian. If migrants planned to be accepted as New Orleanians, such logic
suggested, becoming acclimated was not enough. Migrants must educate themselves about the
culture of New Orleanian Creoles, including the importance yellow fever played in New Orleanian
culture. Further, it was not enough to navigate one’s own seasoning; migrants were expected to
help others in their pursuit of acclimation and to act charitably toward their fellow residents
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during epidemics. While New Orleanians such as Mrs. Dugan believed that migrants who shirked
their cultural responsibilities during epidemics were undesirable candidates for inclusion, most
believed that yellow fever would ultimately target and eliminate those who were unlikely or
unwilling to assimilate. This process just happened to reinforce existing social prejudices.179
The role that immunity played in this elaborate ritual of belonging meant that acclimation
remained a badge of membership in New Orleanian society and culture. Yellow fever narratives
argued that certain migrants were more likely than others to acclimate and assimilate.
Nevertheless, New Orleanians expected all migrants to subject themselves to the ritual of seasoning
wherein the city itself—through the interaction of climate and disease environment—would select
acceptable migrants and weed out undesirables. In 1878, New Orleanians still considered
seasoning a crucial initiation for newcomers to the city. Edwin Britton Jennings, whose story
opened this chapter, was just one migrant who hoped to survive this initiation.

Foreign Immigrants
New Orleanians considered all foreign immigrants to be strangers. Yet, like American
migrants, foreigners were placed on a hierarchy of yellow fever susceptibility that suggested certain
immigrant groups were more desirable than others. New Orleanians continued to view yellow fever
as a strangers’ disease that would weed out undesirable immigrants who were unlikely to assimilate
to New Orleanian social and cultural standards. This holdover from the antebellum era remained
relevant to the cultural identity of New Orleanians in 1878; however, the hierarchy of
susceptibility had shifted to reflect the nativist concerns of the time.

179

M. T. Ducan, “Yellow Fever,” New Orleans Times, August 9, 1878.

124

Yet this new hierarchy was full of paradoxes as a result of the complexity of postEmancipation racial politics. For example, while Louisiana planters welcomed Italian immigration
as a corrective to expected labor shortages following Emancipation, New Orleanian yellow fever
narratives presented Italians as unfit for city life. Further, while Louisiana politicians supported
Western efforts to limit Chinese immigration, New Orleanian yellow fever narratives proclaimed
them racially immune—an argument that supported white supremacy yet implied Chinese
immigrants’ implicit inclusion in the city’s social hierarchy. The traditional role of yellow fever
immunity in the ritual of belonging therefore ran afoul of the reorganization of the racial hierarchy
in post-Reconstruction New Orleans.

New Orleans was a major antebellum port of entry for immigration to the United States.
Only New York admitted more immigrants into the country, making New Orleans the
cosmopolitan metropolis of the South. In 1817 Samuel J. Brown claimed in the Western Gazetteer,
Or Emigrants’ Directory that, walking the streets of New Orleans, “in half an hour you can see, and
speak to, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Danes, Swedes, Germans, Englishmen, Portuguese, Highlanders,
Mexicans, Kentuckians, Tennesseans, Ohioans, Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, New Englanders,
and a motley group of Indians, Quadroons, Africans, etc.” While these migrants and travelers may
not have settled in the city, immigrants destined for other Southern states generally arrived
through the port of New Orleans, exposing the residents to a constant influx of the foreign-born.
New Orleanians therefore elaborated theories of susceptibility that explained newcomers’ high
mortality rates—one in five Irish and one in eight German immigrants succumbed to yellow fever
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during the 1853 epidemic, for example—while also justifying nativism against the foreigners judged
least likely to assimilate.180
In 1878, New Orleanians generally maintained their belief in a hierarchy of yellow fever
susceptibility based on physical and cultural resemblance to the Creole norm. For example, The
Daily City Item newspaper reported that “any constitution not acclimated to the marshy air of
Southern Louisiana—not accustomed to the sudden changes of temperature, to Creole diet, and
the temperate habits of the Creole” could fall victim to yellow fever. Yet the paper expected the
French, who most closely resembled Creoles in diet and lifestyle, to enjoy less susceptibility to the
disease and lower mortality rates than either the Irish or Germans. The Item further explained that
European newcomers “must find it no easy matter to adapt themselves to that moderation in diet,
that abstinence in the use of strong drink, which the climate demands.” Migration to Louisiana, it
seemed, required that European immigrants adopt the local cuisine and work ethic of Creoles for
their own good.181
New Orleanian natives took pleasure in this perceived superiority of their culture while
characterizing immigrants believed to be unassimilable as having the most to fear from yellow
fever. Before the Civil War, German and especially Irish immigrants were scapegoated as
unassimilable strangers and blamed for the horrific epidemics of the 1850s. In the 1878 epidemic,
it would be Italian and Sicilian immigrants who bore the brunt of New Orleanian nativism. The
Italians were a relatively recent immigrant group. While present in the city prior to the Civil War,

180

M. Mark Stolarik, ed. Forgotten Doors: The Other Ports of Entry to the United States (Philadelphia: Balch Institute Press:
Associated University Press, 1988); Samuel R. Brown, The Western Gazetteer; or Emigrant’s Directory, Containing a
Geographical Description of the Western States and Territories, Viz. the States of Kentucky, Indiana, Louisiana, Ohio, Tennessee,
and Mississippi: And the Territories of Illinois, Missouri, Alabama, Michigan, and North-Western (Auburn, NY: H. C.
Southwick, 1817), 148; Carrigan, The Saffron Scourge.
181
“Some Questions of Yellow Fever Statisticians,” The Daily City Item, August 29, 1878.

126

the New Orleans census of 1870 reported a population of fewer than 2,000 Italians. However,
Italian and especially Sicilian immigration had been increasing since the end of the war,
particularly in response to Emancipation.182
Under the imagined threat of a mass-exodus of freed slaves and the feared collapse of the
plantation economy, Louisiana (along with other Southern states) inaugurated a wave of
immigration schemes and propaganda to facilitate the immigration of Italian agricultural laborers.
A post-war, pro-immigration pamphlet explained that “owing to the great mortality among the
blacks during the war...and as the colored population cannot increase by foreign emigration, as the
whites may do, the blacks will henceforth fall into a steadily diminishing minority.” The Louisiana
Board of Immigration was created in 1866 to solve this anticipated labor shortage. They aimed a
large amount of propaganda at Italians and Sicilians, believing them to be ideal substitutes for
black plantation labor. These projects proved largely successful, with thousands of Italian
immigrants entering the state, most through the port of New Orleans.183
In response to the growing numbers of Italian immigrants, anti-Italian nativism began to
rise in the city, a trend that was further exacerbated by the Italians’ ambiguous racial status. Italians
occupied an intermediate category in the racial hierarchy of New Orleans. In effect, they were
situationally or conditionally white, meaning that they were afforded the status of whites in certain
situations—particularly those that worked to the advantage of other whites, such as in voting.184
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Propaganda attempting to promote Italian immigration to Louisiana portrayed Italians as
white. Democratic supporters of these immigration schemes, such as the Louisiana Immigration
and Homestead Company, assured white Louisianans that European labor would help to speed
the restoration of the state to Home Rule by reviving the plantation economy, diminishing its
reliance on black labor, and by creating a column of white voters who could be easily influenced by
Democrats. Commissioner of the Board of Immigration, James O. Noyes, advocated an aggressive
marketing campaign, stating that “Terrible stories are current in the old world as to the treatment
of the unsophisticated stranger in this country.” The Board therefore papered European ports with
favorable descriptions of Louisiana plantation life that dismissed the assumption that agricultural
labor was only for black people.185
The Board of Immigration further bolstered Italians’ classification as white when they
assured would-be immigrants that whites could labor safely in the Louisiana sun and that they had
nothing to fear from yellow fever. One pamphlet confidently stated that, “In every part of the
state...we find...white men, women, and children...laboring at all hours in the fields, without
regard to the pretended climatic and miasmatic influences which are so erroneously imagined to
be detrimental to white labor.” Concerned migrants, perhaps having heard of the attrition rate for

Religious Boundaries of an Inbetween People: Street Feste and the Problem of the Dark-Skinned Other in Italian
Harlem, 1920-1990,” American Quarterly 44 (1992): 313-347. The term “situationally white” has also been used to
signify that racial labels depend upon the context of the situation in which they are applied and that at different
moments the same individual may be classified within different racial categories. David Roediger, Working Toward
Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants Became White: The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs (New York: Basic
Books, 2005) and others have argued that occupying this liminal space was an experience of racialization. This implies
that any separation between the more traditional rhetoric of intra-European “races” and color-dependent race—such as
that posited by Thomas Guglielmo, White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890-1945 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003)—becomes untenable.
185
Commissioner Noyes was not a Democrat hoping to displace black labor. Rather, he spoke of the glory of the New
South in attracting the best migrants from around the world to become yeoman farmers who would prop up
Louisiana’s modernizing economy. Moon Ho Jung, Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); James O. Noyes, Report of James O. Noyes, Chief of the Bureau of
Immigration to the General Assembly of Louisiana (New Orleans: A. L. Lee, State Printer, 1869), 13

128

newcomers, were assured: “...it may be said with equal truth that there is no climate in the world
so favorable to the European immigrant than that of Louisiana.” The state’s pro-immigration
policies and propaganda thus attempted to counteract New Orleanian characterizations of yellow
fever as a strangers’ disease.186
To further allay fear of Louisiana’s disease environment, immigration pamphlets included
letters written by potential employers that described the health benefits of the countryside over
those of the city. For example, Henry Leach, a planter from Ponchatoula, wrote, “There is no
acclimating fever known here, and men can work summer and winter.” Planter John M. Bach
agreed, claiming that “Strangers are not liable to any acclimating fever” in the countryside and E.
Addison proclaimed further, “No prejudices exist here against the laboring class of the North or
West, or foreigners, that would mar their peace, or interfere with their business in the country.”
These pamphlets thus pressed the case that immigrants who labored in the Louisiana countryside
could be reasonably assured of their health and prosperity. Further, they would escape the
devastating fevers that attacked strangers who stayed in the city.187
In truth, many Italian immigrants worked under oppressive and exploitative conditions in
the Louisiana countryside. Because Louisianans sought Italian immigrants for agricultural labor,
they were in practice often equated to black workers in the labor market and similar racial rhetoric
was used to justify their subjugation. In 1873, the British consul in New Orleans warned that to
most Southern planters “a labourer is a labourer...whether he be French or German, Italian or
186
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Norwegian, British or Chinese, he is to be housed, fed, and treated just as the black race used to
be.”188
Those Italians who returned to or remained in the city upon arrival were not treated much
better. Throughout the postwar decades, the New Orleans press published an increasing number
of stories that reinforced the strangeness of Italian, and particularly Sicilian, immigrants. Such
stories emphasized Italians’ negative cultural traits, including laziness, criminality, and their
isolation in ethnic ghettos. Among the negative traits commonly attributed to Italians was their
high rate of yellow fever mortality and their unwillingness to submit to the process of
acclimation.189
During the height of the 1878 epidemic, the New Orleans Times described the exodus of a
large group of Italians, supposedly comprised of fruit vendors and itinerant peddlers, who
attempted to elude the disease by taking over two small plantations outside of the city. The Times
described the Italians as squatters, numbering in the hundreds, poor, wretched, and “crowded into
small rooms, in stables and dilapidated quarters.” The article further characterized them as hostile,
suspicious, uneducated, lazy, and well-armed. The Times reported that despite the Italians’ attempts
to flee, yellow fever had followed them and that a family had perished of it, shunned and isolated
by their fellow countrymen for fear of its spread. Even the “gaping crowd of negroes” living in a
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nearby house were quoted as saying they thought the Italians a “mighty cur’us people,” implying
that even freedpeople recognized the Italians’ behavior as incompatible with local custom.190
The Times reporter consistently characterized the Italians as strangers who, through their
unwillingness to relinquish their foreign culture and vagabond lifestyle, proved themselves
eminently unassimilable. In highlighting their isolation, their rudeness, and their lack of loyalty to
the yellow fever victims in their midst, the Times suggested that Italians were undesirable as
potential members of New Orleanian society. The Daily City Item agreed; as one article claimed, “it
is not difficult to account for the mortality among Italians and Sicilians...their gregarious mode of
living, coupled with their inclination to settle in unhealthy courts and tenements...and their
marked indifference to certain rules of cleanliness,” all contributed to their susceptibility. Various
New Orleanian newspapers reported that the epidemic was devastating to the population of
Italians and Sicilians, implying that yellow fever—that arbiter of belonging in New Orleans—had
deemed these immigrants unacceptable.191
Yet Italians’ yellow fever mortality, while designating them as strangers, also clearly marked
them as white Europeans. The New Orleanian press may have characterized Italians as
unassimilable; yet their discussion of Italian susceptibility nevertheless took place in the context of
a perceived hierarchy of European “races” with both medical and newspaper sources including
Italians under the “white” column of mortality statistics. Although New Orleanian nativists argued
that Italians were less likely to survive their seasoning, they nevertheless conceded that Italians
could survive and become acclimated. New Orleanians thus based Italians’ potential for immunity
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on acclimation and not on race, thereby classifying Italians as white in the medical context of
yellow fever immunity. Significantly, these hierarchical theories of susceptibility to yellow fever,
while pressuring immigrants to assimilate to an idealized version of New Orleanian identity,
nevertheless simultaneously created opportunities for certain immigrant groups to assert their
whiteness.192
Italians thus found themselves amid a confusing array of contradictory ideas about their
potential for belonging. Statewide immigration policies sought to promote their inclusion while
New Orleanian nativists sought their exclusion. Post-emancipation racial politics, coupled with the
complexity of New Orleans’s racial dynamics, only made matters worse. Further, yellow fever
theories of susceptibility proclaimed Italians to be white, yet unwelcome.
A similar multitude of factors faced Chinese immigrants during the 1878 epidemic. Asian
immigrants—who typically came to Louisiana to work as agricultural laborers on the state’s sugar
plantations—played an even more complex role in the postbellum discourses of race, labor, and
immigration than the Italians. Similar to the Italian example, Chinese immigrants provided a
transitional form of free labor immediately after Emancipation. Postbellum plantation owners—
seeking to resuscitate the sugar economy—supported Chinese immigration in order to reinstitute
more familiar forms of plantation labor as racial, if not legal, slavery. Their labor, immigration
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supporters argued, promised to maintain white supremacy and control over agricultural
production.193
Immigration policies were steeped in the racial politics of agricultural labor. Therefore,
similar to the Italians, Chinese immigrants were characterized as alternately white and black. To
promote their immigration as much-needed plantation labor, and to allay Republican suspicions
that these Asians were being transported to the state as “coolie” labor, immigration supporters
coded them with traditionally white characteristics using language often reserved for whites.
Though briefly labeled as white in the context of immigration, however, Chinese bodies were
reassigned as black, or at least nonwhite, in the fields of Louisiana. Once Asian immigrants
entered Louisiana and took their place as agricultural laborers, planters were quick to shift their
rhetoric, employing racial language traditionally used for black plantation labor, to characterize the
natural dependence and servility of Asian workers.194
Despite many similarities to the Italian experience in terms of labor relations, Chinese
immigrants were clearly labeled as nonwhite when it came to yellow fever theory. Newspapers ran
articles with titles such as “Bronze John vs Bronze John”—a play on the nativist caricature of the
Chinese immigrant and the anthropomorphic caricature of yellow fever—which presented the
popular assumption that Chinese laborers were naturally immune to the disease. The New Orleans
Item claimed in its discussion of the hierarchy of susceptibility that “The Chinese appear to enjoy
immunity.”195
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Stanford Chaille—an elite New Orleanian physician—reported to the National Board of
Health in 1879 that “the Chinese...have proved beyond question their liability to yellow fever, and
at the same time their comparative immunity.” Chaille went on to claim that although cases of
yellow fever were found among the Chinese population of the South during the epidemic of 1878,
the “Asiatic races,” like the black race, enjoyed some physiological resistance to the disease. George
Sternberg made a similar claim when he reported to the U.S. Marine Hospital Service that “the
Mongolian race” was not immune to the disease, “but like the negro they have, although to a less
degree, less susceptibility than the white race, and the mortality among those attacked is not so
great.” Neither physician attempted to explore or explain this assertion, despite the fact that the
Board of Experts, appointed by Congress to investigate the epidemic of 1878, recognized many
yellow fever cases and deaths among Chinese residents and reminded readers in its report that
“yellow fever has never been known in Asia.”196
The assumption that the Chinese enjoyed immunity from yellow fever, therefore, revealed
more about their racial status than their actual susceptibility to disease. In his report to the
National Board of Health, Dr. Chaille even complained that Cuban physicians, believing Chinese
immigrants to be completely immune to the disease, nevertheless included the Chinese and
Indians with Caucasians in their calculations of yellow fever cases in the white population,
reserving the designation of “colored” for black residents only. Chaille’s argument, that Chinese
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immigrants were biologically immune to yellow fever, was intended to confirm their status as
nonwhite.197
Chinese immigrants, while also occupying a middle ground in the racial hierarchy of New
Orleans were, nevertheless, widely regarded in the city as biologically immune to yellow fever and
therefore “colored.” Moreover, those who stayed in the city occupied positions of service that, for a
time, indicated their willingness to labor for whites, promoting white supremacy by occupying the
traditional place held for slaves. In 1878, New Orleanians hoped that Chinese immigrants would
conform to white expectations of deference to authority, conveniently upholding traditional racial
categories when freedpeople were seen as subverting them.198
Yet New Orleans’s newspapers ran just as many vitriolic condemnations of Chinese
immigration as they did of Italian immigration. While apparently contradictory, this makes more
sense if viewed in the national context of growing anti-Chinese sentiment during and after
Reconstruction. The Naturalization Act of 1870, for example, opened naturalization to “white
persons and persons of African descent,” while reaffirming the limitation for immigrants that were
not clearly white or black to become American citizens. Congressional debates over the
Naturalization Act’s language betrayed a clear moment of Republican discord in Reconstruction
policy. In the context of racial politics leading to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, biological
theories of yellow fever immunity buttressed the designation of Chinese bodies as nonwhite in
ways that affirmed their outsider status.199
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This maneuvering seems to contradict the New Orleanian cultural symbol of belonging
traditionally invested in yellow fever immunity. New Orleanians’ claim that Chinese immigrants
were racially immune to yellow fever should have provided them with a badge of membership in
New Orleanian society, just as it had for antebellum black residents. Granted, this membership
would be based on racial and social inferiority, but they would nevertheless have a guaranteed
place in the New Orleanian social hierarchy. Arguably, in this instance, the confidence in Chinese
yellow fever immunity—based on biology rather than acclimation—was an argument for their
“colored” racial status rather than their inherent belonging in the city. The decoupling of
belonging from their immunity reflects the ambiguous status of racial minorities in postReconstruction New Orleans, a concept that will be discussed further in the next section.

Similar to Northern-born American migrants, immigrants recently arrived from abroad
found themselves in a traditional hierarchy of yellow fever susceptibility based on their degree of
cultural difference from the Creole norm. This hierarchy echoed antebellum New Orleanians’ use
of the strangers’ disease to compel assimilation and justify nativism. In 1878, New Orleanians
revised the hierarchy of assimilation to append Italians at the bottom. The traditional hierarchy of
belonging in New Orleans was further complicated by post-Emancipation racial politics. Italians,
while seen as undesirable, unassimilable strangers—and while occupying an ambiguous racial
status—were nevertheless coded white by their yellow fever susceptibility. The Chinese, on the
other hand, were believed to be immune to the disease which clearly indicated their status as
nonwhites. However, these assertions were further complicated by the divergent views on
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immigration and race in the city vs. the countryside, as well as larger national negotiations over the
limitations of nonwhite immigrants.

African American Immunity
Because immunity to yellow fever acted as a measure of cultural belonging, theories of
biological immunity that helped to construct race became more complicated in the postbellum
period. Originally created to justify the continued enslavement of Africans and their descendants,
black immunity had guaranteed that slaves were accepted as an important and necessary
constituent of New Orleanian society. This acceptance was, of course, never intended to put blacks
on equal footing with immune whites; instead, it naturalized the unequal power relations that
defined African Americans as a subservient workforce. The advent of Emancipation, however,
threatened this elaborate medical and social construct. After the Civil War, issues of belonging
and citizenship were at the nexus of debates over how to reincorporate freedpeople into the
Southern social body. At stake was the future role that the three to four million newly freed slaves
would play in Southern politics, economics, and society.
In New Orleans, the relationship between immunity to belonging—as indicated in the
example of Chinese immigrants—was in flux following Reconstruction because of the ambiguous
status of African Americans in the city. During the 1878 epidemic, authors of yellow fever
narratives expressed surprise at the high morbidity and mortality rates found among the black
population. New Orleanians either questioned black residents’ racial immunity because they

137

believed them to be susceptible strangers or they affirmed theories of racial immunity to argue that
blacks were immune citizens.200

To white New Orleanians acculturated to believing in inherent black immunity, the 1878
yellow fever epidemic seemed to produce a startling development. During the summer and
autumn of 1878, Southern periodicals regularly printed statistics showing high morbidity and
mortality among the black population. As the disease swept up the Mississippi Valley, examples of
“colored cases” became a marker signifying how bad the disease was in any given place.
Newspapers ran headlines such as “Grenada—Pure-Blooded Negroes Dying of Yellow Fever” and
“Fever Panic Among the Negroes.” Medical and popular authorities wondered whether these cases
were a consequence of the incredible scope and virulence of the present epidemic or, alternately, if
the famed immunity of black people had somehow diminished.201
Despite the surprising morbidity of black residents described by New Orleanian
newspapers, the official mortality statistics of the epidemic, published by the New Orleans Board
of Health, revealed a starkly different picture of black experience with the disease. While there
were cases and deaths among the black population—enough to call into question the belief in an
inherent immunity to yellow fever—the numbers of black deaths were much lower than their white
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counterparts. Medical authorities therefore insisted that black bodies, while not immune, must be
remarkably resistant to the disease.202
Analyzing more than three decades of New Orleans’s mortality statistics, Joseph Jones,
Chair of Chemistry and Clinical Medicine at the University of Louisiana, argued that yellow fever
epidemics skewed the mortality statistics, “due chiefly to the destructive effects of this disease upon
the white race.” He calculated that the deaths attributed to yellow fever in 1878 were 52.08 per
1,000 white and 39.0 per 1,000 nonwhite population. The Board of Health cited the final count
of yellow fever deaths for the year 1878 as 4,046 in its year-end report to the Governor. Of these, it
cited only 183 deaths as “colored.” While over 14,000 cases of yellow fever in the white population
were reported to the Board of Health, only 1,710 cases were reported for the nonwhite
population.203
While arguing that antebellum theories of black immunity were inaccurate, physicians like
Jones nevertheless claimed that their statistical evidence proved that black people had some innate
resistance to the disease. Both the significantly lower rate of infection and death, they contended,
demonstrated that blacks’ racial characteristics made them less susceptible to yellow fever and far
more likely to survive a case than their white counterparts. For example, William Joseph Holt,
Sanitary Inspector for the Fourth District, claimed that “The exemption of the negro race
is...strikingly shown in the table of mortality.” His report listed 29 deaths among blacks in the
district compared to 569 deaths among whites. In Holt’s opinion, a mere 29 deaths out of a total
population of 6,883 black residents was strong evidence in favor of their inherent resistance.
202
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While they did not speculate on the biological basis of this disease resistance, Holt and other white
physicians nevertheless presented it as essentially race-based.204
Significantly, some physicians acknowledged that the statistics of this epidemic may not
have been entirely accurate. Dr. Jones wrote, for instance, that “There are no accurate statistics to
show the actual population in 1878,” though he estimated the number to be approximately
210,000. He further acknowledged that New Orleans’s demographics had been in a state of
transition after the Civil War. “Embracing the entire period of the civil war, and still more
disastrous period of so-called ‘reconstruction,’” Jones argued that New Orleans had undergone a
“complete revolution” in the demographic makeup of its residents, with a net loss of white
population and an influx of black migration.205
Yet, despite the recognition that New Orleans’s black population had nearly doubled after
the Civil War with the migration of freedpeople from nearby plantations, physicians did not
differentiate between New Orleanian blacks and those who might otherwise be considered
strangers. Even those statisticians who stridently opposed the concept of Creole immunity
considered the introduction of a significant number of nonimmune whites into the region a
legitimate reason to differentiate white New Orleanian residents from recently arrived immigrants
in their tables. While maintaining that the only sure way to guard against an attack of yellow fever
was to have survived a previous case, these physicians still contended that racial distinctions in
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differential immunity and susceptibility provided an exception to the rule; buoyed by this logic,
they presented all “colored” cases in a single column.206
Significantly, while physicians complained about the reliability of statistics given the public
confidence in Creole immunity, they did not take issue with the statistical evidence used to
substantiate the argument of black resistance. While they recognized the notion of innate Creole
immunity as socially driven, New Orleanian physicians did not question the line of reasoning that
saw black people as innately different when it came to yellow fever; they only questioned its degree.
New Orleans’s physicians thus presented their ideas about race as unbiased by the changing social
and political reality of Southern race relations, relying upon the vast racial disparity in their
statistical calculations to make the case for them.
While New Orleans’s medical community sought to maintain racial distinctions by
appealing to objective statistical data—endeavoring to remain aloof to the social and political
implications of their arguments—New Orleanian newspapers exercised no such restraint. They
willingly used the experience of yellow fever to argue a number of conflicting positions, usually
reinforced by their political affiliation, and drawing on the cultural significance of yellow fever
immunity to New Orleanian identity and belonging. Their disagreements over immunity reveal the
contested role of freedpeople in New Orleanian society as these debates sought to redefine the role
of black citizens in the post-Emancipation South.
At one end of this spectrum was the staunchly Democratic New Orleans Times, which
openly attributed the loss of black citizens’ yellow fever immunity to their newly freed status. Early
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in the epidemic, its editors published an article, supposedly quoting “an eminent colored citizen”
who blamed the high mortality among the black community on Emancipation:
In de ole anty belly days dese heah po’ niggahs wuz ‘sempt, cuz de Yaller Jack didn’t
know de niggah from de odder stock. But in dese times sence de wah, wen Massa
Linkum dun gone made de niggah jes de same as de wite man, why dey has de same
privumledges, ‘n Yellow Jack don’t see no differumses.
The Times article—presenting a quote written in slave dialect and further using standard racist
linguistic tropes and minstrel imagery—was most likely written by a white author who offered a
caricature of the freedman, readily identifiable by a white nineteenth-century audience. The
“eminent colored citizen” clearly was not representative of the educated and respectable gens de
couleur class of free black New Orleanians. The Times thus recast the “eminent colored citizen” as
the more familiar character of the “faithful slave,” one who spoke of the “good old days” under
slavery and the evils that would befall members of the black race now that they had been given
their freedom.207
Acting as an implicit critique of Emancipation, the Times article used the loss of immunity
to yellow fever as a stand-in for the “unnaturalness” of African American freedom. Because the
popular assumption of black immunity was tied to the ideology of slavery, the Times warned that
the loss of slavery would entail the loss of immunity as well. It argued that black Southerners’
newfound liability to yellow fever proved that Emancipation had destroyed the natural condition
of black subservience which guaranteed their immunity. Further, the Times implied that black
residents’ loss of immunity equated to their loss of belonging in New Orleans. Slavery may have
guaranteed their position in New Orleanian society—albeit as subjugated labor—but once that place
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was challenged, freedpeople effectively became strangers—as liable to yellow fever as any newcomer
to the city.208
At the other end of the spectrum, the editors of the New Orleans Republican tenaciously
adhered to the theory of black immunity, a claim that enabled them to argue that freedpeople still
belonged to New Orleans. In a series of editorials, the Republican lauded the extraordinary value of
the city’s black citizens during the epidemic. Because of their immunity to yellow fever, the paper
noted, black workers could continue to do their field and domestic labor throughout the sickly
season. Further, they had done so with devotion to the people and institutions of New Orleans
during its grievous time of need. For this reason, the Republican praised the “immense value” to
New Orleanian society of this immune population of black workers. Crediting Divine Wisdom to
this “terrible panic and pestilence,” the editors further characterized the black population, who
remained at their post while others fled, as loyal agents of God’s merciful hand. This loyalty and
devotion to God’s plan, they argued, proved the reliability and sympathy of the black population
for their fellow citizens, “and have thus given renewed assurances that as a social, industrial, and
political element, they are entitled to the confidence and protection of the whole people of
Louisiana.”209
The Republican also praised African Americans for the role they could play in keeping New
Orleans’s economy and society functioning smoothly in the case of a future epidemic. The paper
enthusiastically agreed with those who called for the reorganization of business on the basis of
208

Ibid.
“Our Colored Citizens,” New Orleans Republican, September 28, 1878; “An Address to the Republicans of
Louisiana,” New Orleans Republican, and September 21, 1878. There was already an African American medical school
opened during Reconstruction but an arsonist burned down the main building in 1877, thereby contributing to the
school’s decline. For more information, see Todd L. Savitt, “Straight University Medical Department: The Short Life
of a Black Medical School in Reconstruction New Orleans,” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical
Association 41, 2 (2000): 175-201.

209

143

acclimated agents and employees in order to avoid the quarantines that shut down shipping,
believing that this would open up new high-profile job opportunities for black residents. Its editors
took this line of reasoning a step further, however, and proposed that black men should be
educated in medical schools, taking full advantage of their immunity, by placing them as
physicians and nurses in service of their community. “With their capacity for bearing the heat, and
withstanding the diseases of the climate,” the Republican maintained, “it will be in the power of an
educated and acclimated people to render such services to society as that any prejudice of color will
be forgotten in the value of their contribution.” Expressing a continued confidence in black
immunity, the New Orleans Republican thus sought to guarantee economic and educational
opportunities for black citizens, in effect recasting the pre-existing prejudices of the white
establishment in order to grant African Americans new options in society. Their argument
leveraged black residents’ immunity to yellow fever to present them as a unique and vital asset—a
population that would continue to labor for New Orleanians, but as educated citizens rather than
as slaves or strangers. 210
Comparing the way that these two newspapers—with very divergent political positions—
made sense of the question of black immunity is telling. Despite the fact that theories of African
immunity had supported the ideology of slavery, the Democratic New Orleans Times argued that
black people were no longer immune to yellow fever, a process of estrangement that denied
freedpeople’s belonging after Emancipation. The New Orleans Republican, on the other hand,
echoed many of the earlier arguments made by antebellum, pro-slavery theorists such as Samuel
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Cartwright, yet did so in order to manipulate the racial division of labor that had previously been
built on immunity in the favor of black advancement.

In the post-Reconstruction context of the 1878 yellow fever epidemic, discussions of
African resistance or immunity to yellow fever acted as a medical component in the debate over
the status of freedpeople as citizens and their assimilation into the larger community. While this
racial logic was a relic of the antebellum medical justification for slavery, the continued uncertainty
over the issue of African immunity in both medical and lay sources mirrored the ambiguous status
of African Americans in New Orleanian society in the immediate years after Reconstruction.
Racial theories of immunity or resistance to yellow fever were further complicated by the complex
web of racial politics that existed in the post-Reconstruction era. In this context, theories of
differential immunity to yellow fever were rhetorically useful in the negotiation of race and
belonging, particularly for New Orleanians who had a long cultural tradition of yellow fever theory
that mapped hierarchies of immunity and susceptibility onto the social body.

Conclusion
While New Orleanians continued to use theories of differential immunity and
susceptibility to yellow fever to make social claims of belonging or exclusion, some were quick to
point out that the 1878 epidemic flew in the face of these traditional assumptions. The New
Orleans Times proclaimed, “The present visitation has...flung doubt upon all preconceived
opinions. Italians and Spaniards seem as liable to yellow fever as Irish or Germans; thin-blooded
folk fall victims as readily as robust and corpulent people; even creoles die and colored subjects of
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the disease are not wanting.” Despite concerns that yellow fever no longer seemed to respect
traditional social divisions such as nativity, race, class, age, and gender, the confusion over these
theories only added to their utility as rhetorical tools in the debate over who belonged in postReconstruction New Orleans. With the lack of consensus among medical and popular authorities
as to how the disease operated in different bodies, authors of yellow fever narratives used these
theories as evidence for any number of contradictory social claims. The confusion and complexity
exhibited by these theories mirror the uncertainty with which many authors viewed the shifting
social structure.211
For New Orleanians, theories of differential immunity to yellow fever were a tool that had
proved historically useful in naturalizing the city’s social hierarchy—a testament to the natural
superiority of Creole bodies and culture. The popularity of ideas of Creole, or native, immunity in
1878 reflected native-born, white New Orleanians’ concern over the loss of power and position
during Reconstruction. Just as antebellum Creole identity, with its attendant immunity to yellow
fever, acted as a way to naturalize Creole belonging and justify Creole influence contra American
outsiders, postbellum theories of Creole immunity acted as a defensive mechanism that validated
Creoles’ natural supremacy in the face of Northern migrants, foreign immigrants, and resident
African Americans. The belief in native-born immunity therefore continued to be an essential
component of New Orleanian identity after the Civil War.
Originally constructed by New Orleanian Creoles to cement their physical and cultural
superiority and fitness as leaders of New Orleanian society, yellow fever theories built around the
concept of acclimation nevertheless allowed for the eventual belonging of deserving migrants.
Migrants who successfully appropriated New Orleanian identity or assimilated into New Orleanian
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society and culture could exploit theories of differential immunity and susceptibility to assert their
own belonging or to question the belonging of others. The process of seasoning thus continued to
play an important role in the ritual of cultural belonging in New Orleans long after the Civil War.
Yellow fever remained a litmus test for physiological and cultural fitness; immigrants’ behavior
during epidemics was further used as evidence for their assimilability or lack thereof.
However, the ritual of belonging surrounding yellow fever immunity was complicated by
the fact that these theories were used to create and maintain biological interpretations of racial
difference. Yellow fever theories based on acclimation, for example, ultimately proclaimed Italian
and Sicilian immigrants—otherwise judged as unassimilable outsiders by nativist New Orleanians—
to be white. Theories of biological immunity or resistance, in contrast, proclaimed Chinese
immigrants to be clearly nonwhite. Yet this expectation of immunity no longer seemed symbolic of
belonging.
These theories of racial immunity, which allowed New Orleanians to argue clear natural,
physiological differences between white and nonwhite populations, were also employed as rhetoric
in the debate over the role of African Americans in the postwar South. New Orleanian Democrats
argued that black people had lost their immunity to the disease in a clear effort to deny their
previous position of belonging. New Orleanian Republicans, on the other hand, sought to counter
this process of estrangement by reinforcing the traditional conviction that Africans and their
descendants were immune.
Recognizing the social and cultural importance of theories of differential immunity and
susceptibility helps to explain the durability of these theories despite the changing attitude of the
medical elite. These theories continued to be employed after Reconstruction because of their
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utility in naturalizing the privileged status of native-born whites, in providing a rationale for
accepting or denying newcomers’ membership in the New Orleanian social body, and in creating
and maintaining traditional racial categories. Analyzing how these theories were used as rhetoric
during the 1878 yellow fever epidemic in New Orleans further indicates the concerns native New
Orleanians had at the end of Reconstruction about the role outsiders played in the city’s social,
economic, and political affairs.
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CHAPTER THREE:
RELIEF AFTER RECONSTRUCTION

In his official history of the 1878 yellow fever epidemic, Dr. J. P. Dromgoole praised the
efforts of Americans, “from the gentle murmurs of the Atlantic to the ocean-wrapped cliffs of the
Pacific,” who had rallied together to provide aid to the cities stricken with yellow fever. “With a
lavish hand,” he wrote, “the North has soothed the fevered brow of Southern suffering.” These
relief efforts, he claimed, promised to heal any sectional strife that remained from the bloody
history of the Civil War and Reconstruction. “The hideous phantoms and weird ghosts of past
differences and animosities” were now buried, he argued. “The demon of discord and contention
has been hushed amid silent tears over the martyr’s midnight grave; and among the dead and the
dying, with one hand upon the dead husband and the other soothing the gurgling death-rattles of
a dying wife, the North and South have shaken hands over the bloody chasm; and may the God of
heaven and earth decree that it be closed forever!”212
Dromgoole was not alone in believing that the horrors of the 1878 epidemic would usher
in a new era of national reconciliation. The national campaign to relieve the South was steeped in
the rhetoric of reunion. Further, the efforts of Northern contributors to raise and transport
millions of dollars in aid, medicines, and food to the Southern states stood as a symbol of the
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North’s commitment and support for their Southern brethren. Across the country, therefore, U.S.
citizens expressed hope that yellow fever had finally accomplished what neither war, military
occupation, nor constitutional amendments had achieved: the reincorporation of the South into
the nation. Unfortunately, while the relief campaign suggested that the nation was once again
whole, not all Southerners were guaranteed access to the fruits of reconciliation.
This chapter argues that while Southerners recognized Northern aid as a symbol of
membership in the nation—extended to the South as an olive branch of national reconciliation—
Southern relief workers nevertheless refused black citizens’ equal claims to membership by denying
their requests for aid and giving preferential access to whites-only relief organizations. The
distribution of Northern and federal aid depended upon local authorities to distribute private
philanthropic and federal disaster relief, leaving many Redeemer Democrats to dole out these
rewards of national reconciliation. Fundamentally, Northern givers and Southern receivers of aid
operated under very different definitions of reunion. While Northerners may have considered the
gift of relief as a means to achieve national reconciliation, Southerners in charge of its
implementation on the ground also saw relief in a second manner: as a tool of Redemption. Racial
disparity in the dispersal of aid contributed to the rise of a Jim Crow South that segregated blacks
from whites—a “separate but equal” society that was never intended to be equal—and systematically
denied the access of African Americans to their rights as legitimate members of the nation.
In his discussion of the change in postwar rhetoric among Northern white Protestants—
away from their earlier promotion of racial egalitarianism and toward calls for reconciliation with
white Southerners—historian Edward Blum includes an analysis of 1878 yellow fever narratives for
themes of national reconciliation. This national narrative, he argues, depended in part on the
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relief efforts and donations of money and supplies provided by the North to aid the stricken
South. Blum further claims that African Americans in the South were systematically denied relief
and that this racial disparity in the dispersal of aid signaled the North’s retreat from its
Reconstruction responsibilities to safeguard black rights and lives in the South. While Blum’s
larger work focuses on Northern religious figures’ contributions to the region’s retreat from
Reconstruction, he nevertheless recognizes the 1878 yellow fever epidemic as a moment of white
reconciliation at the expense of black inclusion. This chapter examines Blum’s hypothesis from a
Southern perspective.213
Caroline Janney has suggested that reunion and reconciliation were two distinct but
related processes. Reunion implied the political reunification of the North and South and was
achieved by the Civil War. Reconciliation, however, required a recommitment of loyalty to a single
nation and a belief that sectional hostility was over. This, of course, was a process that took much
longer and often meant different things to different people. Similarly, this chapter recognizes that
while yellow fever relief acted as a symbol of national reconciliation for both Northern
contributors and Southern relief workers, the white men in charge of the relief apparatus also
viewed relief as a tool of Redemption in the South. Northern relief efforts followed the example
set by the federal government, which provided emergency aid for disaster relief in Southern
communities stricken by yellow fever. Relief workers therefore reinforced the national membership
of Southern whites to whom they provided aid but they did not automatically extend this right of
citizenship to black Southerners.214

213

Edward J. Blum, Reforging the White Republic: Race, Religion, and American Nationalism, 1865-1898 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 2005), 146-173.
214
Caroline E. Janney, Remembering the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation (Chapel Hill, University of
North Carolina Press, 2013).

151

Historians of public health have further shown how integral the 1878 yellow fever
epidemic was to nationalizing issues of public health, helping to lay the roots for an emerging,
Progressive belief that the government should regulate the health of citizens who deserved
protection. Historians Margaret Humphreys and John Ellis have each demonstrated that the 1878
epidemic was fundamental in stimulating broad support for the creation of a National Board of
Health and investment in public health infrastructure throughout the South. While federal aid did
not entirely drown out appeals to states’ rights in determining local public health policy, the scope
of the 1878 epidemic suggested that yellow fever was a national problem that must be met with a
federal response. As yellow fever was recharacterized as a disease with significant consequences for
the nation, the political implications of theories of importationism or endemicity in yellow fever
etiology colored the debate over the National Board of Health’s authority vis a vis state and local
public health institutions. Together, this literature on public health has pointed to 1878 as a
moment when Americans reconceptualized the relationship of the South to the nation in the
midst of a Southern epidemic that came to be seen as a national disaster.215
In its examination of the racial disparity in Southern yellow fever relief, this chapter also
draws on the work of legal scholar Michele Landis Dauber, whose analysis of Congressional
support for disaster relief prior to Reconstruction demonstrates that claimants were required to
prove themselves blameless in the circumstances leading to their downfall. Dauber argues that
because assigning blame to disaster victims hinged on evaluating claimants’ moral status, these
decisions were complicated by perceived moral differences assigned to claimants’ race, class, and
gender. Likewise, in their judgments of who deserved to receive the aid that flowed south during
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the 1878 epidemic, Southern relief organizations closely adhered to these precedents. The result
was that relief workers found most white Southerners to be blameless victims of yellow fever while
judging most black Southerners unworthy of aid. These decisions regarding yellow fever relief were
further complicated by popular assumptions of racialized differential immunity to the disease;
relief workers thus construed yellow fever relief as intended for suffering whites, who received the
bulk of aid during and after the epidemic.216
The chapter opens with a discussion of the national relief campaign. Public health
infrastructure in the South was wholly inadequate to meet the needs of such a large medical
disaster, forcing Southern organizations to turn to Northerners to supplement the relief of
besieged Southern communities. It then analyzes the rhetoric of the Northern relief efforts, which
was steeped in themes of patriotic sympathy, national reunion, and brotherhood. Southern relief
workers responded in kind to this rhetoric of reconciliation. Necessary to these efforts at
reconciliation, Northern benefactors and the federal government followed precedents that allowed
Southern authorities discretion over the distribution of relief in their communities. The chapter
then moves to an analysis of the claims of racial disparity in yellow fever relief to argue that
Southern relief workers distributed the lion’s share of Northern and federal aid to white
Southerners, suggesting that they believed the nationalist rhetoric surrounding the relief campaign
did not apply to African Americans. It further discusses relief workers’ disavowal of systematic
discrimination and their justifications for the dispersal of aid. It demonstrates that common
themes found in yellow fever narratives explored in the two previous chapters—the separation of
the black and white communities, the rhetorical support for white patriarchal supremacy, and the
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ubiquity of theories of racialized differential immunity—contributed to this disparity in relief.
Ultimately, however, given the widespread acceptance of relief as a symbol of national
reconciliation, the denial of aid to black Southerners suggests a larger denial that African
Americans be accepted as equal citizens of the nation.

The National Relief Campaign
The devastation of the 1878 yellow fever epidemic in the Mississippi Valley was
unparalleled in the history of the United States. The New Orleans Board of Health listed “not less
than 4,600” deaths from yellow fever. Memphis deaths totaled more than 5,000—this in a city with
one quarter the population of New Orleans. While New Orleans and Memphis suffered the
highest mortality rates during the summer of 1878, hundreds of Southern towns and cities
reported fatal cases of yellow fever. Sick refugees spread the disease throughout the lower
Mississippi Valley and into Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio. Vicksburg, Mississippi lost onethird of its population, while nearby Beechland suffered so many casualties that it became a ghost
town after the epidemic. Greenville likewise “lost nearly its entire population by death and
flight.”217
As yellow fever spread throughout the South, exhibiting a virulence that outmatched any
previously recorded yellow fever epidemic in the United States, Southerners attempted to
coordinate medical care and relief for their citizens. But the scope and severity of the epidemic
completely overwhelmed the Southern relief apparatus. As the epidemic grew out of control,
Southern relief organizations appealed to the federal government for support, prompting a
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national relief campaign that raised and distributed four and a half million dollars worth of relief
to Southern yellow fever sufferers. This campaign reconfigured yellow fever as a national concern
and reconceptualized the South as an integral part of a reunified nation which must be saved from
destruction.

The Southern relief apparatus centered on the Howard Associations, a group first
established in New Orleans in the 1830s when local and state governments in the South rarely
concerned themselves with matters of public health. Largely due to epidemic diseases such as
yellow fever and cholera, New Orleans had the highest death rate of any American city. The
Howards therefore made it their mission to provide medical care to the poor and indigent ill
during epidemics. By mid-century, independent societies modeled on the New Orleans Howards
existed in most American cities. Even with the establishment of local boards of health in Southern
cities during the latter half of the century, the Howard Associations remained the best-equipped
organizations to coordinate medical relief when political and economic elites fled in fear of yellow
fever. They hired physicians, nurses, and druggists, coordinated donations of medical supplies and
money, and visited the sick throughout the city, which they divided into wards under each
member’s personal supervision.218
To begin operating, however, the Howard Association required a declaration by the New
Orleans Board of Health that yellow fever had reached epidemic proportions. This procedural
requirement allowed political and economic elites to delay official declarations of epidemic
conditions which invariably led to panic, prostration of business, and injurious quarantines. The
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Howards were therefore unable to begin work until the epidemic was in full swing. With mounting
public pressure and calls for relief by those who awaited the Howards’ involvement, the Board of
Health finally relented, declaring epidemic conditions in the city on August 10th, after 431 cases
of yellow fever and 118 deaths were reported. Despite the Board’s concern that officially declaring
the disease epidemic would cause unnecessary panic, New Orleanians had already begun to
evacuate and several cities and towns along the Mississippi River and major railroads had already
established quarantines against travelers and freight from New Orleans. The Howards finally went
to work on August 16, almost 2 months after the disease first made its appearance in the city and
after a full fifth of the total population of New Orleans had fled in fear. 219
By then, however, the disease was already out of control and a number of fleeing evacuees
had unwittingly spread the fever to surrounding towns. As the disease advanced along water and
rail routes from New Orleans into the Mississippi Valley and east to Florida, cases of sick refugees
were reported as far north as Ohio, New York, and New Jersey. Within a month, over eighty towns
and villages around the city appealed to the New Orleans Howard Association for aid. While New
Orleanians may have been experienced in coordinating medical relief during yellow fever
epidemics, most of the interior towns and villages were ill-prepared. American medical theorists
generally characterized yellow fever as the quintessential Southern disease, yet most Southern
219
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towns and villages had little experience with yellow fever and little to no organized relief apparatus.
The majority of these rural residents, lacking immunity to the disease, sickened in large numbers
as yellow fever spread throughout the countryside.220
As most smaller towns in the South lacked an established Howard Association and local
boards of health were short on political power and economic resources, a diverse network of
organizations, institutions, and citizen relief committees tried their best to care for the sick, bury
the dead, and give comfort to the living. But with so many people incapacitated, efforts to
coordinate relief required outside reinforcement. Local boards of health and independent relief
societies therefore depended upon the larger, urban Howard Associations for support and advice.
Unfortunately, most Howard Associations adopted the same constitution and bylaws as the
original New Orleans Howards and were just as easily hampered by local attempts to forestall
declarations of an epidemic. But once engaged, the urban Howard Associations provided care,
personnel, and supplies to all the nearby suburbs and smaller towns that they could reach.
Throughout the South, Southerners heeded the call for volunteers who had any experience
with yellow fever to come into the fever districts to work for the Howards. The primary need was
for nurses and doctors. Several railroad companies offered to transport physicians, nurses, medical
supplies, and donated goods free of charge. On her way to Memphis, DePelchin described the fairlike atmosphere at a train depot in Little Rock. A band was playing, urging on the doctor and
twenty nurses departing for the fever zone. She later remembered as she worked among the sick,
“When I learned that but three were acclimated I shuddered at the prospective sacrifice. The
music yet rings in my ears, as if it will be their funeral march.” Southerners who heeded the first
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calls for help had little idea of what horrors they would see or of how the epidemic would spread.
They immediately responded to calls for relief in the hope that the epidemic could be contained.
221

As the epidemic grew in scope and severity, however, the fear associated with the disease
hampered Southern relief efforts. Armed mobs stopped trains that had traveled through the yellow
fever zone from passing through their towns. Panicked residents tore up railroad tracks and
burned down railroad bridges in an effort to stop the spread of the disease. “The judicious
distribution of relief,” J. L. Power, Grand Secretary of Masons, explained, “was attended with
many difficulties.” Few southern towns had organized relief committees, the exodus of evacuees
included important political and economic leaders, and quarantine measures varied throughout
the region. One Arkansas physician wrote his brother describing “the fear and excitement that
pervades our entire community” after it was reported that a refugee from New Orleans had died of
yellow fever within their city’s limits. He explained that over half the town’s citizens had already
fled in fear despite the lack of further cases. As fear and yellow fever spread, each reinforcing the
other, much of the South was soon in a state of chaos.222
The scale of the epidemic completely overwhelmed Southern relief organizations, including
the Howards. Never expecting that the epidemic would become so severe or spread as it did, the
New Orleans Howards made a crucial mistake early in September. Assuming they had raised
enough money to see them through the epidemic until frost, they published a notice stating that
they no longer required donations. This was a grave miscalculation, as the fever continued to
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devastate rural communities who looked to the urban Howards for relief. The Association’s
surplus quickly dwindled but instead of refusing aid to surrounding communities, the Howards
borrowed against renewed appeals for funds. By October, the New Orleans Howards were
$100,000 in debt.223
Likewise, other relief organizations miscalculated how severe the epidemic would become
and how much money they would need. The Independent Order of Odd Fellows (I.O.O.F.) of the
State of Tennessee admitted in its published report to Grand Master E. G. Budd that “they have
been in receipt of daily communications offering material aid and kind sympathy for our sufferers,
which were answered with thanks, declining the proffered aid; but in view of the magnitude of the
scourge, and the certain exhaustion of all means at their command in a very short time, your
committee decided to accept such offers of aid as might be tendered.” Overwhelmed with the scale
of the epidemic—as the New Orleans Howards were—they soon recognized their mistake in refusing
aid from sources outside of the I.O.O.F. and the committee “soon commenced to receive funds
from most every section of the country.”224
As the disease grew more malignant, those in charge of the relief efforts also became
infected. DePelchin wrote of the Howard Association in Memphis, “Every time I call at the Office,
new faces greet me; as fast as one Howard is taken down, another takes his place.” The secretary of
the Memphis Masonic Relief Board begged indulgence in his report for keeping incomplete
records, asking that “it [be] remembered that three times the force of the brethren on duty were
changed—death and sickness making vacancies, which were filled by new and inexperienced
223

Hildreth, “Early Red Cross,” 71.
“Report of the Special Relief Committee of I.O.O.F.,” in John MacLeod Keating, A History of the Yellow Fever
Epidemic of 1878, in Memphis, Tenn. Embracing a Complete List of the Dead, the Names of the Doctors and Nurses Employed,
Names of All Who Contributed Money or Means, and the Names and History of the Howards, Together with Other Data, and
Lists of the Dead Elsewhere (Memphis, TN: Printed for the Howard Association, 1879), 410-411.

224

159

brethren.” Many mutual aid and benevolent organizations failed to meet a quorum as members
sickened or fled, further hampering their efforts to secure relief for their members. As yellow fever
cut the ranks of relief workers, aid that might have been available one day may not have been
forthcoming the next. The plethora of relief organizations further added to the confusion and
difficulties in securing aid.225
Despite the fact that volunteer nurses and doctors were required to be acclimated, the fact
that so many sickened and died suggested that many must have been mistaken about their
immune status or simply lied. Concerning the unacclimated nurses traveling with her, DePelchin
wrote: “I was in hopes that even at the last, they would not be allowed to enter Memphis. The
impulse is noble, to come to help suffering humanity, but it is like someone who cannot swim
plunging into a foaming torrent to save a drowning man. Two who can swim must then jump in to
try to save them, and the chances are against them then.” Unacclimated volunteers, while
animated by a spirit of altruism, only added to the burden of Southern relief organizations when
they swelled the rolls of the sick, particularly as they often came from outside the community and
had no other recourse for support.226
Despite their best attempts to contain the yellow fever and care for its victims, Southern
relief organizations floundered under the weight of so many cases and deaths. Ultimately, they
were forced to appeal to Northern institutions and the federal government for emergency relief.
National chapters of benevolent organizations and churches in the South appealed to their
Northern counterparts for support. The Northern chapters of the YMCA and the Masons, among
others, sent their Southern chapters contributions. Churches followed suit, exploiting national
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networks of denominational affiliation. Priests, pastors, and nuns volunteered in great numbers to
travel south to give aid and comfort to the sick. Foreign language newspapers, such as New York’s
Courrier des Etats Unis, pledged donations to ethnic mutual aid societies in the South.
While newspapers and magazines spread the news of the devastation in the yellow fever
zone, the nation watched, riveted. Contrary to the publication of official case and death rates by a
number of Southern boards of health, the Daily Illinois State Journal asserted that “The tenor of
private dispatches is certainly of a character to justify the suspicion that the published accounts put
the progress of the yellow fever in an exceedingly mild light....” Despite the disruption of mail
traffic by official and shotgun quarantines, these “private dispatches” managed to convey the
gravity of the situation in the South. Telegrams sent news of each city’s condition to the others,
newspapers carried that news into the homes of their readers, and letters brought the suffering of
the South directly to the hearth of loved ones and friends. Oliver Wendell Homes wrote from his
home in Boston that, “Every morning as the paper comes, the first question is ‘What is the last
account from Memphis, Grenada, and New Orleans?’” Across the country, and as far away as
Europe, people followed developments in the South with rapt attention and a growing sense of
fascination and horror.227
As the disease spread beyond the geographic bounds of any previous yellow fever epidemic
in the United States, Northerners began to worry that the disease might not be isolated to the
South. The Washington Post reported that “Considerable alarm has been felt in some of the more
Northern cities along the Atlantic seaboard, lest the pestilence now raging in the South should be
brought among them.” Several newspapers announced the deaths of Southern refugees who had
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fled north not realizing they had already contracted yellow fever and that these individuals could
carry the disease into Northern states. Despite the fact that it had been fifty years since the last
Northern epidemic of yellow fever, the New York Times reported, “No one feels safe.”228
The 1878 epidemic therefore re-established yellow fever as a national problem. It was a
moment when Northerners viewed the South as an integral part of the nation. Help was necessary,
not only to safeguard the borders of the Northern states from the pestilence, but also to save the
South. In response to the appeals of Southern relief agencies and the continued human
destruction wrought across the Mississippi Valley, Northerners inaugurated a massive relief
campaign to collect and send donations of money, supplies, and goods to Southern yellow fever
sufferers. The federal government, likewise, sent emergency assistance to select Southern cities.
Hereafter, as Memphis newspaperman John Keating described, “The cry for food, for clothing, for
money, for doctors, for as many as a thousand coffins, went out by telegraph to the ends of the
earth, and a prompt and generous response came back.”229
The national relief campaign was spurred by the early emergency assistance provided by the
federal government. On the 19th of August, Representative H. Casey Young sent a telegram from
the Memphis Citizens’ Relief Committee to Washington D.C. The telegram requested that the
Hayes administration send rations and tents with which to assemble a refugee camp outside the
city. The original request asked for sufficient rations to feed 2,000 Memphians for a period of
thirty days. Hayes’s Secretary of War, George W. McCrary, was initially concerned that there was
no provision in the Constitution for this kind of emergency aid. He referred the request to War
Department Commissary-General of Subsistence Robert MacFeely, who responded that,
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“Although there is no appropriation applicable to the purchase of the rations within called for,
relief has been extended by the government, through this department, in previous similar cases,
and it is, therefore, respectfully recommended that the food part of the rations within requested by
furnished.” Using a previously authorized dispersal of federal aid to yellow fever sufferers in 1873
as precedent, McCrary sent 40,000 rations and 1,300 tents to Memphis. This response prompted
additional requests for subsistence from Southern cities. The federal government subsequently
sent rations of food to eight cities within the yellow fever zone: Memphis, Grenada, Vicksburg,
New Orleans, Brownsville, Jackson, Canton, and Holly Springs.230
Newspapers claimed that “There is no law to permit the issue of rations in such cases
but...the Secretary will assume the responsibility of relying upon Congress to sustain his action.
The Secretary expressed the warmest sympathy with the sufferers in the South.” While concerns
over governmental authority stemmed from the contradiction of relief intended for the general
welfare being applied to local communities stricken by disaster, the geographic scope of the disease
in 1878 necessitated a federal response. On its face, the relief of the yellow fever zone was believed
necessary in order to the keep yellow fever from spreading into other states, particularly Northern
states with no recent experience with the disease. It was further intended to mitigate the financial
disaster to interstate commerce. Southern newspapers recognized that the Secretary of War had
potentially “exceeded his legal powers in this case,” yet they assured readers that “representatives of
a beneficent North and a grateful South...not only approved but applauded” this action on the
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part of the federal government, despite the fact that the move clearly contradicted the logic of
states’ rights and local authority. 231
The federal government also helped to coordinate other Northern sources of aid. The
Yellow Fever National Relief Commission and the Marine Hospital Service, for example, sent a
steamer to disburse relief to “towns and villages along the Mississippi River, between Cairo and
New Orleans, in the yellow fever districts;...as these places are off the line of railroad
communication....” On October 4, The John M. Chambers, flying a yellow flag that read “National
Relief Boat,” set sail from St. Louis “fully laden with all means of relief for the sick and destitute,”
supplies valued at $25,000. The ship was under the command of Lieutenant H. H. Benner, whom
the War Department had assigned to the task. Within ten days, Lt. Benner, as well as the captain
and watchman of the vessel, were sick. Benner died of yellow fever on the 17th and the Chambers
was quickly ordered to return to St. Louis for quarantine. Despite such setbacks, the National
Relief Commission also sent four train cars loaded with supplies and provisions to Memphis and
provided “blankets, rations, and other necessaries” to orphan asylums in New Orleans.232
Individual members of government also took part in philanthropic efforts and offered
personal donations for yellow fever relief. Government agencies, moreover, acted as points of
collection for donations from around the world. Secretary of State William M. Evarts reported that
the Department of State had received $9,000 by cable dispatch from Americans living abroad and
$1,000 as a personal contribution of the President of France. The Secretary of the Navy collected
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$1,953 from sailors stationed in California, another $400 from the sailors stationed in Italy, and
Secretary McCrary sent on $515.50 from the officers and cadets at West Point.233
While the direct, emergency assistance by the federal government may have been small
compared to that provided by private donations, its actions early in the epidemic nevertheless gave
official sanction to Northern relief efforts and the rhetoric of national emergency that spurred
them. Americans gave willingly to meet this national crisis. Charitable contributions for yellow
fever relief ultimately totaled over $4.5 million.234
The public act of giving was a large component of the relief effort, and donating to yellow
fever sufferers soon became fashionable. Northerners staged public concerts, fairs, and lectures in
order to raise money for yellow fever relief. The Yellow Fever Relief Commission of Washington
D.C. reported that “the Israelites, the Temperance Societies, the Masonic fraternity, the Odd
Fellows, the musicians, and the amateur artists of the city” were all fundraising for the relief
campaign. “These exertions resulted in entertainments, excursions, concerts, jousts, and
tournaments which provided...funds of considerable quantity....” Fundraisers canvassed
neighborhoods and distributed envelopes soliciting small subscriptions from the public. The
Southern Relief Association of Georgetown organized a sewing circle to make clothing for the
orphans of the South. When the Yellow Fever National Relief Commission advertised a public
meeting in Washington D.C. in answer to the appeals of the South for aid, “Nearly two hundred
ladies and gentlemen assembled in response to the call.” During the meeting, Simon Wolf claimed
that the offices of the Hebrew Citizens’ Committee had received applications by “more than one
hundred men and women desirous to be sent as nurses to the South, from among whom
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seventeen—seven ladies and ten gentlemen—had been accepted and sent South, to Memphis and
vicinity.”235
Northerners also competed to showcase their generosity. Receipts of donations of money
and supplies filled Southern newspapers—and were reprinted in the North—both to acknowledge
that contributions had been received but also to give public evidence of who was giving and how
much they had sent. These notices encouraged people to send more in an effort to impress their
neighbors and friends with their generosity. The “Yellow Fever Relief Committee” in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania published a report claiming that “Pittsburgh’s part in the great and good work will
compare favorably with that of any city in the country....In fact, it is the judgment of those in the
south with whom the Relief Committee was brought into correspondence, that no city did better,
and very few as well, when our capacity in population and resources is reckoned.” A Washington
D.C. doctor proudly informed the Executive Committee of the Yellow Fever National Relief
Commission that his “little daughter sent to the [Homeopathic Association of New Orleans] $10,
her savings,” for the care of yellow fever sufferers. The Commission further recorded the receipt of
“an old-fashioned purse containing $9, given by four little girls, representatives of the EnglishGerman school.” Prizes were awarded to the schools and teachers who collected the most money to
donate.236
Southern relief organizations, hard-pressed to provide care and support to communities
incapacitated by yellow fever, thus benefited from the donations of money, medical supplies,
rations, and goods from a variety of Northern sources. Individuals, organizations, cities, and the
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federal government all contributed to save the South. Northerners managed to amass an amazing
amount of contributions to aid those suffering from yellow fever and to hopefully halt the spread
of the dreaded disease and fracture its grip upon the nation. Total relief equaled $4,548,672 for
yellow fever sufferers. Of this amount, $1.2 million came from Northern states, $916,500 from
Western states, $100,000 from the U.S. government, and $175,937 from foreign countries.
Northern contributions, therefore, nearly matched the $1.5 million dollars donated throughout
the Southern states for yellow fever relief.237

Southern relief agencies were wholly inadequate to coordinate relief for those who suffered
during the 1878 yellow fever epidemic. The disease proved too vicious and too wide-ranging for
the myriad relief agencies, boards of health, and local governments to meet the crisis. When it
became clear to Southern authorities that they needed outside help, they appealed to Northern
communities for relief and to the federal government for emergency assistance. These appeals met
with an enthusiastic response as Northern relief committees gathered contributions in the form of
money, supplies, and goods to aid the suffering South. The national relief campaign raised a
substantial amount of money and support for the South at a time when sectional antagonism
remained strong and the reach of federal authority was strongly contested.

Rhetoric of National Reconciliation
Antebellum yellow fever narratives regularly demonstrated sectional antagonism between
the North and South. This was true despite Northern contributions to relieve suffering in
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Southern communities. Abolitionists railed that yellow fever was a punishment for slavery;
Southerners responded that black differential immunity was a strong argument in support of
slavery. Americans viewed yellow fever as a “Southern malady,” but this carried a variety of
connotations. Northerners saw it as a sign of Southern backwardness—a scourge reaped by the
region’s slave trade and continued failure to modernize—while Southerners invested the disease
with cultural significance for regional identity. Yet, in 1878, yellow fever seemed an occasion for
national reconciliation rather than sectional antagonism.238
The fundraising efforts of Northern “Yellow Fever Relief” societies circulated a narrative of
the North coming to the rescue of its beleaguered Southern sister. Appeals for support of the
yellow fever-stricken urged Northerners to empathize with Southerners, who they characterized as
innocents suffering a cruel fate through no fault of their own. The extent of the 1878 epidemic
complicated Northerners’ assumption that yellow fever could be blamed on the region’s
backwardness or on individual immorality. Relief fundraisers therefore transformed yellow fever
from a Southern problem into a national disaster that required every citizen’s aid and support.239
In so doing, they invested the national campaign to relieve yellow fever victims in the
South with the rhetoric of national reconciliation, arguing that relief symbolized the North’s
commitment to reunion. Southerners, in turn, accepted the gift of relief that flowed from
Northern states and the federal government, recharacterizing Northern donors as saviors and
brothers in a common country. This rhetoric of national reunion was fundamental to the success
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of the relief campaign as Northerners and Southerners recognized their common work of yellow
fever relief as evidence of a shared interest and destiny.240

In order to drive the impulse to give in patriotic sympathy, Northern fundraisers
recharacterized Southern rebels as honorable martyrs and innocent victims. They further
proclaimed that those of the North and the South were one people with a common bond and
commonly referred to Southerners as “brethren” and part of “our Union.” Southerners recognized
the change in Northern rhetoric regarding the South and followed suit, acknowledging the
sympathy of the North and revising their characterization of Northerners. For example, the
Memphis Daily Appeal published “extracts from editorials eulogistic of the courage and endurance
of the people of the South during this epidemic” taken from the London Standard and the New York
Times. The Appeal proclaimed “while all that it says is true of the pluck and endurance of the
southern people under the provocations of war, pestilence, and famine, there is something to be
said for our brethren of the North,...[who have] extended us the right hand of fellowship, full up
and flowing over with good gifts, tendered with a manly spirit that robbed the generous tender of
the humiliations of charity.” In light of the epidemic, it seemed that sectional bitterness, if not
forgotten, was laid aside in favor of statements of mutual admiration and respect that supported
the efforts of the national relief campaign.241
Northerners believed that their relief efforts would demonstrate the North’s commitment
to national reconciliation and move the country past sectional animosity. The New York Times
editorialized that “The North puts aside all irritating remembrances, and heeds only the cry of
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anguish for help which comes from the fever-stricken districts.” The Times further anticipated that
“the experience which the two sections are now undergoing should uproot lingering animosities
and demonstrate the depth and unselfishness of the feeling which regards their interests as
identical.” Northern fundraisers agreed, arguing that their support of the Southern states during
the crisis stood as proof of their commitment to a mutual, national interest.242
Southerners also claimed that relief had overcome sectional animosity. In accepting a
renomination to Congress, Democrat and former Confederate John F. House of Tennessee
promised, “In the next contest between the two great parties, they will divide upon government
policy and without sectional animosity. Sectional hatred will be eliminated from the contest.” He
went on to explain, “I cannot...find it in my heart to indulge in feelings of malice toward the
people of the North when I witness their unanimous and generous conduct toward the Southern
people. I feel like pulling off my hat and standing uncovered in their presence,” a gesture of
highest honor coming from a Confederate rebel.243
But Southerners went a step further. They claimed that the gift of relief would not only
heal political antagonism but that it soothed the wounds left by the Civil War. A letter from a
yellow fever camp closed with the line: “We are of [the] opinion that Northern generosity has done
more to close the bloody chasm than all the political speeches that ever have been or [are] to be
made.” The Memphis Appeal even asserted that “The same men who led the armies of the North,
the same journalists who inspired those armies, and the same religious teachers,...the same noble,
heroic women who originated and sustained amid the heat of battle...the grandest beneficence ever
conceived of for the relief of soldiers in the field, have been foremost in the heaven-sent work of
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our relief.” They proclaimed, “To no other people could we of the South have surrendered.” The
Appeal thus pardoned and transformed Northern aggressors into saviors of the South through the
act of providing yellow fever relief. Assertions such as these allowed Southerners to recommit their
loyalty to the nation without abandoning the rhetoric of the Lost Cause.244
Because the North won hearts and minds throughout the South with the aid and succor of
yellow fever relief, Southerners were further able to claim this fealty without admitting defeat.
“Grander than the victory of Appomattox is the victory won by the people of the North in their
noble and generous contributions to the stricken and suffering South,” declared Congressman
House. “Upon that fated field the South surrendered her sword. Within the shadow of the dark
wing of pestilence, beside the new-made graves of her heroic sons and daughters, with bowed head
and tearful eyes, she extends her hand and surrenders her heart to the generous and magnanimous
North.” House thus claimed that the South was truly won, not by force of arms, but by the force of
Northern benevolence.245
In shaking hands across the bloody chasm and momentarily abandoning sectional
antagonism, relief fundraisers promoted nationalism, suggesting that reconciliation was finally
complete. In a letter accompanying a stack of autographs donated for sale to the Southern Relief
Committee of Cincinnati, poet and abolitionist John Greenleaf Whittier claimed that “The great
sorrow effaces all sectional and party lines and sweeps away all prejudices and jealousy. Under its
solemn shadow we are one people, fellow countrymen and brothers.” Some even suggested that
God had scourged the nation with yellow fever in order to bring about national reconciliation.246
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Others argued that the former enemies of North and South were not simply reunified as a
nation, under one government, but they were reunited as a family, indicating a deeper sense of
emotional reconciliation that went far beyond political reunion. The ubiquity of the theme of
brotherhood captured this sentiment, that the relief of the South had at last healed the sectional
rift. In his history of the epidemic, Dr. Dromgoole wrote that of the hundreds of volunteers who
traveled south to aid the sick, “Many of these noble sons of the North have fallen, and their cold
remains rest beneath the Southern sod. A noble band of Hero Martyrs indeed, to plunge into the
great maelstrom of death to save a suffering brother.” In death, those who stood on opposite sides
of bloody civil war were now made kin by the sacrifice of one for the other. The New Orleans
Howards argued that the “steady current of beneficence that saved us in our hour of darkest need”
pointed to a “brotherhood wider than birthplace and a patriotic sympathy as ample as the bonds
of our common country.” And John Keating wrote that “From far Oregon and Montana to
Vermont, from villages, towns, and cities of all the busy northern States...from all classes of that
section of our country came the light of an enduring brotherly love.” This theme of brotherhood
symbolized reconciliation on an emotional level as relief workers and fundraisers proclaimed a
kinship of compassion and mutual respect. This was the missing ingredient required for true
reconciliation. While political reunion had been accomplished by the Civil War, reconciliation
required an emotional recommitment to a common country, a shared destiny, and a pride of
national citizenship. Even the staunchly Democratic New Orleans Picayune claimed that the
“munificent donations of Northern, Eastern, and Western cities for the relief of the sick and
destitute in the South,” proved that “the sense of humanity and brotherly love is warmer and
deeper in this country than the mean animosities engendered by party rivalries and sectional
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prejudices. We begin to believe that this really is a nation, a people of one heart.” Southerners thus
gave thanks for the beneficence of the North and recognized that previous hatred did not stay the
hand of succor in their hour of need.247
For it was not simply the rhetoric that surrounded the relief campaign but the success with
which it amassed relief for the South that showcased national support. Relief thus stood as both a
symbol and a performance of national reconciliation, going beyond mere words. Depictions
printed in Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper of Northerners putting their money in donation boxes
or traveling as doctors and nurses to give comfort to the sick promoted not only the rhetoric but
the physical performance of national reconciliation. As Northerners’ actions demonstrated their
commitment to the South and to the reunification of the country, Southerners were regularly
reminded of the efforts of the North to relieve their suffering. National rhetoric alone could not
have achieved reconciliation. However, the act of Northerners providing aid and succor in a time
of desperate need, and the fact that relief was extended so broadly and given so willingly, made an
immediate impact on Southerners, and contributed far more to the process of reconciliation than
mere words. Jefferson Davis, former Confederate president, claimed in a letter to a friend in New
York that “The noble generosity of the Northern people in this day of our extreme affliction has
been felt with deep gratitude and has done more for the fraternization of which many idly prate
than would many volumes of rhetorical assurance.” Newspapers around the South reported that
“the strong sympathy shown to the afflicted cities of the south by their more fortunate sisters of
the north, is something not to be easily forgotten. On every side we hear of the most noble efforts
being made to raise contributions in aid of the afflicted.” By coming to the aid of those
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Southerners in desperate need of relief, they argued, the North “is building a monument to
gratitude which will be luminous forever.” Frank Roder, chairman of the executive committee of
the New Orleans Peabody Association, went so far as to claim, “Let any man use the word ‘Yankee’
again in my presence and I will insult him. Were the people of the North our own flesh and blood
they could not be more our brothers.’” By showing the horrors of the epidemic and the patriotic
fervor of the national campaign to relieve the South, such appeals urged all Americans to forget
past animosity of the Civil War and Reconstruction and to remember that the Union held firm.
The actions of those around the country who offered aid and succor to yellow fever sufferers stood
as proof.248
When the epidemic was over, Southern Senators and Representatives held a meeting at the
Capitol in Washington D.C. on December 20th “to give expression to the feeling of gratitude
entertained by the Southern people toward their fellow-countrymen.” They began the meeting by
acknowledging the terrible scope of the epidemic which claimed upwards of 30,000 deaths, leaving
more than 100,000 sick. Coupled with the devastation of economic, political, and social structures
across the region, “communities numbering in the aggregate more than half a million of souls were
plunged into the profoundest gloom and despair, and want and wretchedness brooked above the
land....” Yet in the midst of the suffering, they claimed, their sister states of the North and West
provided money, medicine, and “material aid of every kind.” But while they acknowledged that
Northern aid had “healed the sick, fed the hungry, clothed the naked, solaced the dying, gave hope
and comfort to the widow and the orphan and buried the dead;” it had done so much more than
that. They proclaimed “It has healed the wounds of war; it has served to entreat us to see our
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brethren of the American Union as they really are; it has bound our hearts to theirs; it has
cemented anew the bonds between them and us; it has renewed the aspirations of all of our people
toward the idea of an American Union based on affection.” In response, the Southern politicians
pledged “the undying fealty of our hearts to the institution of our common country, and perpetual
Union of the States thereunder” adding that this commitment was “not alone [to] the physical,
geographical, and political Union, but a union of affection, of brotherhood, inspired by the idea of
a common origin and a common destiny, ratified by the covenant of our fathers, and now
cemented forever by their love and their charity to us and our people.” This was the definition of
reconciliation that had remained so elusive following the Civil War and only seemed less assured
by the ultimate failure of Reconstruction.249
Of course, not every citizen of the country was willing to see the epidemic as an impetus to
national reconciliation. Some undoubtedly held to their sectional convictions and many in the
North proclaimed that the South’s wickedness had brought the disease upon them. At least one
letter to Mississippi governor John Marshall Stone suggested so. The letter, attributed to “A
Negro” proclaimed that “the wrath of God is now let loose upon the South for all their
wickedness.” The letter continued “Glory to God for his avenging rod, the Solid South will soon
be a Solid Wilderness and better people will go to inhabit it and all the murderous Mississippi
devils will be in hell driven by negroes whom they murdered upon the earth.” Obviously not all
citizens joined in the nationalist, reconciliatory rhetoric stimulated by the efforts to boost
donations for yellow fever relief. Yet this statement was in the minority. Calls for reconciliation,
expressions of nationalist brotherhood, and promises that the bloody chasm had been bridged by
the efforts to relieve the South were so ubiquitous that they drowned out statements to the
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contrary. For the vast majority of citizens, the 1878 yellow fever epidemic was a moment of intense
nationalist fervor that embraced the Southern states as valued and loved members of the nation
and symbolized the North’s commitment to reunion.250

The rhetoric of national reconciliation permeated the relief effort on both sides of the
Mason-Dixon line. It not only galvanized Northern support for relief of yellow fever sufferers, but
also allowed Southerners a way to express their thanks and hope for the future in ways that did not
require an admission of defeat or blame. Southerners did not have to say that slavery was a moral
wrong, they did not have to eschew the legality of secession, they did not have to accept
Reconstruction. Their surrender was based on the overwhelming power of Northern relief
tendered during the most desperate medical crisis the South or the nation had ever known.251
The national relief campaign was therefore a project and a performance of national
reconciliation. The relief and emergency aid donated to the South symbolized the commitment of
the North and the federal government to national reconciliation on an emotional, sentimental
level. Receiving relief therefore acted as a symbolic badge of membership in the national family
and equated to acceptance as equals in the body politic.

Local Authority
The 1878 epidemic may have provided a moment of professed reconciliation between the
North and South but in order to cement the promise of reunion, it was necessary that the North
allow Southerners authority over the distribution of relief. As a symbol of regional trust,
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Northerners offered supplies and money while allowing local authorities to decide how this aid
was to be distributed and spent. Of course, after the epidemic, calls for reconciliation and refusals
to reconcile continued for generations as the rhetoric of the Lost Cause took hold among
Southern whites. The epidemic and consequent aid distribution existed therefore, not as the
moment of national reconciliation that fundraisers and relief workers claimed, but as a sign that
Northern generosity would not be tied to further interference in local Southern affairs.
While Northern benefactors may have viewed the relief campaign as a project of national
reconciliation, Southern relief workers in charge of the distribution of aid used yellow fever relief
as a tool of Redemption. By using their authority to direct the majority of aid to white Southerners
rather than distribute to all Southerners in need, relief workers simultaneously took advantage of
and reinforced the social segregation of the black and white communities and the hegemony of the
white-controlled relief apparatus. Without an independent relief apparatus geared toward helping
black residents get aid, the national campaign to relieve the South vested full authority of
distribution in the hands of the Southern Howard Associations and citizen relief committees,
many under the influence of Democratic Redeemers intent on reinforcing the white supremacy of
the South.

The national relief campaign and the emergency assistance provided by the War
Department acted under precedent that dictated local authorities should disperse aid to their
communities. Previous actions by the federal government to provide disaster relief to American
citizens deferred to local authorities in the distribution of congressionally-approved aid.
Furthermore, the national reconciliationist agenda of the relief campaign required the respect of
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local authority and autonomy. Beyond precedent, it was simply too dangerous to send any
unacclimated individual into the South to coordinate the dispersal of Northern contributions.
While the National Yellow Fever Relief Commission sent the riverboat John M. Chambers to dole
out Northern relief under the command of Lieutenant Benner, the Commission quickly
abandoned the mission after the death of Benner and two crewmen. Southern authorities were
judged to be the best equipped to handle relief, the most knowledgeable of the needs of their
individual communities, and many of them were already acclimated. Therefore Northerners, for
the most part, did not question that the Southern Howard Associations and citizen relief
committees should distribute relief as they saw fit.252
Early in September, representatives of Southern relief organizations in Louisiana, Alabama,
and Mississippi, as well as the President of the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce, telegraphed
“An Appeal for the Sufferers…To the Chambers of Commerce and the charitable of the chief cities
of the Union.” The signatories summarized the dire condition of the South due to the “awful
destruction of the plague” and the “horrors of famine” that may arise given the collapse of the
Southern economy, and urged “that a comprehensive system of relief should be at once
inaugurated.” More specifically, they suggested “that in each of the great cities of the Union a
central depot for the reception of supplies be at once opened, where contributions of provisions,
tea, coffee, wines, medicines, and clothing may be sent.” In addition, those who signed the appeal
asked that New Orleans, “which is most accessible by sea and land, and which has more facilities
for transportation, be constituted the central depot for the reception of the supplies, which can be
forwarded to the Howard and Peabody Associations of that city as fast as collected.” From there,
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agents of the relief organizations in the principle Southern cities and towns affected by the disease
could procure provisions from New Orleanian authorities.253
Partially because of the Howards’ reputation, Northern relief societies assumed that the
Howards were the safest, most reliable organization to receive their contributions. The Grand
Secretary of Masons in New York, for example, urged his Southern agent that “In order that it may
not be charged against the Fraternity that the funds remitted to the Masonic authorities in the
south are expended for the benefit of Freemasons only,...consult with the Howard Associations, so
that the relief afforded may be as general as possible.” J. L. Power—in charge of relief for the
Masons and Odd Fellows in Mississippi—maintained that he dispersed funds to the appropriate
local authorities in an effort to make sure that those who most needed relief were provided it by
the express request of the Grand Master of Masons and “at the insistence of brethren who believe
that a Mason’s charity should be as extensive as the wants of suffering humanity.”254
But the assumption that the Howard Associations were the best organizations to
coordinate the receipt and distribution of aid caused significant trouble in New Orleans when the
Howards published their ill-advised notice that they no longer required donations. The Howards’
mistake rippled through the Southern relief apparatus. As news reached potential contributors
that the Howards no longer needed funds, the other relief organizations fought to maintain the
flow of support. John Sherman, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, telegrammed the Collector of
Customs in New Orleans, ordering him to report the “actual condition of suffering and want from
yellow fever” as well as “the extent of relief on hand and its sufficiency.” The Collector of Customs
responded that “There is more need of aid than ever. The wharves are bare, industrial enterprises
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closed up, and nearly every laboring man [is] out of employment. A meeting, last Monday, of
nearly all charitable associations, developed the fact that with the exception of the Howards, funds
are nearly exhausted.”255
Unfortunately, following the Howards’ initial notice that they had received sufficient funds
to provide New Orleanians yellow fever relief, the Secretary of War cut off further provisions to
the city. He claimed, “I cannot act until I am satisfied that a case of emergency exists, which can
only be relieved by the government,” further asking, if the Howards had a surplus of cash on hand,
“why not use it for food as well as for doctors, nurses, and medicines?” Despite receiving appeals
signed by the presidents of the various New Orleans charitable associations, asking him to
reconsider sending an additional forty thousand rations to the city, Secretary McCrary decided
against a second issue. He responded, “I am...of the opinion that it is possible for you to get relief
from private sources, and that it is not a case for the extension of government aid in the absence of
authority. If the Howard Association have a large unexpended fund, they can probably help you.
At all events their discretion is far more ample than mine.” The New Orleans Republican printed the
telegram under the headline, “NO MORE GOVERNMENT RATIONS. THE LAST HOPE
GONE.”256
The various relief associations assembled a committee to appeal directly to the Howards to
purchase the forty thousand rations which could then be distributed through the Orleans Central
Relief Committee. The chairman of the committee claimed that “some forty or more charitable
associations and relief committees were virtually paralyzed by the statement of the Howard
Association that they needed no more funds.” The Howards’ actions effectively ended continued
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federal support and made it far more difficult for smaller organizations to aid applicants for relief.
The Orleans Central Relief Committee claimed in their final report that “it is with regret that we
allude to the fact that we have a large number of applicants for relief now lying upon our table, to
which we are powerless to respond, for our supplies are exhausted. We trust that their cries will be
heeded by other associations who still have the wherewithal to bestow.” Because of the hegemony
of the Howard Association to the relief apparatus, most Southerners were compelled to apply
directly to the Howards for relief.257
The logistics of coordinating relief independent of the Howards proved too difficult for
many smaller organizations. With quarantines established throughout the South, transporting
relief contributions was far more difficult for smaller relief societies that did not have the contacts
needed to move donations from one place to another. Most of the smaller organizations depended
on larger groups like the Howards or the citizen relief committees. These groups almost always
included some important political or economic elites on their boards who could coordinate relief
from Northern or foreign contacts, negotiate transport, and draft remittances from national and
regional banks. Outside of New Orleans, few groups catering specifically to black Southerners had
this capability. For this reason, many of the contributions of Northern African Americans were
still sent through channels that were under white authority. For example, J. L. Power listed in his
receipts of contributions to Mississippi Masons $14.15 contributed by the “Colored people of
Gonzales, for persons of their own color, per Benj. A. Botts, Houston.” Once this money was
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funneled through larger relief organizations, however, the people of Gonzales would not have
known if their contribution went specifically to aid black Southerners.258
Northern benefactors and the federal government regularly sent instructions that aid
should be distributed equally. In New Orleans, George L. Smith, Collector of Customs—appointed
by President Hayes earlier in the year—distributed aid to the various relief organizations. A Union
veteran, Smith was a Republican who had held office during Reconstruction but had been
defeated as a carpetbagger in his bid for reelection. With Smith in charge of disbursing federal
assistance, the New Orleans Republican assured readers that “applicants of whatever race, region, or
color are ministered to with impartiality, for the United States Government never makes such
distinctions; but...showers its bounty upon all alike.”259
National relief organizations further maintained that there was no discrimination in the
disbursement of aid to yellow fever victims. In his report of relief by the Masons and Odd Fellows
of Mississippi, J. L. Power assured his colleagues that “The relief received through me has been
dispensed, as far as practicable, through the committees of both orders, without regard to race,
color, or creed. Such has been the expressed wish of nearly every Lodge and brother contributing.”
The Orleans Central Relief Association likewise attested to the Secretary of War that they
disbursed “supplies furnished by the United States Government for the relief of the sufferers by
yellow fever, regardless of race, color, creed, or nationality.” They claimed that among the “thirtyeight charitable associations represented by this committee, there has been no complaint made
that the distribution has not been fair and impartial.”260
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Northern benefactors were therefore largely unaware of any racial disparity in aid, or at
least they claimed to be. The Pittsburgh Relief Committee declared that “The arrangements in the
southern towns and cities, for the reception and disbursement of the money and supplies, seem to
have been careful, methodical, and eminently trustworthy. The Howard Associations,...the various
charitable organizations, hospitals, church associations, etc....discharged their trust as almoners of
the contributions...[to] the highest degree honorable.” They claimed that “no voice has been raised
in criticism” against these organizations, proving their fair distribution of the donations in their
care.261
But this was not entirely accurate. In New Orleans, both the Howard Association and the
Peabody Subsistence Association were criticized for racial and religious discrimination and
misappropriation of funds. The Howard Association published a report outlining receipts and
expenditures, in part to “prove our vindication against the false and mendacious statements which
have been made and circulated throughout our own country and in foreign lands, as to the
amount which we received; [and] of the large balance which we were keeping to divide after the
epidemic was over....” Further, they claimed to have been charged with “discriminations as to race,
religion, etc. in the distribution of the funds sent us. Never before has our Association been the
subject of so many and such untruthful allegations.” The claim that the Howards had never been
the subject of allegations of discrimination was true. In no previous epidemic had the Howards
been characterized as anything other than saviors to the populace; 1878 was the first year that their
character and work among the sick was ever maligned.262
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The Howard’s claim that these allegations were untruthful, particularly in regard to racial
discrimination, seems unlikely however. Since much of the national relief effort depended upon
local authorities in the South to properly distribute aid where it was most needed, the vast majority
of Northern contributions for yellow fever relief were sent to the Howard Associations and citizens
relief committees of the South. However, the local authorities in charge of Southern relief
organizations, boards of health, and local governments in 1878 were mostly political Redeemers
and Democrats. This was particularly true of the New Orleans Howard Association, whose VicePresident, Frederick Nash Ogden, was well-known throughout the city as president of the Crescent
City Democratic Club and Commander of the White League, a white-supremacist organization
which intimidated African Americans and Republicans and had attempted to forcefully depose the
Republican government of William Pitt Kellogg.263
While Redeemer Democrats were scattered in positions of authority throughout the relief
apparatus, the fraternal character of the organizations that provided relief may have been a more
general factor in the racial disparity in aid. Many of the smaller relief organizations were fraternal
societies modeled on the Masons and Odd Fellows and mutual aid societies for skilled workers.
Even the Howards, an elite voluntary organization, espoused ideals of fraternalism though they
lacked the ritual initiations of fraternal organizations. Yet fraternalism in the nineteenth century
acted as a site for the production and reinforcement of white manhood throughout the country.
Fraternal societies allowed men to cross class, religious, and political lines to espouse ideals of
brotherhood that embraced all white men. While some organizations allowed auxiliary lodges that
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accepted women or black men, these organizations generally operated under a strict exclusionary
policy. The auxiliary lodges were segregated and placed under the general authority of a white male
member of the larger organization. National organizations that might have acted outside of the
hegemonic role of the Howard Associations were therefore largely controlled by white authorities
that defined fraternalism as reinforcing white male supremacy.264
Despite complaints that the Howards discriminated against smaller organizations,
particularly those that aided minority groups, federal and Northern contributors nevertheless
upheld their authority. Lieutenant Benner of the John M. Chambers met with local representatives
of the Howard Associations and citizen relief communities along the Mississippi River during his
mission to dole out relief contributions on behalf of the Yellow Fever National Relief
Commission. Nearing Vicksburg, he “received a communication from G. W. Stith, president of
the Peabody (colored) Association, asking aid.” But instead of giving the relief that they had
offered to the Howard Associations and mayors of points north on the river, Benner solicited an
interview with Stith and telegraphed United States District Attorney W. H. Bliss in St. Louis to
oversee the interview. For some reason, Mr. Stith, despite being president of a local relief
organization, was not seen as one of the usual “prominent and responsible persons which whom
we wished to confer.” Benner therefore questioned why the Peabody Association did not direct
their request to the Howards.265
Once Benner became ill, his second in command interviewed the men from the Peabody
Association in the presence of the president and representatives of the Howard Association,
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during which “Mr. Stith stated that he knew of no instance of a colored having been refused help
and attention by the Howard Association upon proper application being made.” Stith did not seek
to malign the Howard Association; he only suggested that they were not offering rations to the
Peabody Association and that black Mississippians in the countryside were in need of assistance,
implying that they preferred to apply for relief to the Peabody Association rather than to the
Howards. Rather than release the contributions to Mr. Stith, however, Benner’s second in
command “concluded it was best to turn over the supplies to the Howard Association, with the
understanding that they were intended as much for the relief of colored as white people, and get
out of the infection [zone] as quickly as possible.” These procedures specifically upheld local white
authority and allowed white relief workers to determine who deserved aid.266
In order to avoid cases of undeserving applicants fraudulently gaining access to rations and
donations, relief organizations instituted tight controls and a laborious application process. In New
Orleans, the Central Relief Committee required applicants for relief to produce a physician’s
certificate demonstrating that they had been diagnosed with yellow fever and “detailed statements
of reliable persons” testifying to the individual’s destitution. “As an additional safeguard” against
undeserving applicants receiving aid, the Committee sent relief workers “to personally inspect the
residences of the applicants for relief,” thereby allowing individual relief workers to decide whether
applicants were deserving of rations. The New Orleans Peabody Subsistence Association instituted
similar procedures, requiring applicants to provide a list of references who could attest to their
sickness and need for aid. A member of the relief organizations was then required to interview the
individual’s references and make a personal inspection of their home. If the relief worker found
the individual appropriately deserving of aid, a ration blank would be filled out, signed, and
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stamped which could then be presented at the Peabody depot to receive rations of food sent by the
Secretary of War. As the epidemic progressed—and the relief organizations became more taxed—
they tightened their regulations, instituting changes that made applying for aid even more
arduous.267
These procedures disproportionately affected the black community. Reverend W. W.
Mallory of Memphis claimed that “The supplies in the hands of the Howards and Relief
Committee are ample, but there is such a routine imposed upon the poor colored people that
many of them get out of heart before they reach the end.” Mattie Milton further claimed that
many of the black residents, either by sickness or lack of nourishment, “were so feeble that they
could not stand in the ranks to await their turn at the relief office, but sat on the ground till night
came, and then receiving no attention, went home to die!” In making the process of applying for
aid so arduous, Southern relief workers made it far more difficult for the majority of black
residents to effectively appeal for aid. They further created opportunities for individual relief
workers to declare black residents undeserving of relief.268

Americans hoped that the national campaign to relieve yellow fever victims in the South
offered a moment of true national reconciliation following the failure of Reconstruction. However,
in order to impress upon the South the Northern commitment to reconciliation, Northern
contributors conceded that local Southern authorities had the right to distribute the fruits of
reunion and to dole out relief and material aid as they saw fit. Unfortunately, the Southern relief
apparatus, largely under the control of the Howard Associations and citizens relief committees, was
267
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unduly influenced by political Redeemers, Democrats, and the promotion of white masculinity
inherent in fraternalism. These organizations instituted strict demands upon applicants for relief
that allowed individual relief workers to discriminate against smaller relief organizations and
minority groups, particularly African Americans.

Racial Disparity in Relief
The rhetoric of reconciliation that permeated the national relief campaign effectively
mobilized support for the South. It further characterized the act of donating for yellow fever relief
as a performance of reconciliation and the aid itself as a visual symbol of the benefits of reunion.
In so doing, relief stood as a badge of membership in the nation. But the relief effort was not as
successful as those involved proclaimed, particularly regarding the distribution of aid to all
Americans affected by the 1878 yellow fever epidemic. There is ample evidence to suggest that
African Americans in the South did not receive the relief that they required and that the lion’s
share of aid went to white yellow fever sufferers rather than black.
If the offer of aid was rhetorically symbolic of acceptance as equals in the body politic—as
the rhetoric of national reconciliation suggested—the denial of access to Northern aid can be seen
as an equivalent denial of equal membership in the nation. Given that this relief was further seen
as an extension of the federal government’s initial relief measures, the racial disparity in relief
symbolizes a refusal by Southern relief workers to recognize black claims to aid as a right of
citizenship. Therefore, while Northern fundraisers may have viewed relief as a tool to achieve
national reconciliation, Southern relief workers used the local distribution of that relief as a tool of
Redemption and white supremacy.
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As fear of the disease escalated among black residents living in the yellow fever zone, many
black communities established separate relief societies. The black community of Vicksburg
established the Peabody Association. The Howard Association of Port Gibson had a separate
committee for black residents headed by Thomas Richardson. Black New Orleanians appealed to
the Mutual Benevolent Relief Association. Yet with no separate African American relief apparatus,
these organizations found themselves at the mercy of larger organizations controlled by whites.
While cities like New Orleans had more resources to aid their established black community of gens
de couleur, the majority of cities and towns in the South lacked “colored” mutual aid societies or
branches of national organizations intended to aid black workers and their families.269
Black churches were the main recourse for those in need, the Freedmen’s Bureau long
having been shut down by Congress. The Preachers Aid Society published an appeal for aid on
behalf of black Memphians “To the Colored People of the United States, Especially of the North,”
proclaiming that “Our people are suffering, dying and destitute. For Heaven’s sake relieve us all
you can by sending us means. We are not able to bury our dead or to nurse and feed the sick and
destitute. The most of us have no employment, as all business is suspended. Send us contributions
of money or provisions speedily.” But organizations under black authority were very small and had
fewer networks to coordinate relief than their white counterparts. African American newspapers—
along with most smaller newspapers in the South—ceased publication during the epidemic.
269
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Without newspapers to telegraph the need for aid, black relief societies and churches were less able
to coordinate with Northern sources of support. White missionary groups in the North explained
that, because of the epidemic, freedmen’s schools were closed and Northern teachers fled at the
epidemic’s beginning, closing another possible venue for coordinating aid from Northern
contributors.270
Many of the relief societies that specifically aided African Americans argued that the larger
relief organizations did not equitably distribute relief to black Southerners. For example, the
Mutual Benevolent Relief Association, established to aid black New Orleanians, accused the New
Orleans Howards and the Peabody Subsistence Association of discrimination. In contrast, they
went out of their way to officially recognize the Orleans Central Relief Committee “for the
impartial and uniform courtesy” with which they answered the Association’s calls for aid, mainly
because they were the only general relief agency in the city that included a representative of the
M.B.R.A. on their supervisory committee. However, they complained that the Orleans Central
Relief Committee, “under a strained construction of the orders from Washington, issue rations
only to yellow fever sick or convalescents, to the utter detriment of the starving poor,” a large
majority of which were black. Miss Hattie A. Milton, of the American Missionary Association,
claimed that in Tennessee, “Although several thousand dollars were sent here to relieve yellow
fever sufferers, many of the colored people received but little, some nothing.”271
In contrast to the portrayal of organizations seeking to aid African Americans, citizen relief
committees throughout the South complained that too much of their resources were spent caring
for indigent black residents who could not—or would not—work during the epidemic. The St.
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Louis Globe-Democrat claimed “The negroes never fail to show up for their rations, but can not be
found when a grave is to be dug or a corpse to be removed. They will not move unless paid a five
dollar bill for each errand.” Dromgoole concurred, stating that the “Negroes [of Memphis] will not
work, will not leave town, but lie about and draw rations, and then get sick and become a burden
intolerable.” He thereby blamed black Memphians for their inability to work, their need for aid,
and for getting sick in a single sentence. His indictment implied that black citizens were not
deserving of aid. Some Southern whites simply did not want to provide aid to black people.
George E. Hasie claimed that rations in Vicksburg went to those “who neither need or deserved
them” referring to the long lines of black Southerners who “flocked with their baskets and sacks to
the depot of distribution to demand their share. It is not needed and only encourages them in
laziness.”272
These descriptions of lazy, undeserving black Southerners were repeated in the Northern
press. Dr. Pease of Washington—who volunteered to go to Memphis but was turned away because
he was unacclimated—spread the message in Northern newspapers that “The commissary depots
established by the Howard Association are besieged by throngs of negroes, many of whom come in
from the surrounding country, risking the pestilence in order to get free provisions.” The writers of
these descriptions did not ignore the destitution and starvation caused by the complete breakdown
of the local economy. They admitted that people could not get work or food in Memphis, at least
not without putting themselves at great personal risk among the sick and dead. Yet those engaged
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in relief work consistently characterized black residents as attempting to game the system in order
to gain access to rations and donations of goods, as if they were not entitled to receive them.273
Others believed that, while sick black patients required aid, their actions early in the
epidemic caused their sickness. Dr. J. W. Mitchell, in an interview with the correspondent of the
Louisville Courier Journal, was asked if black residents fared better during yellow fever epidemics.
He replied, “Yes...if you could get over a colored man’s love for champagne. That is what killed
this class....Indeed there were instances where they came from the country and ran the risk of
taking the fever to get champagne.” Mitchell thus argued that black Memphians who contracted
the disease did so because of their immoral and insalubrious habits. John Keating further
commented that early in the epidemic, thirty cases of yellow fever were reported among the black
residents of Memphis, “and yet negroes were to be seen at any and all hours of the day, in the
alleys and back-ways, gorging themselves with watermelons, and all sorts of unwholesome trash.”
These descriptions of lazy, undeserving, and culpable black Southerners were more than simply
racist; they were essential to the racial disparity in yellow fever relief.274
This was due to the moral implications governing the distribution of disaster relief in the
late nineteenth century. Government (and most philanthropic) aid was rarely offered to those
deemed the undeserving poor. Rather, charitable assistance was intended to aid those who fell
upon hard times through no fault of their own, particularly if this hardship led to a loss of class
status. Charitable and benevolent institutions differentiated between those who were blameless in
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their own misfortune and refused aid to those judged as complicit in their own calamity either
through direct action that led to downfall, miscalculation of risk, or negligent inaction. Judgments
of blame further hinged on claimants’ moral status and were mediated by the social politics of
race, class, and gender. Congressional disaster relief, the emergency assistance provided by the
federal government during the epidemic, and individual judgments of need by Southern relief
agencies all followed these guidelines of assessing blame.275
The sheer scope of the epidemic allowed Southerners, in general, to claim they could not
be held responsible for the disaster. While individual cities such as New Orleans might be held
accountable for their poor sanitary condition or their ineffective quarantine of yellow fever, the
1878 epidemic affected so many people throughout the Mississippi Valley that individuals could
hardly be assigned blame for being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Further, both healers and
relief workers argued that the yellow fever of 1878 was especially virulent, attacking those
previously thought immune or in some way protected against a fatal attack. With whole families
dying out and the carnage wrought in cities like Memphis, orphans and widows abounded. Add to
this the economic desolation of the region—a well-documented consequence of yellow fever
epidemics—and Southerners could hardly be blamed for the proliferation of the newly destitute.
Themes of national reconciliation, so vital to the relief effort, also helped to foster this
sense of the South as a blameless victim of medical disaster. As Northerners recharacterized
Southerners as noble, honorable, and in desperate need of their help, they bolstered the
conception of Southerners as virtuous, innocent victims deserving relief. These claims did not
275
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discriminate by race, class, or gender. In fact, the Pittsburg Relief Committee claimed that aid was
desperately required by the South specifically because the epidemic “was no respecter of persons or
localities;...Neither age, sex, or race were exempt, although in prior visitations the children and
negroes had not suffered to the same extent as others. Not so now—it swept all.” If no one was safe
from the disease’s ravages, how then could individual Southerners be categorized as deserving or
undeserving of aid?276
In the case of white Southerners, relief organizations characterized broad swaths of society
as needing and deserving aid. The Orleans Central Relief Committee claimed that the distress
caused by yellow fever “was not confined alone to the laboring classes, but it extended to the
families of clerks, of professional men and property holders.” Describing a sick widow who owned
property but whose tenants were too poor to pay rent, a Committee member claimed “It was a
pleasure to apply the bounty of the Government to cases like these, and to show them that the
great Republic in which they lived, of which they heard only in connection with war, law-making,
and taxation, could...with the hand that had been wont to clasp the sword sustain the falling
victims of famine and pestilence.” The Committee thus recognized aid as a tool of reconciliation
most profitably applied to white Southerners who faced a loss of class status due to the
epidemic.277
Yet this nationalist rhetoric, which characterized Southerners as blameless victims,
apparently did not apply to black Southerners whom relief workers frequently characterized as
somehow complicit in their circumstances. Claims that black Southerners knowingly put
themselves at risk of contracting the disease to obtain alcohol, rations, or wages, for example, stood
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as evidence that black residents could be faulted for their sickness. These narratives, however,
failed to discuss the fact that whites regularly offered incentives to black citizens willing to put
themselves in close proximity to yellow fever. Because black people were supposed to be less
susceptible to the disease, white Southerners generally expected black residents to work as nurses,
gravediggers, wagon drivers to and from the cemeteries, or that they would guard homes whose
white owners had fled to safety in the North. Nevertheless, white relief workers judged black
residents for putting themselves at risk of contracting the disease by accepting work in these
situations. The Southern relief apparatus therefore attributed the suffering of white claimants to
natural causes outside of their control while black claimants’ suffering was due to social causes they
chose not to avoid.
Black Southerners were further judged as complicit in their destitution. Given the
breakdown of the Southern economy because of the epidemic, one could make the case that relief
of destitution and starvation was part of the national relief campaign. Fundraising rhetoric
certainly seemed to imply that this was the case. But once the funds and goods reached the South,
relief workers made a further distinction between whites and blacks and whether they were
deserving of aid. They claimed that the majority of black Southerners were a destitute population
before the epidemic. They argued that black residents refused to do any work during the epidemic,
preferring to draw on free rations. They characterized them as idle and lazy. And they argued that
black freedmen had flocked to cities after the Civil War, a fact that put them directly in the path
of yellow fever. Black politicians’ role in Reconstruction further suggested that they could be held
partially responsible for the economic and sanitary condition of cities struck by yellow fever. All
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these arguments were bolstered by the belief that black people largely escaped the worst of the
epidemic’s ravages to justify the systematic denial that they deserved relief.
The portrayals of white and black residents of the fever districts also regularly reinforced
the differences in their behavior during the epidemic. Telegrams from Memphis claimed that “The
impression prevails that all the whites will be attacked” by the fever and intimated that soon
“nobody will be left to direct the efforts of the nurses and the distribution of supplies.” With
yellow fever narratives highlighting the heroism of the physicians and relief workers as well as the
innocent suffering of the victims, these narratives presented both heroes and victims of the
epidemic as white, either ignoring or maligning the experience of black Southerners. Newspapers
repeated the story wired from Memphis that a militiaman fired into a crowd of black Memphians
outside the CRC commissary, claiming that “A number of negroes, some drunk, assembled before
the commissary depot this morning and becoming riotous made a rush for the door.” John
Keating did not include the claim of drunkenness when he described the incident in his official
history of the epidemic, yet the claim—repeated by a number of newspapers—immediately
characterized the black residents as a senseless mob rather than addressing any legitimate
frustration that the black community’s needs were not being met by relief workers. Instead, the
newspapers claimed that “The committee is doing all in its power to supply the people with food,
but some of the negroes are disatisfied [sic] with the manner the rations are issued and further
trouble is feared.” Furthermore, the papers claimed that “Some negro agitators have been talking
to the colored people and attempting to create trouble, but by the prompt action of [the]
mayor...and the members of the Citizens’ Relief Committee they were arrested this afternoon and
put in the station house....” It is unclear who these individuals were, whether they were truly
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“negro agitators” or if they played any more important role in the relief network of the black
community. What is clear is that yellow fever narratives regularly cast white Southerners as
innocent victims or honorable martyrs while portraying black Southerners as undeserving,
irrational, and dangerous. These characterizations, while most assuredly the result of entrenched
racism and reinforced by the lack of knowledge about what was actually happening in the black
community during the epidemic, nevertheless had real consequences for the distribution of aid on
the ground.278
The characterizations of black residents as dangerous criminals, so prevalent in Memphis,
reassigned the role of black citizen from victim of disaster to part of the disaster itself. Memphians
who feared the looting of the ration store portrayed black residents as one of the forces tearing
Memphis apart and contributing to the deaths of whites. These portrayals, of dangerous black
Southerners who endangered the success of the national relief campaign, were repeated in a
number of towns and cities throughout the South, justifying the wide-spread belief among relief
workers that black residents were attempting to gain access to aid that they did not deserve.

Given the prevalence of complaints by authorities that black residents were attempting to
gain access to material aid and rations that they did not deserve, as well as the numerous attempts
to justify the belief that black residents were complicit in their condition, it is not surprising that a
majority of the aid delivered to the South was disbursed to the white community at the expense of
black citizens. The denial of this aid led to untold suffering and death in the African American
communities of the Mississippi Valley. Further, given the context of the national relief campaign’s
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rhetoric of national reconciliation, the denial of aid had important symbolic consequences as well.
Southern authorities in charge of the distribution of relief refused black claimants’ appeals for
relief based on a number of individual factors, yet taken as a whole, the systematic routing of aid
away from the black community and toward Southern whites suggests that relief workers used
yellow fever relief as a tool of white supremacy and Redemption.

Differential Immunity
A further important component in the racial disparity of aid distribution centered on the
expectation of black differential immunity to the disease. Relief workers acted under the
assumption that black residents were either immune or resistant to yellow fever and that the
population most in need of their help consisted of nonimmune whites. This expectation led relief
workers to privilege the claims of whites over those of blacks. It further led them to assume that
legitimate cases of disease in the black population required less medical care to resolve successfully.
This meant that the majority of aid was spent providing for the medical needs, convalescence, and
support of sick whites and their families.
Instead of dispersing aid to a broader segment of the population that was made destitute
because of the economic effects of the epidemic, relief workers considered the aid provided by the
federal government and donations from communities around the country as intended for yellow
fever sufferers only. They therefore constrained the definition of relief to apply only to the sick, a
definition that favored expectations of white susceptibility and kept relief out of the hands of black
Southerners believed to be either immune or resistant.
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According to white-authored yellow fever narratives, black Southerners seemed
unconcerned with yellow fever at the start of the epidemic. Descriptions of fleeing evacuees
claimed that the vast majority of those who left in the wake of yellow fever were white. Relief
workers further maintained that a majority of the population left behind were destitute black
residents. In general, those who remained in the cities affected by yellow fever were too poor to
escape. Yet many black Southerners also ascribed to the same popular medical beliefs held by
whites that they were either immune or resistant to the disease. In a letter to the Lockport Daily
Union of New York, J. L. Power described how black Mississippians had been trapped by prevailing
ideas of their immunity: “When the stampede first took place from here and other places, the
colored people generally remained. Heretofore they have been comparatively exempt from the
fever, but they are equally subject with the whites to the present type of the disease. When they
begun [sic] to realize this fact, many were quite willing to leave,” but they were trapped by the
quarantines which had since isolated the infected communities. He therefore explained that the
large population of black residents left behind in each of the cities affected by yellow fever had no
choice “but to stay and take their chances.”279
Power further claimed that the subsistence of those trapped in the cities “became a matter
of immediate concern. Those who gave them employment and paid them wages had gone, and all
opportunities of providing for themselves and families were abruptly

closed against them.

Hence the applications that have been made to the Government for rations, and its prompt and
timely furnishing of the same.” Relief workers thus recognized that a large portion of those who
remained in the city, while perhaps not yet sick, were nevertheless caught in a perilous position.
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With local economies devastated by the cessation of business and the inability to enter and leave
the cities—either by quarantine regulations or by fear of the disease—starvation and destitution
became real concerns.280
Yet relief workers in New Orleans, led by the Howard Association, proclaimed that the
relief sent to the Southern states by Northern contributors and rations sent by the federal
government had been specifically designated for yellow fever sufferers and that the donations
remitted to them could not provide for more general relief. Donations often came with written
expressions such as “relief for the sufferers of yellow fever.” While these might have been defined
as descriptive of donations intended for those suffering because of the epidemic, relief workers
decided to construe them more specifically as instructions which, they argued, constrained their
abilities to provide relief to any other than those sick from yellow fever.281
The other relief organizations in the city, dependent upon the Howards as the central
receiver of donated goods and funds, were forced to follow the same guidelines in their
applications for requisitions. The Orleans Central Relief Committee claimed that “It was
determined that under the instructions of the Secretary of War to the Collector of the Port the
supplies could only be issued to those persons having yellow fever in their families and who were
destitute. This resolution prevented us from relieving many.” They furnished a statement to the
newspapers that “Government rations [would] be issued only to such families or individuals as may
have been, are now, or may be afflicted by the prevailing fever, in accordance with the terms used
by the Secretary of War in his letters directing the issue of the said supplies.” Because Secretary
McCrary had designated federal rations “for issue to yellow fever sufferers,” the local authorities in
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charge of disbursing said relief defined those deserving aid as those who were sick, not the healthy
who were nevertheless made destitute by the epidemic. The New Orleans Times-Picayune described
“Quite a large crowd, principally composed of colored people, [that] was collected around the
Custom House, probably with the expectation of a general issue of rations, but it was learned that
the relief was to be limited to fever sufferers.” Forced to follow the example of the Howard
Association—which always limited their care and support to those who were sick—relief of the poor
and destitute relied upon donations that came with instructions designating their use among the
poor without specifically referring to yellow fever, leaving far fewer resources for those who had
not contracted the disease. The New Orleans City Item claimed that, “A great many colored people
with requisitions from the United Benevolent Association...were turned away” from the Peabody
Subsistence Association after “It was resolved to limit supplies exclusively to the sick,
convalescents, and their nurses and families.”282
Other Howard Associations and citizen relief committees around the South followed the
lead of the New Orleans organizations and limited their efforts to the sick, to the detriment of the
destitute black residents trapped in the infection zone. The Memphis Daily Avalanche argued that
“Men worth hundreds of thousands of dollars have left their property in charge of blacks, and
never provided a dollar for their support. They faithfully guarded the property of their employers.
And yet if the Citizens’ Relief Committee cut off the supplies from the servants of these rich men,
what in God’s name will they do?”283
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Despite the constrained definitions applied by the Howard Associations, many workingclass whites throughout the South were judged as deserving of yellow fever relief, even if they were
not sick. The Memphis CRC provided federal rations and tents to refugees in the camps outside
Memphis. And after the epidemic, “the poorer class of people in the districts adjacent to Memphis
who were left destitute by the death of relatives and friends” received $500 in aid by the Yellow
Fever National Relief Commission because Representative Casey Young appealed on their behalf.
This aid was immediately tendered without hesitation because it had the approval of a local
authority and Northern relief organizations operated under philanthropic procedures that doled
out money to Southern authorities. Yet while Southern authorities shared relief with destitute
whites that were not sick, they offered little to the black citizens in their midst.284
Relief workers recognized that the yellow fever of 1878 seemed to contradict their
assumptions that black citizens were immune to the disease. The American Missionary—the
newsletter of the American Missionary Association, which sent relief to aid Southern black
residents—claimed that “The yellow fever...pays no regard to race, color, or previous condition.
Whites and blacks alike have suffered from its sudden and malignant attacks....The statement
which has been often made, that the negroes are proof against this pestilence, seems to have been
ill-based, as intelligent observers of its ravages in former years utterly contradict it. At any rate, it is
not true of this year’s scourge.” Dr. Veazey of Grenada, Mississippi wrote that “The negroes are all
getting the fever” and he cited more deaths among blacks than those of whites, despite the fact
that this was contrary to popular expectation. Dr. Veazey claimed that “The colored patients are
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dying for want of proper nourishment and domestic attentions,” implying that if black patients
were provided good nursing care and wholesome food, they would be fine.285
Yet there is evidence to suggest that the belief in their racial immunity kept black
Southerners who did contract the disease from receiving aid. Because black people were still
believed to be resistant to the disease, many Southern relief authorities viewed their claims of
sickness with suspicion. As one relief worker wrote, “There were a large number of negroes ill from
the first, of whom not more than one or two died, and it is doubtful whether these were yellow
fever at all.” The president of the Yalobusha County Board of Health claimed that “disease was in
general mild and easily controlled among the negroes, many of them getting well without scarcely
any treatment at all” implying that even if black Southerners contracted yellow fever, they did not
require medical care or relief. Throughout the South, white residents were considered the main atrisk population. Statistics compiled during and after the epidemic seemed to verify this.286
By requiring applicants to prove a verifiable case of yellow fever in their households,
Southern relief workers thus funneled most of the federal and Northern contributions away from
the black community, whom they generally assumed were comparatively resistant to the disease.
While they admitted that black residents were contracting yellow fever, Southern whites
nevertheless maintained that the disease was generally mild in black patients and usually resulted
in convalescence whereas they claimed that the morbidity and mortality rates in whites was
significantly higher, justifying their greater need for relief.
Further, the vast majority of Southern physicians and boards of health furnished statistical
evidence to prove that whites suffered disproportionately. But the statistical evidence of the
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epidemic is in part untrustworthy because of this very widespread assumption of differential
immunity and susceptibility the statistics seem to support. Many of these statistics of morbidity
and mortality were compiled by the very relief organizations that were accused of not providing aid
to black citizens so the number of cases among the African American communities in the South
may have been underreported due to these agencies’ biases toward the care of whites. It is likely
that morbidity and mortality among black residents were further underestimated by medical
authorities throughout the South because of the invisibility of black death. There was a general
lack of understanding of what was happening in black communities that is clear from reading the
reports of white relief workers. Further, even whites admitted that rural cases and deaths of black
Southerners on plantations and farms were vastly underreported.
Conversely, the number of yellow fever cases within the black community may have been
overreported as a consequence of their desperate attempts to appeal for aid as the cities faced
starvation. Statistics and anecdotes of cases among black patients that seemed to need little
treatment or generally ended in convalescence rather than death make more sense when it is
remembered that relief was often held in reserve for the sick. White relief workers were certainly
suspicious of black appeals for aid. But we cannot know from the evidence provided whether this
suspicion was justified or not. The white relief apparatus created an arduous process for obtaining
relief, very likely with the intention of making it more difficult for African Americans to
successfully apply for aid. Given the fact that most relief workers seemed to judge the denial of
black residents’ deserving aid as a foregone conclusion, white authorities often assumed that black
applicants were fraudulently attempting to access relief. White relief workers would have further
pointed to cases wherein the black community, desperate for relief, furnished examples of fraud in
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order to further justify their discriminatory practices. The larger point to be made, however, is that
the statistical evidence promoting the differential immunity or susceptibility of blacks and whites
to yellow fever cannot be relied upon as an accurate portrayal of black experience with the disease
in 1878. Yet contemporaries believed that all evidence pointed to a disparity in morbidity and
mortality based on race that suggested whites were blameless because of their greater susceptibility
to the disease.
Only those African Americans who came under white medical authority when sick were
able to be counted with any confidence. Yet physicians and relief workers complained that
members of the black community were loath to place themselves under white medical authority.
Colonel John F. Cameron, Commander of Camp Joe Williams outside of Memphis, remembered
that the “Negroes hold doctors and hospitals in great terror, and can rarely be induced to take
medicine. All removals [to the hospital] required armed force.” He described cases of black
patients fighting with authorities or being hidden by their families to keep them from being
forcibly removed to the hospital. He even claimed that one night a black patient “was stolen from
the hospital, and in the attempt to convey him to the city in a wagon, he died on the way.” This
refusal to submit to white relief workers’ and medical authority may also have made it more
difficult for black patients to get rations and medicine that they needed to care for their families.287
Nevertheless, there were some alternative efforts to care for the sick in the black
community. Reverend Temple Cutler of Chattanooga, Tennessee claimed that “There were many,
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many cases of yellow fever among the colored people that were not reported. They held, perhaps, a
superstitious notion—the doctors would say so, at least—that if they went to the hospital they would
surely die; so they doctored themselves with herbs, and so far as I can learn not one so treated
died.” Unfortunately, very little is known about these efforts or of parallel networks of mutual aid
and solidarity that may have been prevalent in the black community yet never came to the notice
of white relief workers.288
National authorities repeated what they learned from Southern authorities about the
differential susceptibility of the disease. Keating wrote that “The medical experts appointed by
Congress in December, 1878, declare...The white race is most susceptible to it, and all colors
intermediary between that and the negro less and less in degree as they approach the African, who
suffers least of all from it.” Northern newspapers repeated what Southern newspapers described as
ubiquitous white death and comparative black resistance. The statistical evidence furnished by
physicians, boards of health, and relief agencies all seemed to prove this assertion. Given the
ubiquity of this data, most Americans generally believed that black Southerners suffered least. It
may have even seemed appropriate that the majority of aid went to those thought to suffer most—
susceptible whites.289

Relief workers thus pointed to expectations of differential immunity as justifications that
African Americans were undeserving of the relief sent to the yellow fever districts of the South.
Southern authorities, in an effort to systematically discriminate against black citizens, took
advantage of medical definitions of race in order to justify providing relief to white yellow fever
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sufferers at the expense of the black community. While relief authorities could claim that they
acted appropriately, reserving aid for at-risk populations under widely accepted medical standards,
the ubiquity of judgments of black residents’ moral status in order to present them as undeserving
of relief or culpable in their illness, coupled with the ease with which they offered relief to a broad
range of white residents, in some cases neither sick nor destitute, belies the claim that aid was
distributed fairly.

Conclusion
The national campaign to relieve the South during the 1878 yellow fever epidemic was so
steeped in the rhetoric of national reconciliation that the St. Louis Globe Democrat forecast “There
will be no bloody shirt in the campaign of 1880. Recent events have proved that we can get along
without it. It was a useful garment once, but it is no longer needed.” The Weekly Louisianian, the
leading African American newspaper in New Orleans sneered at such sentiment, arguing, “Is it any
wonder the Democracy have nearly ridiculed the wholesale murder of colored men in the South
for political purposes out of discussion in the North...?” In an effort to enact reconciliation
through relief, whites around the nation “clasped hands over the bloody chasm” yet largely ignored
what was happening in the black community. While there is significant evidence that the fruit of
reunion was not shared equally with black Southerners, black newspapers spent little time after the
epidemic complaining about the racial disparity in aid. Instead they focused on the escalation of
political violence across the South and fears of disfranchisement should Redeemer Democrats
hold power in the coming election. The Weekly Louisianian presciently warned black Southerners
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that the coming days would bring segregation, racial violence, and disfranchisement of black
citizens in the South.290
The events leading to the entrenchment of Jim Crow in the South may have overshadowed
the racial disparity in the distribution of relief provided during the epidemic of 1878, yet the
context of the national relief campaign and the racial disparity in aid foreshadowed themes
prevalent during the Jim Crow era. The national campaign to relieve the South relied on a rhetoric
of national reconciliation that fostered the goals of white reunion at the expense of black
Southerners. In an effort to prove their commitment to reconciliation and their respect for
Southern autonomy, Northern benefactors and the federal government deferred to local
authorities in the South to distribute aid as they saw fit, allowing Southern Redeemers to direct
contributions toward white communities and away from black communities. Southern relief
workers accomplished this racial discrimination by making the application process particularly
arduous in ways that disproportionately affected destitute, sick, and/or illiterate black residents.
They refused to cooperate with smaller relief organizations that specifically catered to the black
community, relying on moral condemnations of African Americans’ living habits to declare them
undeserving of assistance. They further endorsed medical arguments that promoted racial and
biological distinctions between white and black bodies that fostered the scientific racism prevalent
in both the North and the South.
This racial disparity in aid, given the nationalist symbolism invested in relief, demonstrates
that those in control of the Southern relief apparatus did not consider black residents to be equal
members of the nation. Their refusal to share in the bounty of relief provided by the national relief
campaign, particularly the rations provided by the federal government, demonstrates a further
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denial of the rights of citizenship to black Southerners. While relief may have been a symbol of
national reconciliation for whites across the country, Southerner relief workers used the
distribution of aid as a tool of Redemption in their efforts to promote white supremacy. In so
doing, they helped institute the structures that would ultimately sustain decades of Jim Crow.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
MEMORY IN MEMPHIS

In his seminal history of Memphis, published in 1939, Gerald Capers argued that yellow
fever epidemics in the 1870s severely crippled a city that had been poised for greatness. Memphis
was captured early during the Civil War and had served as a thriving center of illicit trade between
the North and South, growing in population throughout the 1860s and 1870s. Yet, Capers
claimed, repeated yellow fever epidemics in 1873, 1878, and 1879 had severely damaged
Memphis’s reputation as a budding Southern metropolis. Capers blamed yellow fever for the
exodus of ethnic minorities, for the subordination of Memphis’s Catholic Church, for the
migration of poor, rural whites and freedpeople into the city, and for a lack of Northern
investment, which ultimately led the city to lag behind Atlanta, St. Louis, and Nashville. “The
social and economic consequences of the fever epidemics were so far-reaching,” he wrote, “as to
warrant the conclusion that there have been two cities upon the lower Chickasaw Bluff: one which
existed prior to the pestilence, and a second metropolis which sprang up like some fungus growth
on the ruins of the first.” The demographic changes following the epidemic and the rise of rival
New South cities, Capers argued, had reduced Memphis nothing more than a “southern
Middletown.”291
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In advancing these arguments, Capers’s classic Biography of a River Town gave academic
sanction to a historical narrative that Memphians had told for decades, in which yellow fever was
to blame for any number of the city’s woes. In particular, Memphians continued—and continue—to
single out the yellow fever epidemic of 1878 as the final straw that pushed the city to declare
bankruptcy, surrender its municipal charter and name, and become the Taxing District of Shelby
County. According to these historical narratives, yellow fever not only kept Memphis from
attaining its position of greatness as the point of communication between the South and West, but
also nearly wiped Memphis off of the map entirely. While Memphis survived—regaining its charter
and its name by 1893—the epidemic transformed the city in important and lasting ways.
Memphians therefore continue to commemorate the yellow fever epidemic of 1878 as an
existential crisis in the history of the city.292
Yet Lynette Boney Wrenn has argued that the change from an aldermanic to a commission
form of government, and even the surrender of the charter as a drastic measure to settle the city’s
debt, was not necessarily a unique situation for cities that became financially insolvent after the
economic collapse of 1873. She further points out that, as Memphis’s municipal debt increased
following the Civil War, concerned citizens had engaged in debate over a change in government
for more than a decade before the yellow fever epidemics. In fact, she argues that while the
epidemic was surely the impetus which swayed public opinion toward favoring a radical
restructuring of the municipal government, the financial debt of the city had already mushroomed
to the point that some form of drastic change was surely inevitable. While the surrender of the city
charter and the creation of the country’s first Taxing District may seem extreme, Wrenn explains
that the change was enacted in order to avoid continued law suits against the city for debts
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incurred and that there was very little else the city could have done to avoid the constant writs of
mandamus issued against the municipality.293
Because Wrenn’s focus is on political structures and not on yellow fever, her analysis puts
the 1878 yellow fever epidemic in a wider context of fights over legitimate political authority in
Memphis. Her narrative offers a broader view of Memphis’s debt troubles which presents the
surrender of the charter and the creation of the Taxing District as less contingent upon the
epidemic that preceded it. Further, while Wrenn explains that Memphis newspaperman John
Keating, the author of the central narrative linking the epidemic to the overthrow of the
aldermanic government, was “one of the most ardent proponents of municipal reform in Memphis
during the 1870s and 1880s,” a quality that historians of public health have overlooked in their
analysis of his narrative.294
Yet the historical narrative of the epidemic’s effects on the city of Memphis—particularly
the dominant narrative provided by John Keating—has been put to a number of social, political,
and economic uses over the decades. This chapter therefore offers a critical analysis of the
historical memory of the 1878 yellow fever epidemic in Memphis, which has had a significant and
continuing impact on the regional identity of the city and its inhabitants. Select Memphians
fashioned the yellow fever narratives that rebuilt the social hierarchy during and after the
epidemic. Because historical memory always has social and political connotations, the architects
and executors of these historical narratives claimed authority over the cultural power of collective
memory, deciding which Memphians’ experiences and narratives were legitimate, and using them
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to reinforce the social hierarchy of the city. These narratives, in turn, were memorialized in
physical and emotional ways that marked the city for generations.295
The first half of this chapter focuses on the act of cementing historical memory of the
event in its immediate aftermath and the political, economic, and social implications that were
embedded in the dominant narrative. In particular, Keating’s narratives of the epidemic and its
aftermath were instrumental in tying the 1878 epidemic to the 1879 repeal of the city’s municipal
charter and the change in government from an aldermanic City Council to a highly centralized
commission government branded the Taxing District of Shelby County. Economic elites,
previously barred from significant political representation in Memphis, successfully employed the
memory of yellow fever to push for a change in government that concentrated power in the hands
of a small group of wealthy businessmen.296
Once in office, these economic elites played upon public fears of yellow fever to maintain
power as they instituted reforms they believed would propel Memphis into a premier New South
city. Seeking to capitalize on the creation of a National Board of Health following the 1878
epidemic, they enacted public health and sanitation initiatives in order to repair the city’s
reputation and encourage Northern investment. With the conspicuous absence of yellow fever in
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the city after 1879, Taxing District officials fashioned themselves as saviors of the city. Ignoring
complaints from outlying neighborhoods, lower-class, and ethnically-diverse wards that reforms
were focused on improving the business district and elite neighborhoods, officials nevertheless
portrayed their sanitation reforms as a veritable revolution in public health that would ensure the
bright future of Memphis. Yet, contrary to Capers’s thesis, Memphis’s status as a New South
metropolis was hindered more by the Taxing District’s piecemeal reforms of the city and by
continued economic stagnation than any demographic changes wrought by yellow fever.297
After discussing how business elites used the collective memory of the 1878 epidemic to
transform the city of Memphis, the second half of the chapter discusses the ways in which the
collective memory of the epidemic has continued to impact the history and identity of the city and
its residents. Yellow fever memorials in Memphis continue to commemorate the city’s municipal
crisis but they also tell a particular story about the identity of the people who prevailed the neardestruction of the city. Not only did white, educated elites use yellow fever memory to justify their
political take-over, but this class also continued to employ historical memory in the city to glorify
heroes from their class and to erase the contributions of racial and ethnic minorities—as well as
poor, rural southerners—to the history and identity of their city. Although there have been
repeated attempts to reinsert ethnic and racial minorities into the historical narrative in a positive
way, only some of these have been successful. In general, the experience of African Americans
during the epidemic remains unremembered.
Both early and later memorials that commemorate yellow fever inscribed this selective
historical knowledge onto the landscape. Religious bodies and boosters of historical tourism have
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all reinforced the narratives of the 1878 yellow fever epidemic to enhance the reputation of
specific institutions in Memphis. While Memphis has its fair share of memorials featuring the
Civil War and glorifying the Lost Cause, the citizens of Memphis—a city that prospered during the
War and avoided military Reconstruction—have chosen the yellow fever epidemics of the 1870s as
a symbolic icon of Southern suffering. These commemorations convey an active definition—or
redefinition as the case may be—of identity and belonging to future generations of Memphians and
visitors alike.298
Professional historians have also had a hand in maintaining or challenging the collective
memory of the 1878 epidemic in their analyses of the epidemic’s long-term impact on Memphis.
Historians of medicine and public health have reinforced much of Keating’s narrative. They echo
many of his assertions, including that yellow fever inaugurated the change in government, that the
aldermanic City Council was hopelessly corrupt and unqualified to deal with the debt crisis they
had created, and that the commission government of the Taxing District modernized the city with
the sanitary improvements necessary for safeguarding public health. Historians of Gilded Age
urban spaces, however, point to issues with tax collection and spiraling municipal debt as a
common feature in cities after the Civil War. They further argue that the surrender of the
Memphis charter was neither unique as a solution to the municipal debt crisis nor was it a
consequence of Memphis’s disease environment.299
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In short, the yellow fever epidemic of 1878 provides a well-known historical narrative that
has been used in Memphis for a number of social, political, and academic purposes. While the
history of yellow fever—especially of this specific epidemic—has been memorialized,
commemorated, and retold by generations of Memphians, interestingly, the topic holds far less
historical significance in other cities in the South that have been wracked by yellow fever. This is
true even in New Orleans, the undisputed yellow fever capital of the United States for most of the
nineteenth century and a city whose residents once assigned a great deal of cultural and social
meaning to yellow fever. While New Orleanians have since chosen to reinforce other aspects of
their collective memory, Memphians have sustained the historical narrative of the 1878 epidemic
as essential to the history and identity of their city. This chapter examines how, as well as why, the
epidemic has been remembered in order to understand this characterization of place-based
identity. How has the collective memory of the epidemic been fashioned? What have Memphians
chosen to remember about the epidemic and what have they chosen to forget? How has this
memory been preserved and passed down through generations? And to what uses has this memory
been put? This chapter attempts to answer some of these questions.

The Aftermath
In the immediate aftermath of the 1878 yellow fever epidemic, Memphians sought to deal
with the consequences of the death and destruction wrought by yellow fever. Survivors wrote of
their experiences and published the first official histories of the epidemic. In these writings,
Memphians attempted to make sense of the tragedy and deal with the loss of friends and loved
ones by glorifying heroes of the epidemic in a way that offered a message of hope and community
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to those who survived. They celebrated the brave doctors and relief workers, their heroic deeds of
selfless service, and honored those who willingly gave their lives to help yellow fever sufferers. But
these accounts were selective, silencing many Memphians who experienced the horrors of yellow
fever or who likewise sought to aid their fellow citizens.
In fashioning heroes of the epidemic and publishing official accounts of events, a
particular historical narrative emerged that glorified the actions of specific Memphians: all white,
nearly all male, and predominantly middle- or upper-class. This dominant narrative effectively
overshadowed or silenced alternative experiences of the epidemic and largely ignored the
contributions of those who did not fit this description. While honoring heroism was an important
component in moving forward after such a devastating tragedy, Memphians sought to venerate
heroes that displayed attributes and characteristics of an idealized Southern identity. Choosing
appropriate figures for idolization was therefore key to creating a lasting public memory that would
have significance for current and future generations of Memphians.

When the epidemic was officially declared over on October 29, 1878, refugees who had
fled the city began slowly trickling back into Memphis. On November 1, All Saints’ Day, the Irish
Catholic refugees of Camp Father Matthew enjoyed a mass of thanksgiving for the deliverance of
all but eight of their number, and then marched back into the town. The convoy proceeded
straight to St. Bridget’s Church where they spent the day offering prayers of thanks for their
survival and mourning for the dead. According to J. P. Dromgoole, “no band of music preceded
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the procession” through town, out of respect for the grief-stricken congregation. The Irish
population had suffered the largest proportion of deaths from yellow fever in the city.300
In comparison to this solemn return of Irish refugees, other Memphians arrived in the city
amidst an atmosphere of joyous celebration. When Camp Joe Williams disbanded the next day, its
residents paraded down Main Street, following the Bluff City Cornet Band. The militia companies
that had guarded the camps marched behind. This military-style parade symbolized a triumphant
homecoming. Evacuees who had fled north likewise returned to reopen homes and businesses
boarded up in their absence.301
As families and neighbors were reunited, Memphians began to take stock of the devastating
losses to the community. While evacuees had kept abreast of the devastation through newspapers
and letters, only when they returned home could they see how much their city had changed. Every
Memphian, whether they had stayed behind or fled in terror, knew someone who had perished of
yellow fever. Many learned that their loved ones had been laid to rest in trench graves with no
marker or headstone that their family could visit or decorate. Even those who had purchased
burial plots had been consigned to this coarse interment, heaped with the poor and destitute in
the Potters’ Field, as overworked undertakers fought to keep up with the pace of death during the
height of the epidemic. No family, neighborhood, or heart remained untouched by tragedy.302
Memphians promised to help each other remember those they had lost, those that had
given their lives to help save others, and the event that had left the city in such a state of shock.
Memphis residents attended a mass meeting on Thanksgiving Day at the Greenlaw Opera House
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to publically offer thanks for the national relief campaign and to mourn the dead. The meeting
began with a formal statement, which read: “To the martyred dead, we feel but cannot express our
gratitude; yet, in all days to come shall their memories be kept green, and their names go down in
the annals of our city, honored, revered, and blessed.” Memory and memorialization served as a
way to try to make sense of and deal with the tragedy. Memphians began the search for suitable
heroes of the epidemic who symbolized the spirit of dedication, sacrifice, honor, and compassion
that had kept the city of Memphis alive, even as thousands of its citizens sickened and died.303
John M. Keating published his first official history of the epidemic in January of 1879,
though he took much of the material in his work from the columns of his newspaper, the Memphis
Daily Appeal, published during the epidemic itself. As a journalist, Keating understood the
importance of the narrative in influencing public perception of what was happening in the isolated
city. He used the Appeal as a bullhorn for the Citizens’ Relief Committee and the Howard
Association in their efforts to raise funds from outsiders. The Appeal further justified these
institutions’ emergency powers and policies. In effect, the Memphis Appeal and the Memphis Daily
Avalanche, owned by a former partner and friend of Keating, provided the official commentary of
the epidemic for those who were not present to witness the destruction of the city. The dominant
historical narrative of the epidemic was thus being created as the disease fed upon the city.
When the epidemic was over, Keating used the narratives set forth in the Appeal and the
Avalanche to frame his recollections. His History of the Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1878 in Memphis
included stories he had heard or gathered from surviving Memphians as well as official reports
from the Board of Heath, the Citizens’ Relief Committee, mutual aid and benevolent associations,
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and the commander of the refugee camps. he donated his official history to the Memphis
Howards, desiring that “the proceeds of the sale of such work...be applied to the building of a
Monument to the Physicians, Nurses, [and] Members of the Howard Association and Citizens
Relief Committee, who died in Memphis during the epidemic of 1878.” Keating thus created the
first official academic and public narratives of the epidemic’s history and helped to inaugurate the
memorialization of key heroic figures.304
The most obvious heroes were healers who had sacrificed their lives while caring for the
sick. Medical and religious figures who had volunteered to care for yellow fever victims were
martyred for the city of Memphis. Keating wrote that his History was intended to be “a
monument...to the heroism of the women and men who illustrated, as physicians and nurses, with
a sublime self-abnegation, the first and chiefest of Christian virtues.” Other histories of the
epidemic also set out to honor the heroism of physicians, nurses, and relief workers. J. P.
Dromgoole’s Yellow Fever Heroes, Honors, and Horrors of 1878 included a “Roll of Honor of
Volunteer Physicians, Nurses, Howards, Relief Men, Preachers, Telegraphers, Druggists, Etc., who
did Heroic Service.” He further listed a “Martyr Death Roll,” of volunteers who died in service to
the community. D. A. Quinn’s book titled Heroes and Heroines of Memphis; or Reminiscences of the
Yellow Fever Epidemics that Afflicted the City of Memphis During the Autumn Months of 1873, 1878, and
1879 likewise set out from its very title to honor select heroes of the epidemic.305
Keating, Dromgoole, and others fashioned the men of the Howard Association and
Citizens’ Relief Committee as perfect examples of self-sacrifice and as the primary heroes of the
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city. Keating wrote of the Citizens’ Relief Committee, of which he was a prominent member: “An
organization better calculated for the purpose which called it into existence could not have been
devised, nor could one have been more faithfully managed.” He went so far as to claim “that but
for its officers, anarchy, confusion, riot, robbery, arson, and murder would have prevailed to
increase the burdens of the period, every hour of which was freighted with special horrors,” adding
that “perhaps the city would have been destroyed” without their authority. The distinguished roll
of saviors of Memphis thus included the men of the CRC who took over management of the city
during the crisis and oversaw the distribution of non-medical relief.306
Memphians hosted a number of commemorations and honorific dinners distinguishing
these officially sanctioned heroes of the epidemic as refugees began returning to Memphis. The
first such dinner honored the men of the Howard Association and the Citizens’ Relief Committee
for their faithful service to the city. Wealthy Memphians, many who had fled from the city at the
first sign of the disease, hosted a number of these banquets and parties. Absent during the crisis,
they nevertheless sought to insinuate themselves into the process of memory creation following the
epidemic by touting their efforts to send relief, hobnobbing with established heroes, and publically
honoring martyrs. Because of their absence, they generally accepted the narrative set forth by
Keating in the Appeal that the Howards and CRC had saved the city. Further, the leaders of the
Howard Association and some of the men of the CRC were business owners and merchants, wellknown to wealthy Memphians, who presented these men with gold-headed canes, pocket watches,
and medals in reward for their service.307
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Most nurses, however, were not invited to partake in the doling out of honors and gifts, a
fact that bred resentment among many female healers. Kezia DePelchin, a volunteer nurse from
Texas, wrote on November 6 that she believed the yellow fever scourge was not yet over. “But it no
longer exists as an epidemic and the Howards are congratulating themselves and the rest of
mankind thereupon,” she explained, “getting up little mutual admiration societies in the way of
suppers, presents to the most popular or to those whose work had shone out more brilliantly than
the rest.” Her tone turned bitter as she described how the volunteer nurses who had put their lives
at risk to aid the sick found themselves quickly ushered out of Memphis yet were caught in the
quarantines that made it impossible for them to return home. “The call for nurses was loud, and
urgent, and now they are through, they hustle them out of the way like poor relations,” she
complained. “It will create a bitter feeling with those who find themselves shut out from home,
not against their home, but against those who sent them [away] without ascertaining the exact state
of [the quarantine].” As DePelchin made clear, many nurses and other non-traditional healers felt
slighted by the Howards and Citizens’ Relief Committee in their efforts to honor their chosen
heroes.308
Father Denis Alphonsus Quinn, a Catholic missionary who returned to Memphis to
minister to the city’s Irish Catholics similarly critiqued the veneration of particular heroes in the
aftermath of the epidemic. “The Sisters who had given up their mission in Memphis, but who
volunteered to come from St. Louis (300 miles) to nurse the sick received no stipulated or
honorary remuneration from the citizens,” he proclaimed. “Neither the Howards nor the Board of
Health, nor any one of the so called Relief Committees, offered them even a vote of thanks. They
had to bear their own travelling expenses to and from Memphis.” He complained bitterly that
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these women received no such assistance because their religious devotion precluded any earthly
rewards. While he agreed that religious healers did their duty to their fellow human beings in
devotion and service to God and hoped only for a place in heaven, he felt they had nevertheless
been slighted by those for whom they had risked their lives.309
Father Quinn recognized the impulse to symbolize the heroic deeds of many by idolizing a
few key figures; yet he questioned the efforts of the Howards and the CRC in memorializing
certain individuals. As an example, he described the commemoration of Mattie Stephenson, a
martyr of the 1873 epidemic: “As the people, after a battle, plague, or pestilence, are sure to have a
hero or a heroine, so after the Fever of ’73, the Howards, finding no special hero amongst
themselves, selected a handsome-faced young lady (a volunteer nurse) for a Yellow Fever heroine.”
He argued, however, that Mattie Stephenson was an odd choice. Yes, she had willingly volunteered
to leave her family in Illinois and travel to Memphis to care for the sick, ultimately forfeiting her
life to the disease. Yet as Quinn pointed out, she had cared for only 5 families in the city, had
actually been turned away by one family who felt she had not been attentive in her duties, and had
been well-remunerated for her work, “earning ten dollars a day, the wages generally given to white
nurses at that time.” While Stephenson attended relatively few patients and was well paid, Quinn
claimed, the Howards chose to honor her above all others, including the Catholic priests and nuns
who had worked tirelessly night and day to care for hundreds of patients for free. He wrote, “The
monument raised to her memory in Elmwood cemetery would do honor to the remains of a
princess,” though Stephenson was a very ordinary volunteer whose actions, in his estimation, did
not deserve such outstanding veneration.310
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Quinn believed that Mattie Stephenson had been chosen as a yellow fever martyr because
she was young, beautiful, and unmarried. He contrasted her honored death to a “poor
Irishwoman, who, after nursing and burying her husband and three children, volunteered her
services to the Howard Infirmary.” No veneration or care was laid upon her grave. “But this poor
woman was neither young nor very handsome—two qualifications necessary for Masonic or
modern beatification,” he complained sarcastically. “This good matron’s ‘remains’ were consigned
to a Potter’s grave, while many of the young ‘braves’ of Memphis were making love to, if not lots of
money by, Mattie Steveson’s [sic] picture.” Just as in 1873, Quinn believed, the honors placed on
heroes and martyrs chosen by the Howard Association and CRC intentionally circumscribed the
identity of the heroes of 1878. He was right.311
The heroes and martyrs honored in the dinners, banquets, and parties hosted in the
aftermath of the epidemic were all white, all male, and all middle- and upper-class. Hosts did not
award gifts to any women or working-class men for their service as nurses. While a few Catholic
priests received “magnificent gold watches,” no one invited their poor Irish Catholic congregants
or any African Americans. Most of those honored were Memphians, unless they were doctors
hired by the Howard Association or they had donated large sums to the relief efforts. Keating was
singled out for his role in broadcasting the need for aid and for his service on the Citizens Relief
Committee. And while the Howard Association awarded each of its physicians a gold medal, it
gave no such trinket of appreciation to nurses.312
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Put bluntly, women and outsiders comprised the vast majority of nurses. During the
epidemic, Memphians generally distrusted these nurses, thinking they came for personal gain—
either in pay for their services or in whatever they could steal from unsuspecting patients. After the
epidemic, the character of nurse was too compromised by rumors and outright accusations of
criminal behavior to be venerated as yellow fever hero or heroine. Although Keating minimally
attempted to present nurses as one component of the Howards’ heroic work, his History relegated
the experience of nurses to only four pages—and only three of these were complimentary. He
otherwise maligned nurses for their role in the deaths of untold yellow fever patients and in the
theft of unknown amounts of valuable goods. Even the Episcopalian and Catholic nuns who
would eventually receive veneration as yellow fever martyrs were largely ignored by all but their
congregations, though they escaped much of the condemnation heaped upon secular nurses
during and after the epidemic. And while fraternal societies held meetings and dinners honoring
their fallen brothers, no similar organizations existed to offer tribute to fallen sisters of the
epidemic.313
Many of the yellow fever narratives similarly demonized the poor, particularly the large
population of black Memphians, who they generally characterized as villains during the epidemic.
During the Thanksgiving Day meeting, Mayor John Flippin denounced those who had refused to
evacuate Memphis. He believed the epidemic had raged out of control for so many weeks because
of the number of poor Memphians who had stayed in the city rather than evacuate to camps. This
criticism ignored the fact that many of these individuals had been hired to look after homes and
businesses owned by wealthier Memphians who had fled at the first sign of the disease. It also
dismissed the idea that many chose to remain in the city, lured by the promise of wages paid to
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nurses, or that African Americans sought to leverage their expected immunity in order to secure
work. None of these men and women could have known how bad conditions in the city were
going to become, but for Flippin, neither poverty nor the expectation of racial immunity acted as a
viable excuse. All who had remained in the city for any reason other than to offer care to the sick
found themselves widely condemned for their actions.314

The creation of the early narratives of the epidemic show how different Memphians
attempted to cope with this trauma and sorrow. At the same time, these efforts demonstrate a fight
for dominance over what would be included and remembered and what would be silenced and
forgotten. Not all Memphians’ experiences enjoyed equal weight in the aftermath of the epidemic.
The return of refugees offers one example of the divergent experiences of different groups of
Memphians. The Irish procession back into the city after Camp Father Matthew disbanded was
somber and sad; it was an expression of mourning and of repentance. The return of refugees from
Camp Joe Williams, on the other hand, was one of triumph, parading behind a band and wearing
their best clothes. The dinners and banquets likewise characterize the divergent experience of
Memphians deemed heroes and martyrs for their actions during the epidemic. Specific
Memphians achieved veneration—white, middle- and upper-class men of the relief and medical
apparatus—while other Memphians who worked just as tirelessly and who died in greater numbers
were ignored for their contributions.
The specific heroes chosen for veneration, the hosts of these dinners and parties, the
authors who influenced what would become the dominant narrative all worked to circumscribe

314

Memphis Daily Appeal, November 29, 1878; Molly Caldwell Crosby, The American Plague: The Untold Story of Yellow
Fever, The Epidemic that Shaped Our History (New York: Berkley Books, 2006), 85.

226

the historical memory of the epidemic. They claimed the cultural power and authority to provide a
historical narrative for posterity that celebrated a particular Memphian identity, at the expense of a
narrative that was more inclusive and representative of the cosmopolitan city. They decided who
had the right to use that narrative, what the narrative would include, and to whom the collective
memory of the epidemic belonged. Keating’s narrative became the dominant version, backed by
the Howard Association and the members of the Citizens’ Relief Committee as the official account
of the Memphis epidemic. Several of his contemporaries, such as J. P. Dromgoole, largely
replicated much of what Keating published in the pages of the Memphis Daily Appeal. Historians of
Memphis have since relied on Keating’s narrative so heavily that other experiences of the epidemic
have been all but forgotten.
The heroes of the epidemic years of the 1870s continued to be venerated throughout
Memphian history for their role as saviors of the city. J. P. Young, for example, in his 1912
Standard History of Memphis, Tennessee dedicated his work “To the pioneers who founded and the
brave sons who builded [sic] and loyally stood by Memphis in her hours of adversity and pestilence
as in her days of victory and triumph....” These men—and a handful of women—who laid down
their lives as doctors, nurses, and relief workers during the epidemic have achieved a vaunted
position in the place-based memory of Memphis as symbolic sons and daughters of the city. But
the Memphians who have been remembered most are largely from a class who helped to construct
the historical memory of the epidemic in its immediate aftermath and represent a circumscribed
display of collective memory and identity of the city.315
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Political Takeover
The dominant historical narrative of the 1878 epidemic was also created within a political
and socio-economic context that justified a seizure of power by the business class of the city.
Economic elites in Memphis capitalized on the confusion and devastation wrought by yellow fever
to push for the dissolution of the city charter and the restructuring of the municipal government.
The dominant narrative provided by Keating helped to justify this action and further characterized
the new government as the city’s saving grace and the silver lining to weeks of sorrow, terror, and
death.
In 1878, Memphis was laboring under a dual calamity of disease and debt. The city was so
heavily indebted that many Memphians—particularly wealthy property owners—argued that only a
commission form of government with significant representation of businessmen could help the
city deal with its financial mismanagement. Efforts to change the form of government had been
largely unsuccessful, however, as the aldermanic form of government was extremely popular
throughout the city’s many working-class neighborhoods. Ethnic and racial minorities had
managed to gain a significant amount of political power through local alderman and were loath to
concentrate power in the hands of wealthy Memphians. After the 1878 epidemic, however,
economic elites capitalized on the fear of yellow fever to push for the change in government that
would allow them to seize power. In order to carry out the necessary sanitary reforms that would
protect the city from future epidemics, Memphians rescinded their city charter and petitioned the
state legislature to create a Taxing District of Shelby County. In effect, they abolished the city of
Memphis. While this restructuring of the municipal government did not have the intended effect
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of wiping out the old city’s debts, it did allow economic elites in Memphis to achieve their ultimate
goal of seizing political control from ethnic and racial minorities in the city.316

Memphis was in economic trouble long before yellow fever devastated the city in 1878.
The city had incurred over one and a half million dollars of bonded debt before the Civil War to
invest in railroads and trade-related city improvements that Memphians hoped would secure the
city’s reputation as the gateway to the West. By the war’s end, with the railroads ruined, Memphis
had accumulated more than $300,000 of interest owed on the debt and was caught in the
economic depression that spread throughout the South after the war. Taxable wealth estimated at
$28 million before the war was reduced to $18 million, $6 million of which had been purchased
by the state government at tax sales in payment for delinquent taxes. Memphis became more
embroiled in debt as it failed to make interest payments on its many loans. Problems with tax
collection further hampered attempts to pay down the debt, particularly because the wealthiest
Memphians resisted paying taxes to a government that did not represent their interests.317
Prior to the epidemic, economic elites did not have proportional representation in the
municipal government of Memphis. From the city’s incorporation, municipal government was
extremely decentralized with a weak mayor and a bicameral legislature made up of aldermen and
councilmen. This aldermanic system of government meant that individual wards nominated their
representative political officials. With the influx of ethnic minorities in the decades prior to the
Civil War, many of the city’s wards had become entrenched ethnic neighborhoods. The railroad
companies’ reliance on immigrant labor had inaugurated an important demographic shift. By the
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start of the Civil War, over thirty percent of Memphians were foreign-born, the majority
comprised of Irish immigrants. And with many antebellum economic elites temporarily
disfranchised following the war for supporting the Confederacy, political power was centralized in
the hands of small business owners and ward bosses who reflected the ethnic makeup of the
neighborhoods they represented. One early historian of Memphis went so far as to suggest that the
Irish, because they had taken an oath of loyalty to the Union, had consequently taken over the
municipal government. After the freedmen gained the right to vote in 1867, black Memphians
became another important voting block in electing officials. And while Tennessee avoided military
Reconstruction, the Reconstruction-era government was more amenable to black political
participation and, as elsewhere, this period saw the election of a number of black political officials
in Memphis.318
Economic elites, blocked from political office by the election of aldermen by ward, argued
that the city’s debt had been illegally contracted by an unrepresentative government. They had
argued for years that the city should surrender its charter to avoid repayment of the debt. Yet these
same economic elites were largely to blame for the city’s economic woes. For one, tax collection
remained a significant obstacle to getting the city out of debt, and economic elites refused to pay
their fair share of taxes. As early as 1868, the Memphis Daily Appeal editorialized: “It is said that
there are large property owners who owe heavy taxes and have a considerable amount of scrip, but
knowing the depressed condition of the city finances, withhold payment even of scrip to the last
moment. The ears of such citizens should tinge, for their hearts are cold.” Wealthy businessmen
complained when city officials attempted to raise tax revenue to pay down the debt or to provide
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municipal services to minority neighborhoods because they claimed that the assessment of taxes
inhibited the growth of the local economy. In fact, a fight brewed between political and economic
elites when the municipal government attempted to levy a city-wide tax to pay for street paving.
Residents who refused to pay sued the city, successfully, adding another million dollars to the city’s
debt.319
Business elites and large property owners, who believed that a commission-style of
government would be more responsive to their needs, had previously pushed for the dissolution of
the City Council. They argued that the body was hopelessly corrupt yet elided their own role in the
city’s financial predicament. Despite the mounting debt crisis, the measure had been extremely
unpopular with the majority of Memphians who gained power and patronage through the
aldermanic government. It was only after the devastation of the 1878 epidemic that Memphis’s
economic elites succeeded in convincing the city to finally centralize political power in the hands
of a commission government.320
As early as August 17, a month after yellow fever first entered the city, Keating editorialized
in his Daily Appeal that “This visitation is the straw on the camel’s back. We can endure no more.
We must have relief from ignorance and incompetence in government, the cormorant greed of city
and foreign creditors, and the visitations of a disease from which we ought to be, and would with
proper sanitary regulations be, exempt. We must make a change, some change.” With this critique,
Keating thus tied the yellow fever epidemic to the failure of the current municipal government to
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properly manage the city, particularly its sanitary affairs. In effect, Keating thus echoed the
argument of the business community who pushed for repeal.321
After the epidemic, economic elites in the city likewise argued that the aldermanic form of
government not only contributed to the city’s continued debt crisis but that they were incapable of
making the sanitary and public health reforms that would safeguard the city from another yellow
fever epidemic. Memphis newspapers—especially Keating’s Appeal—claimed that the city had a
moral obligation to surrender their charter in order to take the necessary steps to safeguard the
public health. They reminded Memphians of the generosity of Northern contributors to their
relief in the midst of the crisis. And they reprinted articles from national newspapers urging
Memphians to take steps to protect themselves from yellow fever. At a citizens’ meeting held on
December 31, as refugees continued to trickle back into Memphis, a committee of local merchants
passed a resolution stating that “whenever government, from any cause, becomes untenable to
provide for the peace, safety, and general welfare..., it should be abolished and another instituted
in its place.” The business community thus charged the aldermanic city government as culpable for
the yellow fever crisis and again pushed to disband the City Council in favor of a government that
could protect the city from a future epidemic.322
To be sure, many Memphians continued to object to the change—particularly the forfeiture
of the city charter—but for the first time, a majority of the citizens at the meeting agreed to abolish
the municipal government and appeal to the state legislature for assistance. Significantly, this
occurred only three months after the Board of Health had declared the epidemic officially over as
yellow fever cases were still being reported, patients were still convalescing, and a number of
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evacuees had yet to return to the city. A committee was appointed to capitalize on the sudden
change in public opinion and to swiftly draft all necessary bills that would repeal the charter and
propose a new commission-style government. The members of this committee were all wealthy
business elites and three of them would serve in the new government.323
Tennessee Governor Albert S. Marks approved the bill to enact the Taxing District on
January 31, 1879. The mayor and alderman resigned and the government of Memphis was
restructured to a small board of three fire and police commissioners and a board of five public
works supervisors. Of the first three commissioners installed in 1879, Governor Marks appointed
D. T. Porter—who was then nominated President of the Taxing District—and William Wallace
Guy. In its first city-wide election, Memphians chose John Overton Jr. as the third commissioner.
Both Porter and Guy were cotton factors and commission merchants of considerable wealth.
Overton owned substantial real estate holdings and was a direct descendant of one of the founders
of Memphis.324
The new city-wide elections for commissioner and supervisors guaranteed that individual
ward bosses would need to compete outside of their districts and hindered candidates without
substantial financial resources. Because of this, all of the members of the new Taxing District
government were Memphis businessmen. David T. Porter was part owner of Porter, Taylor & Co.,
cotton factors as well as acting President of the Planters’ Insurance Company. While the Board of
Fire and Police Commissioners held most of the power in the city, a Board of Public Works also

323

Ibid.; Wrenn, Crisis and Commission Government in Memphis.
Ibid.; C. W. Heiskell, Digest of the Acts Repealing the Charters of Certain Municipal Corporations; The Proclamation of the
Governor Thereon; The Acts Establishing Taxing Districts, and the Ordinances of the Taxing District of Shelby County, Tennessee
(Memphis, TN: Price, Jones & Co., Printers and Binders, 1879); Young, Standard History of Memphis; William S. Speer,
Sketches of Prominent Tennesseans, Containing Biographies and Records of Many of the Families who have Attained Prominence
in Tennessee (Nashville: Albert B. Tavel, 1888);

324

233

debated legislation. Five men comprised the board: Charles W. Goyer of C. W. Goyer & Co.
which specialized in wholesale meats and provisions and acting President of the Union & Planters
Bank; John Gunn of Gunn & Black Lumber dealers and Gunn & Fagan Iron Works; Robert
Galloway, proprietor of the Peabody Hotel; William N. Brown of Jones, Brown & Co., cotton
factors; and James M. Goodbar of Goodbar & Co. which sold wholesale boots and shoes.325
Supporters of the Taxing District argued that the business elites would better secure the
economic interests of the city. The Memphis Daily Avalanche was not convinced. “What does
Governor Marks mean?” the Avalanche retorted. “He has not designated even one professional
politician for Commissioner of the nation’s only Taxing District.” Among this group of
businessmen, only two had previous experience in the government of Memphis. Yet several had
actively sought the repeal of the aldermanic charter as a way to gain political power.326
With their political power already weakened by the loss of so many citizens to fever,
working- and middle-class Memphians lost additional power under the Taxing District, which
allowed economic and social elites to affect municipal policies that disproportionately aided the
rich. Minority groups lost their positions in government. A single black politician, Lymus Wallace,
was elected to the Board of Public Works in 1882 and again in 1886; he was the only black
Memphian elected to city council for the next seventy-eight years. The Irish also suffered a loss of
the substantial political power they had gained in the city.327
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Pro-business interests welcomed the consolidation of power in the hands of wealthy
Memphians. Keating reiterated in his 1888 History of the City of Memphis and Shelby County,
Tennessee that the Taxing District was more likely than its predecessor to meet the needs of
“commerce and the business of the city, and its sanitary needs and necessities, and all this free
from the interference or manipulation of the ward ‘bummer’ or ‘striker,’ or of the ‘ward
politician.’” He explained that “The officers existing under the law creating the Taxing District are
elected by the whole body of voters of the city, the wards being abolished; the citizens cannot
therefore be easily defeated of their purposes in selecting efficient and honest men; they cannot be
beaten in detail as under the ward plan,” a move intended to guarantee that Memphis should not
“ever again become the prey of characterless vultures, be saddled with debt or become the victims
of decimating epidemics.” Keating thus continued to advance the narrative that corruption in the
municipal government—as a direct result of the infiltration of ethnic and racial minorities—had
caused the debt situation and had led to the horrible epidemics of the 1870s.328
Keating likewise fostered the narrative that the change in government could not have been
accomplished without the yellow fever epidemics. He claimed that “To crush this power...so
carefully distributed by wards, would have been impossible had it not been for the epidemics
which not only lessened the population by many thousand but greatly reduced the taxable values
of the city.” He continued, “It was only when the citizens found their assessed and taxable values
reduced...and the city debt increased...by non-interest payment and court’s costs that they could be
induced to consent to the revolution....” He therefore recognized that the move was not popular in
the city and that the majority of Memphians only capitulated under duress after the devastation of
the epidemic. Further, without the epidemic’s effects on the demographics of these poor
328

Keating, History of the City of Memphis and Shelby County, Vol 1, 691-693.

235

neighborhoods, the framers of the Taxing District bill might never have gotten enough popular
support to send it to the legislature. Only with the general chaos of the city in the immediate
aftermath of the epidemic were they able to push the bill through. Capitalizing on the fear of a
future epidemic, they insisted that the debt must be dealt with before sanitary reforms could be
financed.329

And yet, contrary to what most Memphians believe, the city’s municipal government was
bankrupt long before the yellow fever epidemic began in 1878 and would have been hard-pressed
to maintain its charter, even if the epidemic had not occurred. By the opening of that year,
Memphis owed more than five and a half million dollars in bonded debt. Despite attempts to scale
down the debt, by January 1878 Memphis was declared officially insolvent. The yellow fever
epidemic afforded Memphis’s economic and business elites the opportunity to push for the
dissolution of the city’s aldermanic form of government, a move that had previously been
unpopular throughout the city. The creation of the Taxing District of Shelby County and the
institution of a commission form of government allowed these same economic elites to wrest
control of the municipal government. In doing so, these elites shaped the historical memory of the
epidemic in order to justify their rule.330
The historical narrative that the 1878 yellow fever epidemic almost destroyed the city of
Memphis was convenient for the new business elite after their seizure of power. They maintained
popular criticism of the aldermanic form of government by claiming that the previous form of
government was incapable of getting the city out of debt and that they had failed to inaugurate the
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public health and sanitary measures that might have prevented the tragedy of the 1878 yellow fever
epidemic. Claiming that yellow fever was the straw that broke the camel’s back further elided their
own role in causing the city’s financial crisis. Because they immediately began instituting the types
of reforms in sanitation and public health that they had so widely condemned under the
aldermanic government, they proclaimed themselves saviors of the city when yellow fever failed to
return after 1879.

New South
Once the business class was able to seize power, using yellow fever memory to gain support
for the repeal of the charter, they further capitalized on the memory and fear of yellow fever to
further their pro-business agenda. They then pointed to the absence of yellow fever after 1879 as
evidence that their policies worked and to deflect criticism that they favored the business and
upper-class districts in their improvements at the expense of working-class, racially-mixed, or
outlying neighborhoods. Keating’s later publications repeated his justification for charter repeal
and reorganization of the municipal government and then promoted the assertion that Taxing
District officials’ governance had saved the city from future epidemics of yellow fever.331
Over the decades, Memphians have continued to use yellow fever memory to justify
contemporary concerns. While later historians of Memphis have since blamed the yellow fever
epidemics of the 1870s for Memphis’s role as a “Southern middletown”—as opposed to the
preeminent New South city it could have been—the conservative, piecemeal reforms of the Taxing
District were in fact the primary cause of Memphis’s slow growth, not yellow fever. Later Taxing
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District officials and historians conveniently scapegoated yellow fever to deflect criticism from the
highly-centralized commission form of government or the political power of economic elites.332

The business class supported the city’s initial debt outlay for railroad and wharf
improvements prior to the Civil War in an effort to promote Memphis’s role in a more industrial,
urban South. Once the economic elites had control of the municipal government, they essentially
returned to an earlier program of urban development that would secure Memphis’s place as a
major Southern metropolis. But first, they needed to deal with the reputation Memphis had
garnered for insalubrity in the wake of the epidemic. Taxing District officials saw public health,
sanitation, and city improvements as key to making Memphis competitive in the New South and
were therefore willing to keep promises to clean up the city’s sanitary condition as a defense
against yellow fever. Memphis and Tennessee were also important supporters in the creation of a
National Board of Health because officials hoped they could appeal to the federal government for
financial support in making these improvements.333
Before the new government could institute any sanitary reforms, however, Memphis’s
creditors tested the constitutionality of the Taxing District. By surrendering their charter,
Memphians hoped to repudiate the debt of the old city. Once the state accepted the repeal of the
city charter and allowed the creation of the Taxing District, city creditors petitioned the General
Assembly to protest this attempted repudiation. In reaction, Taxing District officials and leading
citizens submitted their own petition arguing that the old debt was, in fact, largely fraudulent.
They further reminded the state government of the yellow fever epidemic they had just endured, in
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part to excuse their unsound financial condition and to gain sympathy in their bid to do
something many business people considered unethical. “Had it not been for the charity of our
fellow citizens throughout the whole country [during the epidemic],” they wrote, “we would not
have been able to bury our dead—and in the midst of it all the insatiate clamor of creditors, not for
justice, not for compromise, not for a fair compensation, but for the pound of flesh which they
have from the beginning claimed....” It was only due to this crushing debt and the need to protect
the city from yellow fever, they maintained, that it was necessary “for us to ask your honorable
body, the State Legislature, to take back our franchises, and give us another and different
municipal instrumentality, by which we could preserve ourselves from absolute destruction.” Elite
Memphians thus pointed to yellow fever, again, as the justification to push through policies that
were controversial.334
Supporters of the Taxing District linked the failure of repudiation to continued fears that
yellow fever would again invade the city. Proponents, such as John Keating, argued that Memphis
would soon face another epidemic if it did not address its appalling sanitary condition. They
claimed that only the repeal of the municipal charter would keep the city creditors from suing the
new government for tax money that was desperately needed to install sewers, clean up garbage, fix
the streets, and inspect buildings and privies. Also, they claimed, money was needed to fund a
more powerful Board of Health that could take control of quarantine should yellow fever make its
appearance in the Mississippi Valley again. Proponents thus played on popular fear both in

334

Young, Standard History of Memphis, 191.

239

Memphis and abroad that these reforms were vital to protecting any city connected to Memphis by
rail or river from yellow fever.335
Keating argued forcefully that the creation of the Taxing District was necessary if Memphis
was to move forward with the much-needed sanitary improvements that would guard against
future epidemics. In his newspaper and in his published histories, he blamed the unsanitary
conditions that perpetuated the epidemic on the previous government while absolving the business
class that took over the Taxing District. Keating claimed that “the whole body of merchants and
business men” agitated for quarantine prior to the epidemic and that only with “a prompt
subscription of funds by the merchants” was the Memphis Board of Health able to “immediately
set about improving the sanitary condition of the city, which was disgraceful in the extreme....”
This late attempt to clean up the city occurred in spite of the “criminal neglect of the city
government, who turned a deaf ear to the persistent appeals of the press” and was only instituted
because of the support of individual wealthy Memphians. If this were true, the business
community’s support of sanitation and quarantine are in contrast to historic trends. Historically,
business interests persuaded politicians and newspapers to hide the fact that yellow fever had made
an appearance in their city, fearing the resultant exodus of citizens and prostration of business.
They generally argued against quarantines that impacted trade routes until enough cases suggested
an epidemic was underway. Keating claimed that instead, the economic elites that came to power
under the Taxing District had tried to protect the city from yellow fever in 1878 but were
hampered by the ignorance of the City Council.336
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These economic elites, now in charge of municipal affairs, did support initiatives to clean
up the city and fund a more powerful Board of Health in 1879. While wealthy businessmen and
property owners in Memphis had not been particularly supportive of these measures in the past,
Taxing District officials recognized that their continued legitimacy would depend upon their
ability to fund a sanitary campaign against yellow fever. Merchants further pointed to the fact that
sanitary improvements were required to repair the city’s reputation as an appropriate location for
Northern investment after such a well-publicized epidemic. While broadcasting the deteriorating
conditions in Memphis had been necessary to the success of the relief campaign, business elites
feared that it would have long-term negative consequences on the city’s economic growth.
Significant improvements in sanitation, they believed, would help assuage concerns that investing
in the future of Memphis entailed too much risk.337
Memphis’s business elites also supported public health and sanitary improvements because,
after the epidemic of 1878, it was likely that the city would gain significant financial support in
funding these improvements, saving local tax-payers and property owners money. With the
creation of a National Board of Health in the works and with Congress funding a sanitary survey
that would begin in Memphis, business leaders sought to take advantage of the burst in national
public health interest to subsidize the city’s campaign. Because of this, Memphis was a significant
supporter of the National Board of Health. Thus the building of medical infrastructure and public
health organization in Memphis that occurred after the 1878 epidemic was in part due to the
Taxing District’s attempts to take advantage of federal support for city sanitary improvements.
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These were initiatives that the Taxing District officials wanted to implement but not necessarily
pay for.338
For example, wealthy property owners protested a new tax that would pay for a desperatelyneeded sewer system. Over 2,000 Memphians attended a town meeting to discuss the new tax
proposal. A majority demanded that the new government install sewers and opposed calls by some
of the larger property owners who requested a hearing to discuss alternatives to taxation. Taxing
District officials compromised on the issue, finally choosing to award the contract for sewerage to
Colonel George E. Waring after he delivered a paper to the Public Health Association on an
untested sewer design using much smaller, cheaper pipes used only for waste rather than installing
large, expensive pipes that would carry waste and rain water. President of the Taxing District, D. T.
Porter promised that the new sewers would be “the salvation of Memphis.”339
While wealthy Memphians capitulated on paying a tax for sewers, they staunchly opposed a
proposed one percent tax for street paving. Instead, the Taxing District raised enough money to
pave the business center—and some of the more affluent neighborhoods—first. In order to avoid
taking out any debt or raising any new taxes, the new government likewise began laying the Waring
sewers in and around the business district. They did so by fighting to overturn a stipulation in the
Taxing District Act that specified a majority of the taxes raised in a ward had to be spent there.
Officials lobbied the state legislature to repeal this provision, allowing them to use tax receipts for
these improvements in the city-center. Many working-class neighborhoods, particularly on the
outskirts of the city, waited years for these same upgrades.340
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Residents of these neighborhoods complained loudly that the Taxing District’s priorities
were clear. Even residents who generally supported the commission government recognized that
officials improved the business district and the neighborhoods in which they lived while ignoring
the needs of outlying and minority neighborhoods. One letter, published in the Memphis Daily
Avalanche, claimed that the Taxing District “left the poor folks out in the cold” while officials
courted railroads and manufactures. The letter further called for more diverse representation in
government and officials who would remember the needs of the “poorer class” of Memphians.341
Despite these complaints, the new political elites of Memphis believed the city was well on
its way to a bright future. The public health initiatives that they inaugurated and the pro-business
policies they adopted seemed successful in generating growth in the local economy and in securing
outside investment in the city. They further argued that their successes proved that the
commission form of government under the authority of wealthy Memphians could guarantee
Memphis a bright future, unlike the old, ignorant aldermanic system.
Keating likewise described the Taxing District form of municipal government as “...the
safest, the most guarded and the most responsible ever devised, and at the same time the most
limited, affording nearly absolute certainty in the honest and economical expenditure of the
appropriations....” Keating and the Taxing District officials fostered the narrative that, while the
old municipal government had nearly brought about the city’s annihilation, the Taxing District
had saved the city after the 1878 epidemic and guaranteed its future success as a New South
metropolis. Keating wrote in 1888, “Nothing so shames the old form of municipal government as
this exhibit of progress, economy, and business-like management. Every dollar of expenditure has
been wisely planted as a basis for the health and prosperity of the present and populations to
341
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come.” He argued that even in the absence of the crushing debt that paralyzed the old aldermanic
government, “so sweeping a sanitary reform, as has been accomplished, would have been
impossible to the mayor and board of aldermen and councilmen.” Only the Taxing District could
offer Memphians a healthful and prosperous future.342
For a time, Keating seemed to be right. In 1886 Congress passed a bill that allowed a
railroad bridge to span the Mississippi River at Memphis. The President of the Taxing District, D.
P. Hadden, stated that plans supported “the general outside feeling that Memphis possesses the
location of a great railroad center.” In fact, he claimed that “The past two years have been the most
prosperous and most important in the history of Memphis,” suggesting that with the completion
of the proposed bridge, “various railroad interests both east and west of the Mississippi will be
focalized at Memphis, thereby forever fixing her commercial supremacy in the great Mississippi
Valley.”343
While Memphians had hoped the surrender of their charter would clear the debt of the
old government, they were only able to compromise on repayment of a more manageable amount.
Yet by 1889, Memphis was almost free from the old debt. “It is gratifying to report that the debt of
the old city of Memphis is practically settled, probably ten thousand dollars yet outstanding,”
Hadden, wrote in his biennial report to the Governor. He regaled the Governor with all of the
improvements that the Taxing District had overseen in recent years: “...during the last two years a
new gas company has been introduced into our city, and also a new water company, and our
citizens are to be congratulation upon having at present an abundant supply of pure artesian
water...This is the greatest boon our city has ever possessed.” Because of these city improvements
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and with the construction begun on the new bridge over the Mississippi, Hadden avowed, “Our
city has enjoyed perfect health during the past two years, and we know of no city that has such a
bright future and possesses so many elements of prosperity and future greatness.”344
J. P. Young further claimed in his 1912 Standard History of Memphis, Tennessee that the
Taxing District reform had been a great success. While business had languished for a couple of
years after the epidemic, the local economy had since returned to its former robustness just as it
had after the 1873 epidemic. “The city was cleaned up as she had never been before, an excellent
sewer-system inaugurated and business not only revived but in a little while flourished more than it
ever had. Each year showed increased cotton receipts and, what seemed even better to many, all
kinds of other business increased. A few manufacturers came and a growing industry, lumber, was
becoming very important.” He credited the creation of the Taxing District with this return to
prosperity. He claimed that “Wealth was now rapidly accumulating and by 1890 it was said that for
the past twenty years Memphis had,—despite the discouragements of the seventies, surpassed any
city of equal population in the United States in business and increase in wealth....In addition, she
was the largest inland cotton market in the world.” Surely this apparent prosperity was enough to
make Memphis competitive with newer rivals in the New South.345
So why did Capers, in 1939, proclaim Memphis a failed New South city when Taxing
District officials and earlier historians had insisted the city was destined for greatness? For one, the
successes of the Taxing District, as hinted at previously, were concentrated in the business sector of
the city. The Taxing District government was extremely conservative. With the consolidation of
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power in the hands of economic elites, their focus on a pro-business agenda, coupled with their
fiscal cautiousness, the new government was not responsive to the needs of a growing city.
Political power in the city not only changed hands with the creation of the Taxing District;
economic elites were able to concentrate power in the hands of three men. The Taxing District bill
gave the Fire and Police Commissioners at the head of the government the “power to appoint all
officers and subordinates in the police and fire service, including the Chief of Police, and to
suspend and discharge the same at will.” The President of the Taxing District, chosen from the
Fire and Police Commission likewise had authority over all municipal employees and had
complete discretion to hire and fire at will. He also acted as the main judicial authority in the city.
This concentrated an enormous amount of power in the hands of one out of three heads of
government. Whereas political power under the aldermanic government had been dispersed
among a weak mayor and thirty alderman and councilmen, the Fire and Police Commissioners
held all the power in the new government. While the five-member Board of Public Works was
designed as a check on any abuse of power by the three Commissioners, Memphians recognized
that the Board had very little real power in the city. A businessman elected to the Board in 1882
admitted the “office doesn’t amount to very much.” The Taxing District President that year
likewise described the Board as “figureheads” who were allowed to discuss policy
recommendations but that their findings meant very little. While framers of the Taxing District
bill intended this consolidation of power to end corruption and patronage, it only acted to solidify
these under the influence of the business community rather than the ward bosses of individual
Memphis neighborhoods.346
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Further, the Taxing District framers created checks on the government’s ability to raise and
spend funds, in the hopes of avoiding another debt crisis. Therefore the government was “simply
an agent of the state government, without the power of credit or taxation and the evils consequent
thereto.” The government held no property and did not have the authority to issue bonds or to
contract any debt. It had very limited abilities to raise taxes from residents and had to gain
permission from the state legislature to raise revenue. C. W. Heiskell, one of the framers of the
Taxing District bill, wrote that this method of government “therefore pays as it goes—the only true
policy for individuals and states. What improvements it makes, it pays for and if it has no money
to pay, it waits till it has.” This meant that Taxing District officials had to institute programs and
reforms in a piecemeal fashion. They prioritized the business district and improvements in
sanitation at the expense of other improvements necessary to maintain the growing city.
Nevertheless, Haskell claimed, that “Launched under these auspices, it is hoped that [the Taxing
District] will prove a lasting blessing, and that economy, honesty and enterprise, cleanliness and
sanitation, good streets, and an efficient fire and police protection, will close its gates on the
pestilence forever, and open wide the doors of health and lasting prosperity.” Framers thus
believed that the measures of fiscal austerity built into the structure of the Taxing District would
avoid future debt, bring about economic recovery, and guard against yellow fever. These three
objectives were at the heart of selling the idea of the Taxing District to Memphians and to the state
of Tennessee. Yet it also meant that municipal officials had to work within the strict confines of
fiscal rules that made it impossible for the city to raise the revenue required to institute city-wide
reforms, even once the economy was sufficiently recovered.347
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Capers also claimed that “...it can be suggested with some justification that Atlanta owes its
present position as the ‘New York of the south’ more to the work of Aedes aegypti in Memphis a
half a century ago than to any other cause.’” Interestingly, Atlanta undertook a similar radical
restructuring of the municipal government to scale down bonded debt after the Civil War. So the
commission-style government of the Taxing District, per se, did not keep Memphis from becoming
a preeminent New South city; it was the way that municipal government instituted reforms. And it
certainly was not an issue of population. The Census figures Capers used to make his case showed
that Atlanta had surpassed Memphis in population by 1880 but only by about 4,000 people. By
1900, Memphis boasted 102,320 citizens and was again larger than Atlanta, Nashville,
Birmingham, and Dallas. Atlanta, the closest runner-up, could only claim 89,872 in population.
Yet it should be noted that by 1930—a few years before Capers published his first article advancing
the thesis that Memphis suffered as a New South city due to yellow fever—Memphis had dropped
from its number one spot to number four on his list of Southern cities.348
Capers further blamed yellow fever for demographic shifts that made Memphis a less
cosmopolitan place, but this is not necessarily true either. Of course, Memphis lost a significant
portion of its population to yellow fever during the summers of 1873, 1878, and 1879 and there
were surely refugees who abandoned the city if they found a satisfactory situation during their
forced exile. But the population of Memphis doubled during the 1880s, continuing to grow
throughout the 1890s. Compared to other Southern cities, Memphis actually retained a large
proportion of foreign-born residents during the Gilded Age. Perhaps their immigrant population
was lower than it had been in the mid-‘70s but this had far less to do with yellow fever than it did
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with larger demographic trends then occurring across the South. Fewer immigrants entered the
United States through the port of New Orleans and new railroads linking New York and Chicago
to other Midwestern cities allowed immigrants to migrate without navigating the Mississippi
River.349
Of course, population does not necessarily equate to economic growth. But while Capers
complained that the influx of poor whites and blacks from the surrounding countryside created a
drain on already taxed municipal services after the epidemic, he was actually describing a trend
that had begun before yellow fever hit Memphis in 1878. Even Keating complained in his history
of the epidemic that, while the population had doubled in the city prior to 1878, “...the volume of
trade was only a slight increase over that of 1860” and that with the influx of freedpeople, “...the
non-producers—those who consume without laboring and live without the least regard for the
obligations of good citizenship—were increased to the proportions of a small army” that strained
the resources of the old, aldermanic government. Memphis had long been the home of a growing
underclass of poor people: rural whites and blacks that had flocked to the city during and after the
War, Northern soldiers who sought to make a new life in the South, as well as the influx of ethnic
minorities seeking job opportunities along rivers and railroads. They did not appear as a result of
yellow fever.350
This growth in population put additional strain on the city’s need to expand municipal
services, just as it had before the epidemic, but the fiscal conservatism of the Taxing District was
incapable of meeting the increased demand. It certainly did not help that Memphis remained one
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of the nation’s most unhealthy cities. The sanitation reforms meant to protect the city from yellow
fever, begun in the business district and affluent neighborhoods, did not extend to working-class
and poor neighborhoods in Memphis for many years. Tuberculosis, pneumonia, malaria, and
dysentery remained prevalent in the city and the annual death rate remained high.351

Memphians have blamed yellow fever for the city’s failure to modernize into a New South
city and for municipal bankruptcy instead of long-standing economic issues and demographic
changes. To be sure, Memphis had a difficult decade in the 1870s. Several calamities—cholera,
smallpox, yellow fever, and the Panic and depression of 1873—helped seal Memphis’s economic
and demographic future. Yet the 1878 yellow fever epidemic receives the blame for changing the
historical trajectory of Memphis. For Memphians, yellow fever memory has acted as a convenient
rationalization for contemporary conditions. In good times, yellow fever stands as a contrasting
moment in Memphian history, buttressing the policies that have made the situation better. In bad
times, Memphians point to yellow fever as sowing the seeds of their present problems. The
memory of the 1878 epidemic is therefore malleable to contemporary concerns in the city.352

Counternarratives
Much of today’s collective memory of the 1878 yellow fever epidemic in Memphis
continues to reinforce the story told by John Keating and the officials of the Taxing District: that
the corrupt municipal government bankrupted the city; that yellow fever was the straw that broke
the camel’s back and which forced Memphis to relinquish its charter; and that the Howard
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Association, the Citizens’ Relief Committee, and the Taxing District were the city’s saving graces.
The dominant narrative of the epidemic, therefore, continues to reflect a narrative originally
authored by white men of a certain class.

However, a few Memphians have attempted to

reinsert the voices and experiences of a wider group of residents into the central narrative of the
epidemic. While these counternarratives have been only partially successful in reintroducing the
experience of ethnic and racial minorities during the epidemic, they represent an important
challenge to the ubiquity of the dominant narrative. Religious institutions have been most
successful in influencing the narrative, sometimes relying on networks of religious affiliation
outside of Memphis to commemorate the actions of religious healers. Catholic organizations have
successfully resurrected the experience of the city’s large Irish immigrant population. Similarly, an
ostracized sect of Episcopalian Protestants has fashioned martyr-heroes of a select group of their
religious healers. Each of these religious groups has been able to expand the narrative of the
epidemic provided by white elites, who have otherwise sought to lay exclusive claim to the
collective memory of the epidemic in order to circumscribe white Memphian identity.
More recent attempts by academic and public historians to include the experience of
African Americans, however, have been plagued by a lack of primary source material. Whiteauthored yellow fever narratives consistently portrayed black residents in one of two roles: as
caretakers to whites or as dangerous criminal elements. This was in many ways analogous to the
treatment of nurses in yellow fever narratives as representing potentially subversive elements in
Southern society. Yet the characterization of the black caretaker was reminiscent of the faithful
family slave, happily submitting to white authority and fulfilling their racially-ordained duty of
protecting white lives and property. Historians have had difficulty investigating the experience of
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black Memphians beyond these nineteenth-century tropes. For this reason, the contemporary
collective memory of yellow fever in Memphis continues to disseminate the notion—advanced by
the creators and arbiters of the dominant narrative—that the only Memphians whose experience
really matters are white.

The dominant narrative of the epidemic justified the political takeover and New South
agenda of economic and business elites in Memphis. But it further allowed these Memphians to
present the Memphian experience, and by extension Memphian identity, as specifically white,
male, Protestant, and native-born. It further linked Memphian identity to a larger Southern
identity that was to become all the more patriarchal and white-supremacist in the years to come.
Much of this dominant narrative was constructed by John M. Keating, owner and primary
editor of the Memphis Daily Appeal, who published his History of the Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1878 in
Memphis within weeks of the epidemic’s end. Keating likewise reinforced this narrative in his 2volume history of the city published a decade later. However, Keating narrated the story of the
epidemic with a very specific agenda. As one of the leaders of the Memphis Citizens’ Relief
Committee and a supporter of the creation of the Taxing District, he favored the experience of
white relief workers and supported the agenda of the business elite that took control of the city
following the epidemic. Because Keating’s work continues to offer the most comprehensive
historical account of the epidemic, subsequent historians—myself included—have depended upon
his description and analysis of the tragic events in 1878 to understand what happened in Memphis
that fateful season. However, it is necessary to complicate Keating’s narrative of the epidemic and
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its aftermath and to recognize that Keating fashioned his History to tell a particular story about
yellow fever’s effects on the city.
Keating understood the importance of fashioning an advantageous, culturally powerful
account of the epidemic. For the history of the epidemic to be successful, he knew that it needed
to be published soon, repeated often, and presented with an air of detached observation unsullied
by the author’s point of view. Keating was in a perfect position to write such a narrative. As owner
of a major newspaper, he was already creating the story of the epidemic for the outside world as
the devastation unfolded. As a member of the Citizens’ Relief Committee, as well as of the press,
he was privy to information that was not readily available to other would-be historians of the
epidemic. His newspaper was also a vital component in the national relief campaign. Coupled with
his support of the Taxing District, Keating garnered significant support for the publication of his
History. The Citizens’ Relief Committee, the Howard Association, and the architects of the Taxing
District all enthusiastically endorsed his narrative.
In his history of the epidemic, and in his two-volume History of the City of Memphis and
Shelby County, Keating presented “the Press” as a significant force for political and sanitary change
in the city. Yet he did not discuss his own authorship and editorial control over much of what was
printed in “the Press” as owner and primary editor of the Memphis Daily Appeal. He therefore
presented his narrative with the detached distance of an observer of events rather than a powerful
historical actor in his own right shaping events as they unfolded. He further obscured his own role,
both as a journalist and as an historian, in shaping the meaning ascribed to these events in the
collective memory of the city. In doing so, Keating fashioned a narrative that continues to heavily
influence the historical memory of Memphis.
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While Keating wrote his narratives with an eye to promoting the interests of the Citizens’
Relief Committee, the Howard Association, and the officials of the Taxing District, his were not
the only narratives of the epidemic experience. While many authors reinforced Keating’s story of
heroic doctors, relief workers, and Taxing District elites, others recognized that this dominant
narrative ignored, disparaged, or intentionally silenced alternative experiences of the epidemic in
Memphis. For example, Kezia DePelchin tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to publish her letters to
counter the abuse and misinformation perpetuated against nurses during and after the epidemic.
And religious healer D. A. Quinn published his Heroes and Heroines of Memphis, which recounted
much of the experience of the Irish Catholic clergy, as a corrective to Keating’s History of Yellow
Fever, which he claimed “was so ‘sparing’ of Catholic facts that it scarcely referred to Catholicism.”
Quinn wrote in his Preface that he had waited for a better writer to rectify this slight but as it was
now almost a full decade after the epidemic and no one had seen fit to privilege the experiences of
the Catholic priests, nuns, or of the Irish Catholic population of the city, he considered it “an act
of justice to the memory of the departed” to record his “Yellow Fever Reminiscences” so that the
Irish Catholic experience of yellow fever could not be ignored and forgotten.353
To be sure, Keating’s History included very little about Catholic religious healers or about
the Irish Catholic community and Quinn’s criticism of this fact is understandable. The Irish
immigrant community in Memphis suffered disproportionately from the disease due to their
greater susceptibility to yellow fever and the inability of thousands of poor and working-class Irish
to escape the city. Yet the majority of Memphians cared little for what happened in the poor,
immigrant neighborhoods of the Pinch district where most working-class Irish lived. They were not
surprised, or particularly concerned, that the fever started in this district or that, of the white
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residents who remained in the city during the evacuation, a majority were Irish who died in record
numbers. In general, it is only when disease epidemics spread beyond poorer neighborhoods into
more affluent areas of a city that middle- and upper-class residents become seriously concerned. So
Keating’s silence is not all that surprising in that regard.
While he did mention a few names of martyred priests and nuns, Keating avoided praising
any one denomination over another in an effort to downplay the numerous complaints against the
Protestant ministers in the city. During the epidemic, newspapers reported that Memphians were
roundly denouncing Protestant religious leaders for fleeing the city, ushering their families to
safety while leaving their parishes without religious support. Keating admitted that many pastors
had fled, though he claimed that most had stayed and that “a few ill-conditioned zealots, taking
advantage of this state of public mind, made comparisons between the Protestant ministers and
the Catholic priests, which the circumstances did not warrant, with a view to the injury of the
Protestant churches.” Keating likewise claimed that “The ministers and sisters of all the Christian
sects were alike conspicuous for their zeal and fidelity,” subtly absolving Protestant pastors, whom
he repeatedly mentioned had done just as much for the sick as those from the Catholic and Jewish
orders.354
Keating’s concerted effort to downplay the criticism levied against Protestant clerics may
have contributed to how little attention he paid to the Catholic experience in the city. Yet even his
own newspaper—the Memphis Daily Appeal—published a litany of abuse against the Protestant clergy
during the epidemic, asserting that they “left their communities to die like dogs, without one word
of consolation or hope....They have strengthened the mother church, against whom it was their
habit to inveigh as the ‘scarlet woman.’” So while the Appeal largely denounced the un-Christian
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behavior of Protestant religious leaders, lauding the Catholic clergy in comparison, Keating
conspicuously sought to salvage the reputation of Protestant leaders after the epidemic was over.
Part of this strategy included downplaying the work of Catholics and of the terrible experience of
the Irish in the city.355
The work of Quinn and the Catholic churches in and around Memphis not only helped to
reinsert the Catholic experience into the collective memory of the epidemic, it also helped to
reintroduce the Irish immigrant population as belonging to Memphis. Despite the fact that many
Irish Memphians lost significant demographic and political power following the epidemic, these
counternarratives fought against their marginalization in the history of Memphis. More
contemporary academic and public historians of the 1878 yellow fever epidemic have built upon
these counternarratives to privilege the experience of the Irish immigrant community. They discuss
the nativism and labor competition that relegated many working-class Irish to the Pinch district of
the city; they describe the unsanitary conditions of the Pinch that were thought to perpetuate the
epidemic and the indifference with which most Memphians viewed the public health of the poor
immigrant community. Capers asserted that “the Catholic Church lost two thousand of its
parishioners, thirteen priests, and thirty nuns” to yellow fever and that, in terms of morbidity and
mortality, “the toll was heaviest among the Irish.”356
Because of the successful contemporary resurrection of this counternarrative, particularly
by historians like Capers, the experience of the Irish immigrant community is now a central
narrative in the history of the epidemic. This has been important in counteracting the portrayal by
Keating and others that ethnic and racial minorities were partially to blame for the horrors of
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1878, both in their unwillingness—rather than inability—to depopulate the town and for their
political power in the old aldermanic government which perpetuated the city’s poor sanitary
conditions. Therefore, these counternarratives have been successful in broadening the historical
memory beyond the dominant narrative and in combating the biases of the Memphis business
elite.
Another religious group has, likewise, managed to ingratiate their story into the collective
memory of the city. Despite being a white, Protestant congregation, the Episcopalians of St. Mary’s
Cathedral were a marginalized group in Memphis whose custom of worship and style of living too
closely resembled that of Catholics. Their reverends took a vow of chastity, as did the women who
pledged themselves as nuns to the church. The nuns wore traditional black habits, the reverend
wore a traditional priest’s collar, they continued to pray to saints, and their church was filled with
religious iconography. This made St. Mary’s a sect outside of the Protestant mainstream, leading to
charges that they were “Romanists in disguise.” According to the Reverend Morgan Dix, “Before
the memorable year of 1878, many spoke against these faithful and devoted women....” Likewise,
Texas volunteer Kezia DePelchin was shocked when the Howard Association sent her to nurse the
children of an orphanage run by the Episcopalian Sisters. She described the Sisters in one of her
many letters, writing, “...such communities were relics of the dark ages that I thought forever swept
away from the pure Church of Christ by the mighty power of the Reformation. What would
Martin Luther say to a Protestant nunnery?” Perhaps sentiments such as these are why Keating said
very little about the work of the Episcopalian nuns. While he included an article published by the
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Nashville American praising the work of the Episcopal Church in Memphis, he relegated it to a
mere footnote in his History.357
While Keating remained largely silent about the Episcopalian healers and DePelchin was
unapologetically hostile toward their way of life, the congregation of St. Mary’s—with the assistance
of the Episcopal church in New York from which many of the Sisters had come—worked to present
the Episcopalian healers as alternative heroes of the epidemic. Aided by the letters of Dr. William
Armstrong, who was their physician and spoke very highly of their work during the epidemic,
Episcopalians across the country have fashioned a small group of four Episcopalian nuns and two
priests who died of yellow fever as the “Martyrs of Memphis” or Sister “Constance and her
Companions.” While these women gained very little recognition outside of their congregation
during the epidemic, Episcopalians throughout Tennessee and New York worked to spread the
word of their deeds and sacrifice for the city and its inhabitants. In 1879, church members around
the country gathered the personal papers and letters written by the sisters and priests in order to
piece together a narrative that privileges the experience of this group of religious healers. St. Mary’s
printed this narrative in a pamphlet, titled “The Sisters of St. Mary at Memphis: With the Acts and
Sufferings of the Priests and Others Who Were There with Them during the Yellow Fever Season
of 1878.” With the publication of this counternarrative, Reverend Dix claimed, “their names
became sacred thenceforth...” The Episcopal Church celebrates a day of remembrance in honor of
Constance and Her Companions in their official calendar. Prayers are offered up to them, people
visit their graves, and commemorations are held in their honor on the anniversary of Sister
Constance’s death. These continued efforts at commemoration have been highly successful.
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Reverend Dix was able to write as early as 1896 that after the epidemic, at least among
Memphians, “the tongue of calumny was silent, while men looked on with beating hearts and eyes
dim with tears,” at the sacrifice of the Episcopalian healers.358
These narratives fashioned the Catholic clergy and the Episcopalian “Martyrs of Memphis”
as alternative heroes not under the direction of the Howard Association or the CRC. Because of
these religious institutions’ early and continued efforts to publicize and distribute these
counternarratives alongside that of Keating and the CRC, contemporary Memphians continue to
remember and commemorate these healers and the experiences of the ethnic and religious
minorities that they represent. The fact that these stories symbolized appropriate roles and
behavior for ethnic and religious minorities—as well as for women—as selflessly sacrificing their
lives for the greater good of the city may also have helped to assure the successful integration of
these narratives.359
Just as national religious networks were involved in the relief campaign, these contacts were
also vital to spreading these counternarratives throughout Anglican, Episcopalian, and Catholic
communities across the country. Memorials and sermons were offered up to these alternative
heroes in a number of these churches. The Sisters of St. Mary are commemorated in the Anglican
calendar each year on September 9, for example, with a prayer that states, “We give thanks and
praise, O God of compassion, for the Heroic witness of Constance and her companions, who, in a
time of plague and pestilence, were steadfast in their care for the sick and the dying, and loved not
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their own lives, even unto death. Inspire in us a like love and commitment to those in need,
following the example of our Savior Jesus Christ....” Martyr’s Weekend is also considered an
official commemoration on the Memphian society calendar and religious groups honor the
memory of the Martyrs with stories, choral songs, and a group visit to their graves in Elmwood
Cemetery.” In many ways, the Martyrs of Memphis now stand in for all yellow fever heroes, even
those who were not a part of their religious order. But for Southern Episcopalians, according to
Dix, the model of Constance and Her Companions acts “more as a reality of the present than a
memory of the past,” constantly strengthening and reinforcing the determination of this religious
community.360
But not all attempts to expand the collective memory of the epidemic to include the
experiences of a more diverse body of Memphians have been successful. In general, the voices of
African Americans have been effectively silenced in the public memory of the 1878 epidemic.
Despite a recognized need to reintroduce the African American experience of yellow fever into the
collective memory, attempts to do so have thus far been infrequent and suffer a lack of reliable
primary source material that is not curated by white authorship. There is little evidence of the
experience of black Memphians during the epidemic outside of their interactions with the relief
apparatus. Based on historic beliefs in their immunity to yellow fever, many whites believed that
black people were naturally suited to roles that safeguarded white bodies and property. Because
white voices present much of what historians know about the African American experience during
the 1878 epidemic in Memphis, the few glimpses into what was happening in the black
community reinforce black service and deference to white authority. More contemporary attempts
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to include the experience of the black community often fail, therefore, to step outside of the role
prescribed for African Americans during yellow fever epidemics—that is, as caretakers and
protectors of whites.
The belief in differential racial immunity to yellow fever has functioned as a double-edged
sword for Americans of African descent. While acting as a medical justification for slavery, black
Americans were able to leverage the wide-spread belief in their resistance to yellow fever to secure
opportunities they would have otherwise been denied. Unfortunately, blacks were really only
successful at gaining these opportunities during epidemics, when whites’ fear for their own lives
outweighed entrenched racism that sought to keep blacks in their prescribed social place. Once
epidemics were over, black Southerners lost many of these lucrative opportunities as whites sought
to reinstitute the social boundaries that supported white supremacy.
One interesting example of the possibilities opened for black Memphians during a yellow
fever epidemic occurred when the Citizens’ Relief Committee hired the first black policemen in
Memphis in 1878. White Memphians had previously blocked black men from the police and fire
departments throughout Reconstruction and again during the 1874 racially-mixed political
coalition that elected John Loague mayor of Memphis. Despite Loague’s promises that these
departments would be integrated and the efforts of black councilmen to capitalize on some public
support for the hiring of black officers following the 1873 epidemic, councilmen on the police and
fire boards blocked efforts to extend these positions of authority to black men.361
Yet the sheer scope of the 1878 epidemic defeated the organized opposition to the hiring
of black policemen. The CRC hired the first black police officers in late August, after a majority of
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the town’s citizens had either fled or fallen sick but before it was clear that black Memphians were
just as susceptible to the disease as whites. The CRC hoped that hiring black policemen would
allow them to maintain order in the face of a majority-black population, especially as it became
clear that those left behind in the city faced sickness and starvation on a scale never before
witnessed in Memphis. White relief workers were particularly concerned that an unruly mob of
fearful, starving blacks would vastly outnumber healthy whites. In order to gain support from the
leaders of the black community, the CRC—an all-white organization—accepted resolutions from a
Colored Citizens’ Relief Association and hired the first black policemen in order to demonstrate
that it had biracial support.362
Keating applauded black policemen for supporting the CRC and the black militia who
guarded the evacuation camps outside the city. He even listed these men by name, distinguishing
them for their service. But Keating presented black policemen and militiamen as a foil to the
potentially dangerous criminal element in the black population, singling them out as a credit to
their race in their prescribed role as caretakers of whites. Interestingly, Keating honored the black
policemen and militiamen but did not do the same for the black leaders who served on the
Colored Citizens’ Relief Association. Perhaps he saw the CCRA as competing with white authority
rather than supporting it.363
After the epidemic was over, many of the black police officers hired retained their positions
under the Taxing District, which capitalized on the black policemen as visible symbols of their
racial egalitarianism and a tool in maintaining black political support while they consolidated
political power in the hands of white economic elites. The Taxing District Officials may have
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further benefitted from animosity between the new black policemen and the Irish population,
which lost representation on the police force in order to break up the interracial coalition that had
been so successful in 1874. Black policemen continued to serve in Memphis until the late 1890s,
when Conservative Democrats took control of the Taxing District and began the process of Jim
Crow disfranchisement, making political support from the black community unnecessary to
maintaining power.364
Public and academic historians have since used the example of black policemen as a symbol
of racial unity in the city during the epidemic. They point to the hiring of black officers—
something that even Reconstruction-era Republicans could not accomplish—as an example of how
the epidemic forced Memphians to abandon racism in order to survive. This narrative promotes
racial unity in the city today yet fails to properly contextualize the role that African Americans
played during epidemics and the racial implications attached to theories of their immunity. While
the epidemic did provide important opportunities to black Memphians, even these positions of
authority as police officers were understood as an extension of their racially-preordained role of
caretaker during a yellow fever epidemic. White authorities in the city offered these opportunities
to black residents as long as they vowed to safeguard white lives and white-owned property and as
long as they pledged allegiance to white political and social control over the city. So, while the
black population was able to take advantage of white fear of and susceptibility to yellow fever in
order to obtain positions of authority in the post-Reconstruction South, whites nevertheless
expected these positions to strengthen the relationship and power dynamic between blacks and
whites that had been forged during the antebellum era.
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The narrative that black Memphians suffered less from yellow fever because of their innate
resistance to the disease continues to be the aspect of the black experience reinforced by the
dominant narrative. The story of the first black policemen in Memphis largely fosters this
assumption. It has also been the most successful attempt to include black participation in the
public memory of the epidemic. Unfortunately, it does so with a view to promoting racial unity in
the city rather than properly contextualizing race relations immediately following Reconstruction.
The story continues to be presented as whites lowering the color barrier to offer resistant or
immune black residents important positions of authority, rather than presenting the black
community’s long campaign to fight for integration.365
The memorial headstone erected for R. H. Tate offers a similar—though far less
successful—attempt to remind contemporary Memphians of black participation in the 1878
epidemic. In 2005 the Bluff City Medical Society donated a headstone to commemorate the death
of R. H. Tate, who was reportedly the first black doctor to work in Memphis. The headstone reads:
“Dr. R. H. Tate, 1845-1878. Hero of the Yellow Fever Epidemic. The first African-American
professional to practice in Memphis, he answered the call of the Howard Association with seven
other Cincinnati physicians. Three weeks later, he died of the plague.” Following Tate’s death, the
Greensboro North State newspaper proclaimed that the Memphis Daily Avalanche was mistaken when
it reported that he was “born and reared in the North” and that he had actually been a slave in
Greensboro who had migrated to Cincinnati after Emancipation, receiving his medical education
there. According to Keating, the Howards assigned Dr. Tate to a neighborhood “known as ‘Hell’s
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Half-Acre,’ a region...densely populated by colored people.” Contemporaries said nothing more
about the epidemic experience of the doctor or of his patients.366
His memorial headstone actually marks an empty grave as Tate’s place of interment is
unknown. Yet the choice to memorialize Dr. Tate’s contributions during the epidemic by erecting
a headstone in Elmwood Cemetery reinforces his connection to the Howard Association and
presents him as an orthodox hero of the epidemic. As an educated physician honored by the
Howard Association upon his death, he symbolizes the idealized figure of the heroic doctor for the
African American community. And despite the fact that he was not from Memphis, and was
mistaken as a Northerner during the epidemic, his story offers black Memphians a chance to claim
a hero that meets the conventional standards set by the dominant narrative.367
The memorial of R. H. Tate is an important contemporary attempt to create a black hero
of the epidemic; yet it is only partially successful in that very few people know of R. H. Tate.
Though his name was printed in the lists of martyred Howards following the epidemic and
Keating even mentioned him in his 1888 History of the City of Memphis and Shelby County as “the
first innovation made by the colored race in the medical profession of Memphis,” Tate’s
contributions were generally forgotten following the epidemic. His memorial attracts little
attention, making R. H. Tate a minor character in the collective memory of the epidemic. While
his name shows up in a few academic works as the first black doctor in Memphis, so little is said
about him that he is too easy to forget in a story with so many interesting characters, heroic deeds,
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and horrific events. In this way, he is perhaps more representative of the African American
experience in the memory of Memphis than his memorial suggests.368
Contemporary memorials and commemorations of the epidemic endeavor to appeal to all
Memphians regardless of race, class, or gender but their attempts to do so are incongruous with
the ubiquity of the dominant narrative. For example, the 1970s saw a reinvigoration of public and
academic interest in Memphis’s history of yellow fever in advance of the centennial anniversary of
the 1878 epidemic. In 1972, the city opened Martyr’s Park along the Mississippi Riverwalk, which
is a memorial park dedicated to the heroes and victims of yellow fever. A historical marker, titled
“Memphis Martyrs” offers the following historical narrative of the epidemic:
In August 1878, fear of death caused a panic during which 30,000 of 50,000 Memphians
fled this bluff city. By October, the epidemic of yellow fever killed 4,202 of 6,000
Caucasians and 946 of 14,000 Negroes who stayed. With some outside help, citizens of
all races and walks of life, recognizing their common plight in this devastated, bankrupt
community, tended 17,600 sick and buried the dead. As a result many of them lost their
lives, becoming martyrs in their service to mankind.
Prominently displayed at the center of the park is a memorial statue in honor of those who chose
to remain in Memphis to care for the sick during the epidemics of the 1870s. The figures are cast
in bronze and represent only vaguely human shapes. Stripped of race, class, or gender they look as
though they are floating in their cement frame or standing on each other’s shoulders, symbolic of
the support that each person gave or accepted in order to survive the epidemic.369
The memorial statue purposely presents these figures as faceless, featureless Memphians in
an effort to include the thousands whose names are lost to history. It also builds upon the adage
that epidemics are great social levelers, making race, class, or gender suddenly less important in the
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fight for survival. Further, it presents a visual narrative into which contemporary Memphians can
insert themselves and fosters an emotional tie between the Memphians of the past and present.
The juxtaposition of the memorial’s aims is telling: it at once celebrates Memphians’ mutual
experience and common identity alongside the stripping of individual traits that divide people and
the dissolution of everything but naked fear in the face of human suffering.370
But placing the memorial statue—which explicitly attempts to elide race as a social divider
of Memphians—alongside a historical marker that presents the official narrative to visitors
exemplifies the difficulties. Memphians have tried to create a usable past for all residents using a
dominant narrative that privileges the experience of a few. The goals of the memorial statue seem
incongruous to the narrative presented in the historical marker, which presents statistical evidence
that the epidemic experience was not so bad for black Memphians, who are anachronistically
referred to as “Negroes.” The marker subtly changes the meaning of the narrative provided by the
statue, making it seem that blacks set aside their differences to care for sick whites because of their
comparable immunity or resistance to the disease, thus reinforcing the roll of the black caretaker.

A tension therefore exists between the dominant historical narrative of the epidemic and
numerous counternarratives. White elites created and reinforced the dominant narrative in an
effort to circumscribe Memphian identity and experience and to create heroes that symbolized an
idealized Southern identity. Counternarratives have repeatedly challenged the dominant narrative
and pushed the collective memory of Memphians to be more inclusive of religious, ethnic, and
racial minorities. Yet these attempts to revise the historical and collective memory of the epidemic
370
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must fight against the ubiquity of a dominant narrative that has significant public and academic
support behind it.

Historical Tourism
Few places appeal to tourists in Memphis like Graceland, home and final resting place of
Elvis Presley; Beale Street, the birthplace of the blues; or the National Civil Rights Museum on the
site of the Lorraine Motel where Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in 1968. When people
think “Memphis,” they think of music, barbecue, Elvis, and King. Nevertheless, while most tourists
do not come to Memphis to hear about yellow fever, Memphians have made a conscious effort to
keep the history of the 1878 epidemic alive in local history and to insert it into the larger historical
narrative told to visitors. The 1878 yellow fever epidemic remains a foundational historic narrative
to the identity of Memphis and its people.
Both public and academic history play a vital role in continuing to memorialize this
epidemic as an existential moment in the history of Memphis. The narrative has experienced a
revitalization since the 1970s, particularly with the growth of historical and heritage tourism. Both
public and academic historians, however, tend to reinforce the dominant narrative without
questioning its implications for belonging and identity in either the historical or contemporary
city. This results in the continued promotion of a narrative that historically sought to circumscribe
Memphian identity as white and middle- or upper-class.

Memphis Heritage, a non-profit organization that promotes historic preservation in Shelby
County, claims that “Tourism is one of Memphis’ top revenue producers” with “Heritage tourism

268

[accounting] for 24% of all visits to Memphis.” Their mission is to convince local politicians,
businesses, and land developers that saving important sites around Memphis “generates heritage
tourism and increased property values” while building “community awareness.” Thanks in part to
the work of Memphis Heritage, “Memphis has more properties listed on the National Register [of
Historic Places] than even Boston....[and] Memphis is ranked fourth in the U.S.” for the ubiquity
of its historic sites. Memphis thus takes its history very seriously, both as a collective understanding
of Memphian identity and heritage, but also as an economic strategy to promote historical and
cultural tourism.371
The success of this strategy depends upon creating a usable past for contemporary
Memphians and visitors. They do so by presenting narratives and interpretations of the past that
have relevance to contemporary Memphians: that offer physical and emotional continuity with the
past, that demarcate sacred, historical space; and that offer communion with long-dead
Memphians who embody an idealized Memphian identity. Many of these historic sites in Memphis
memorialize or commemorate the 1878 yellow fever epidemic. They present the dominant
narrative of the epidemic to visitors and impress upon them the importance of the epidemic’s
history to their city, purposely creating a usable past that fosters the collective memory and identity
of Memphis.
For example, the Peabody Hotel touts its historical legacy in a tour it offers every day,
charging $5 per hotel guest or $10 per visitor. While the main attraction of the tour is a view of
the famed mallard ducks that descend the elevator each day to wile away the afternoon in the
lobby’s fountain, the duckmaster who cares for the birds conducts a one-hour tour detailing the
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historical importance of the “South’s Grand Hotel.” The current structure in which the tour takes
place was built in 1925 on Union Street, not far from where the original Hotel Peabody was built
in 1869 on Monroe and Main Streets as the first luxury hotel in Memphis. The duckmaster docent
explains that a horrific yellow fever epidemic almost crippled Memphis, leading to a loss of the city
charter, and that the original Hotel Peabody functioned as a hospital for yellow fever victims
during that time. The hotel’s website furthers these claims:
The 1878 Yellow Fever epidemic blindsided the city of Memphis and Hotel Peabody.
Thousands died and thousands fled. Though many hotels folded, The Peabody remained
open, vacant of paying guests, but serving as a hospital for the yellow fever victims.
Memphis was faced with bankruptcy and losing it charter. By the mid-1880s, the hotel
was once again bustling, as cotton and hardwood trading resumed. River traffic saved the
city to the point where, in 1893, it reclaimed both its charter and rightful place as one of
the country's leading distribution centers.
Contrary to these claims, the hotel did not remain vacant of paying guests during the epidemic. In
fact, it was not even set up as a hospital. It offered accommodation to volunteer physicians that
were in the employ of the Howard Association. Kezia DePelchin and E. Kate Heckle both
complained of the harsh treatment they received from the hotel staff and the refusal to grant
nurses accommodation for fear that they might infect the atmosphere of the hotel after caring for
sick patients in their homes.372
Successive owners of the Peabody, however, have recognized the importance of aligning the
hotel with the historical narrative of the 1878 yellow fever epidemic in order to boost the
legitimacy of its Memphis identity. The proprietor of the hotel during the epidemic, Robert
Galloway, served on the Board of Public Works after the creation of the Taxing District,
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reinforcing the correlation of the epidemic and charter repeal narratives. The current owners of
the hotel continue this tradition in an effort to bolster historical tourism. The tour emphasizes the
hotel’s status as an important Memphis landmark by showcasing its historic credentials but also by
perpetuating the narrative that the hotel served the city during its moment of medical and
municipal crisis in an act of benevolent loyalty, a narrative that appeals to tourists and Memphians
alike.373
Elmwood Cemetery has likewise capitalized on the centrality of the yellow fever narrative
to the city’s history in order to boost their legitimacy as a significant tourist attraction. Elmwood
offers 90-minute docent historical tours to the public and sells an audio tour and map visitors can
play in their car as they drive through the cemetery. These tours represent an important
fundraising opportunity for the cemetery. Yellow fever tours are a popular and frequently repeated
theme, particularly during the months that yellow fever historically raged in Memphis. During the
yellow fever tours, visitors are shown the graves and memorials of prominent Memphians who
died of the disease, the private Howard Association plot, the memorial statue to Mattie Stevenson,
the headstone of Annie Cook, the memorial to “Constance and her companions,” and an empty
area where an unknown number of yellow fever victims were buried in trenches.374
In 1985, a headstone was erected in memory of those yellow fever dead who were buried in
mass graves at Elmwood. The marker was titled “No Man’s Land” and presents the following
epitaph and history:
In four public lots known collectively as ‘No Man’s Land’ lie the remains of at least 1400
victims of the great yellow fever epidemics of 1873, 1878, and 1879. Memphis lost over
8500 citizens to the disease, and 2500 of these rest at Elmwood.
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At the peak of these outbreaks, Elmwood was required to handle over fifty burials a day.
Due to the sickness and labor shortages, many bodies were piled above ground. Awaiting
burial, persons from all levels of society were interred in trenches in an area formerly
reserved for paupers and unknowns.
By 1878, half of Memphis’ 50,000 citizens fled the city. Yellow fever struck ninety percent
of the remaining population, killing 5100. The epidemic so decimated its population that
Memphis became bankrupt in 1879, and declared a Taxing District of Nashville.
In commemoration of all forgotten who perished in the epidemics.
By Robert Kaplan, MD, Christine Mroz, MD, Jim D. Taylor. May 1985
“No Man’s Land” fulfills an important role in maintaining collective historical memory as a
demarcation of sacred space within Elmwood, which itself is a sacred place of yellow fever memory.
The cemetery therefore acts as a memorial and employees both recognize and capitalize on their
role as arbiters of the historical narrative.375
In 2014, Elmwood hired a full-time historian to help build the cemetery’s reputation as a
site of public history and historic preservation. She also regularly writes posts on the cemetery’s
blog. Elmwood likewise invites guests to speak about their historical research on the epidemic and
offers a picnic lunch as part of their monthly Lunch and Lecture Series. Their yellow fever tour
allows visitors to view the infamous Elmwood Cemetery Register with its pages and pages of yellow
fever burials catalogued by the daughter of the cemetery superintendent until she herself
succumbed to the disease. The docent reads a selection of Dr. William Armstrong’s letters to give
tourists a feel for what life was like during the epidemic. This inclusion of primary sources provides
legitimacy to the historical narrative told at Elmwood while the lectures offered by published
historians of the epidemic give the cemetery’s public tours an air of professional, academic
endorsement.376
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These tours and lecture series act as a performance of historical memory. With the
demarcation of sacred space, official days of remembrance and mourning—especially those
sanctioned by religious groups—allow Memphians and tourists to visit the graves of yellow fever
martyrs. This ritual of remembrance cements group identity. The narratives and stories allow
contemporary visitors to commune with the Memphians of the past just as the demarcation of
sacred spaces ties the physical contemporary city to the Memphis of the past. This fusion of space,
narrative, and performance creates a continuity of place, memory, and identity.377
Museums likewise allow visitors to “transcend the chasm of time and to experience the past
through contact with objects,” acting as a repository of collective memory that reinforces people’s
relationship to the past. The Pink Palace Museum—a cultural and natural history museum of
Memphis and the Mid-South—offers an exhibit on yellow fever and the history of the medical
profession in Memphis. Yet this exhibit further reveals a tension between the importance of the
epidemic’s history and the need to advance public respect for the achievements of modern
medicine and science. The exhibit presents the dominant narrative which establishes the doctors
as heroes of the epidemic yet presents a counternarrative that the historical medical profession
knew almost nothing about curing disease or helping patients, in many cases hurting more than
helping with their archaic methods of treatment. While the exhibit recognizes the doctors as
heroes, they are presented as heroes without knowledge, a narrative which elevates the
contemporary medical profession as far superior.378
The Pink Palace exhibit is an example of a usable past that presents the historical narrative
of the epidemic to bolster the needs of contemporary Memphians. While it presents objects and
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stories designed to allow communion with a past Memphis, it does so in a way that intentionally
reminds visitors that they are fortunate to exist in the present. The exhibit thus fosters pride in
Memphians for their historic and their contemporary city at once. The exhibit further showcases a
theme of public support from Memphis’s medical profession in many of the public works that
memorialize and commemorate the 1878 epidemic. Numerous physicians, medical societies, and
hospitals have contributed money to the creation of these memorials. In doing so, they reinforce
the dominant narrative which presents the doctor as the symbolic hero of Memphian and
Southern identity.379
Public historians depend and expand on the research published by academic historians and
both groups work in tandem to provide a usable historical past to the public and to the profession.
Attempts to bolster the historical legitimacy of heritage tourism in Memphis have therefore
depended upon a mutually beneficial relationship between academic and public historians’
interpretations of the past. Tours and exhibits regularly present the work of published historians,
allowing academics to showcase their research to a broader audience and leaving visitors with the
sense that outside experts have vetted the historical accuracy of the narratives told in these tours.
Yet Keating and others who supported the seizure of power under the Taxing District, its
pro-business, New South policies, and the white male-centric experience of the epidemic and its
effects continue to heavily influence the historical narrative presented to the public in these tours
and exhibits. Keating’s remains the dominant historical narrative. This usable past therefore
continues to circumscribe Memphian identity as one that is white, male, and middle- or upperclass.
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This is because Keating’s narratives remain the main repository of historical evidence for
academic historians interested in understanding what happened in Memphis during and after the
epidemic. This is particularly true for historians of medicine and public health who focus on
Keating’s descriptions of the breakdown of everyday life and society during the epidemic and the
organized campaign to relieve the sick and destitute led by the Citizens’ Relief Committee and the
Howard Association. These historians repeat the narrative that the Taxing District was requisite to
the development of public health infrastructure and the modern sanitary improvement of
Memphis. Historians beginning with Gerald Capers in the 1930s and Thomas Baker in the 1960s
to John Ellis, Margaret Humphreys, and Khaled Bloom in the 1990s all relied heavily on Keating,
reinforcing a long historiographical trend of accepting Keating’s dominant narrative almost
without question.380
This is not necessarily true, however, for urban historians who have chosen instead to focus
on the political changes wrought following the epidemic with the creation of the Taxing District.
While still utilizing Keating’s published works as a primary source, historians not focused on the
epidemic itself have been able to more fully contextualize Keating as someone who wrote in
support of the Taxing District. Further, these historians present the inauguration of the Taxing
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District as a seizure of power by the business class rather than as a corrective to a hopelessly inept
or corrupt aldermanic City Council.381

Unfortunately, the significance of the epidemic to the history and identity of Memphis has
solidified the dominant narrative provided by Keating in the collective memory. A number of
professional, academic historians, dependent upon Keating’s narratives as a major primary source
base have repeated and legitimized his narrative over the course of generations. Public historians,
in an effort to promote the historical legitimacy of their sites and to attract heritage tourism dollars
to their city, have presented the narrative vetted by published historians, further cementing the
dominant narrative in the collective memory of Memphis. In their endeavors to create a usable
and marketable past, both academic and public historians have promoted the dominant narrative
at the expense of alternative interpretations of the epidemic and its significance to Memphis
history and identity. While some counternarratives have successfully infiltrated the collective
memory of the epidemic, the dominant narrative—and its influence upon the identity of
contemporary Memphians—remains largely unquestioned.

Conclusion
The memory of the yellow fever epidemic of 1878 has been fundamental to the collective
identity of Memphis and its inhabitants. In the immediate aftermath of the epidemic, Memphians
recognized the need to remember and to commemorate and honor the heroes of the epidemic as a
way for the community to move forward after such a devastating tragedy. For the most part, the
heroes selected for veneration were upper- and middle-class white Southern men of the relief and
381
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medical organizations. Newly published official histories of the epidemic, especially those written
by John M. Keating, praised the actions of this class of Memphians above all others and argued
that without them, the city would have been lost.
Following the epidemic, upper-class Memphians capitalized on the fear and memory of the
fever to enact sweeping changes in the city’s landscape and power structure. They pressed for the
repeal of the city charter and inaugurated a Taxing District government which sought to repeal the
crushing debt of Memphis. While Taxing District officials swept to power under promises of debt
repudiation and sanitary reform, the ultimate goal of the change in government was to transfer
political power from entrenched ethnic- and racial-minority ward bosses under the aldermanic
system of government to the elite business class which had previously been excluded from
government office. Once in power, Taxing District officials again employed yellow fever memory to
introduce reforms that advanced business interests and prioritized the business district and
wealthier neighborhoods in the sanitary campaign to clean up the city. They further turned to
Keating to cement their reputation as saviors of the city and to frame the reorganization of
government as a silver lining to weeks of epidemic yellow fever.
Keating’s narratives of the epidemic and its aftermath therefore received official sanction
by the government and became the dominant narrative of the epidemic. Because this narrative
provides a selective accounting of the epidemic and privileges the experience of a certain class of
Memphians, other groups have had to fight to be included in the collective memory. While certain
religious and ethnic minorities have been largely successful in reincorporating their stories into the
history of the epidemic, racial minorities are mostly absent from the narrative. The few times that
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they appear unfortunately reinforce nineteenth-century racial stereotypes of blacks as either
caretakers to whites or as criminals.
Keating’s narrative continues to influence the efforts of contemporary Memphians to
commemorate the history of the epidemic. Public historians attempt to create a usable past for
Memphians that solidifies place-based identity and group cohesion while further capitalizing on
the trend of historical and heritage tourism. Tours and exhibits rely on primary sources, historical
objects, sacred spaces, and appeals to emotion to offer the visitor a communion with the past.
These elements, combined with guest lectures by published historians, further provide legitimacy
to the historical narrative presented to visitors. Unfortunately, much of the narrative provided by
both public and academic historians—particularly those that focus on medical and public health
history—relies too heavily on Keating as a primary source without taking the time to explore his
motivations and biases.
The collective memory of yellow fever—particularly the dominant narrative provided by
Keating and his contemporaries but also later historians like Capers and Ellis—claims that the
Memphis that existed before the epidemics is gone, replaced by a new, changed city. It was not just
the inauguration of the Taxing District or the public health reforms that transformed the city. The
experience of the epidemic marked Memphis so much that its culture changed, its people changed.
For better or worse, these indelible changes have all been attributed to yellow fever. Because of
this, yellow fever will always be tied to the identity of the city. While the history of most places in
the South is separated into antebellum and postbellum periods—generally demarcated by the year
1865—the history of Memphis is divided by the year 1878. Memphians imagine that a new
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historical epoch began in Memphis in the wake of this epidemic. Yellow fever is therefore integral
to the history and identity of the contemporary city.
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EPILOGUE

Yellow fever still exists as a worldwide public health concern. The disease is caused by an
arbovirus that is still endemic to tropical and subtropical areas in Central and South America and
Africa and kills between 30,000 and 60,000 people each year worldwide. It is considered such a
threat that the World Health Organization began a Yellow Fever Initiative in 2006 aimed at
coordinating mass vaccination campaigns throughout Africa. However, it is considered by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention “a very rare cause of illness in U.S. travelers.” In the
United States, there were 3 deaths from yellow fever between 1996 and 2002—all American
citizens who contracted the disease on trips to South America. Prior to that date, there had not
been a single yellow fever death on U.S. soil in nearly eighty years.382
But this may be changing. Yellow fever epidemics are partly a consequence of globalization:
the movement of people, goods, ideas, technology, and disease. With modern transportation
networks and global migration, the United States could experience another epidemic. Indeed,
American doctors earlier this year watched with concern as a major epidemic swept through Brazil,
concerned that the virus could be transported here in the body of an unknown traveler. In 2015,
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the CDC estimated that “approximately eight million U.S. residents traveled to 42 countries with
endemic yellow fever virus transmission.”383
The majority of people first infected with the disease display mild symptoms, a fact that
may allow sufficient dispersion of the virus within a population before serious cases come to the
notice of health professionals. Only about 15% of cases, on average, display the kinds of symptoms
that suggest a potentially fatal case: “high fever, jaundice, bleeding, and eventually shock and
failure of multiple organs” according to the CDC. Even with medical care, 20-50% of these more
serious cases will end in death. While these statistics may sound promising—with only 3-8%
mortality—it must be remembered that these statistics are compiled each year from sporadic cases
among travelers and in areas where the disease is endemic, that is, with a large population who are
immune from childhood exposure. Further, the CDC believes that a large number of cases go
unreported each year, arguing that the actual case rate may be anywhere between 10 and 250 times
higher than that reported to officials. If an outbreak were to occur in the United States, the
statistics of morbidity and mortality would likely be far greater. It has been suggested that as high
as 50% of cases in a virgin population might advance to the more serious, and potentially fatal,
stage of the disease.384
With the lack of sporadic yellow fever cases for several decades, the United States now has
a virgin or completely nonimmune population. In fact, yellow fever is only suspected in cases of
travelers to locales where the disease is considered endemic. If a true yellow fever outbreak were to
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spread in the United States, it is unlikely medical professionals would immediately diagnose the
disease as yellow fever in any patient who had not traveled outside the United States. The disease
could therefore spread out of control by the time medical and public health officials recognized
that an epidemic was underway.385
The United States is home to the classic mosquito vector—Aedes aegypti. With the Southern
states experiencing milder winters due to global climate change, the endemic zone could be pushed
northward as the lack of periodic frosts allows Aedes aegypti eggs to survive until the next summer.
All that would be needed for the disease to silently spread would be for an Aedes aegypti mosquito
to bite a traveler during the several-day incubation period before the individual started showing
signs of illness. Infected humans would pass the disease to mosquitoes and those mosquitoes
would infect more humans; the number of yellow fever patients would rise. But with a virgin
population, public health officials consider a single case of the disease on American soil an
epidemic and would respond accordingly.386
If the epidemic were not quickly contained, the CDC and state health departments would
inaugurate a mass vaccination and anti-mosquito public health campaign. A live-virus vaccine for
yellow fever has been available since 1937. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention states
that “No vaccine efficacy studies have been performed with yellow fever vaccine. However, the
number of yellow fever disease cases was substantially reduced following the introduction of the
vaccine supporting it being protective in humans.” The vaccine, however, has very rare but serious
side effects. It cannot be used in children under six months old or in anyone who has a
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compromised immune system. Vaccines are available for patients from six to eight months or over
sixty years of age, as well as those who are pregnant or breastfeeding, but with the understanding
that these cases may be at higher risk of adverse reaction.387
An outbreak in Angola that spread into the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2015
resulted in the near depletion of the emergency vaccine stockpile held in reserve for a major
epidemic. A manufacturing problem in 2016 further lowered the availability of yellow fever
vaccine such that Sanofi Pasteur, maker of YF-Vax—the only vaccine that is licensed for use in the
United States—expects “complete depletion of yellow fever vaccine available for the immunization
of U.S. travelers my mid-2017.” Another vaccine is currently undergoing trials by the FDA hoping
to bolster supply of yellow fever vaccine. But the vaccine would only help those who had not yet
been exposed and offers 80-100% protection 10 days after vaccination. For those who had already
contracted the virus, there is no cure; medical care remains palliative.388
It would not take much for a yellow fever epidemic to strike the United States today. If it
did, what narratives of race and belonging would structure our responses to it? As this dissertation
has shown, despite an organized national campaign to combat yellow fever and organize relief for
sufferers, fear of disease contributes to discrimination that is mapped onto already existing
structures of nativism, racism, and efforts to gain political and social power. In the current political
climate, politicians and government organizations tolerate and/or actively promote nativist, racist
387
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rhetoric in order to gain or maintain power. In this climate, even a minor public health scare tied
to immigration could be disastrous. The example of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 has already shown
that a local, natural disaster can be compounded by official mismanagement and racism thereby
intensifying human suffering.
Perhaps most notably, as it pertains to yellow fever, many people still consider African
Americans with significant West and Central African heritage to be less susceptible to the disease.
This expectation has been supported by the work of many historians of American yellow fever
epidemics. Yet Mariola Espinosa has argued that this contention is a hold-over from the racial
ideology of an earlier era and that there is very little contemporary medical evidence to suggest that
such a genetic resistance exists. She claims “there was never a consensus among medical observers
that black immunity to yellow fever actually existed, the evidence from epidemics indicates that in
fact it did not, and the analogy to the very real and well-documented evolutionary consequences of
endemic malaria is not apt.” Yet this belief remains prevalent in Americans’ cultural
understanding of yellow fever. Historians have been largely responsible for keeping this
expectation of racialized differential immunity alive; it is time that we help to dismantle it,
particularly given the negative impact that the expectation of African American resistance could
have during a domestic epidemic.389
In terms of epidemic disease more broadly, employing the concept of “at-risk populations”
runs the risk of increasing nativism and racism, a fact that has been demonstrated by a number of
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historians of medicine and public health. There is an adage that epidemic disease is the great social
leveler: that microbes care not for our socio-cultural hierarchies of race, class, or gender, that all
alike are subject to suffering. Yet these hierarchies do not disappear during an epidemic. If
anything, they are laid bare. Fear makes people do things that are outside the socially acceptable
bounds of behavior and prejudices that might exist below the level of consciousness can suddenly
surface during a crisis, often with terrible results. Historians have further demonstrated that racial
hierarchies and theories of racial immunity to diseases are created and elaborated in a selfreinforcing loop: racial hierarchies suggest theories of racial difference in immunity which further
reinforce the racial hierarchy. This is not unique to the Americas; historians have charted their
concomitant creation across the globe.390
Governments and social groups around the world foment nativist prejudice, in part by
associating immigrants with the fear of infectious disease. Nativists’ fear that the immigrant
“other” will import disease into a native population is coupled with general fears that the modes of
living of immigrants differ from the norm. This nativism is often spurred by racism, which can
spread and be applied to racialized “others” within the native population.
In terms of disease states in general, humans often marginalize, vilify, or fear those who
are sick, even if the individual is not an outsider. Building on the work of Susan Sontag, many
historians have shown that the cultural metaphors surrounding disease stigmatize patients,
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sometimes keeping them from getting the treatment they require. This is especially true for
contagious disease like HIV/AIDS but it is also true for non-contagious diseases such as cancer.391
Fundamentally, it is important to uncouple the link between bodies and disease. Such
beliefs inevitably lead to social isolation and the development of an insider/outsider mentally
which argues that certain bodies are dangerous, certain modes of living are dangerous, and the
people who inhabit dangerous bodies with their dangerous mores are “other.” Unfortunately, the
medical concept of “at-risk populations” tends to reinforce this expectation. In general, however,
medical knowledge—both official and popular—remains an under-utilized category of analysis for
issues of cultural identity and belonging beyond the realm of immigration.
On a wider scale, writing a cultural history of medicine is extremely relevant to
contemporary issues of health and disease. Despite the fact that this dissertation’s analysis is
contingent on the historical context of 1878, the ability to take apart knowledge which helps a
population of human beings to understand a natural phenomenon like disease is certainly
applicable to another time or place, including today. Analytical readings of medical narratives as
products of knowledge contingent on a number of different knowledge components—social,
cultural, political, economic—leads to a deeper understanding of how the cultural metaphors of
disease reinforce existing social hierarchies and mechanisms of exclusion. The meanings associated
with a disease, the ways in which we attempt to understand it, and how we view the interaction
between diseases and differently-classed human bodies are all dependent upon a wealth of previous
scientific, social, and cultural knowledge. Further, that understanding is dependent on one’s
relationship to the disease in question. Doctors, scientists, patients, survivors, evacuees, and
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potentially fearful outside observers, all have different ways of understanding epidemic diseases
and their relationship to human bodies. With a disease that has been almost entirely absent from
the United States for over one hundred years, social and cultural histories of earlier epidemics are
vital, helping us to make sense of how contemporary Americans might respond to a reintroduction
of yellow fever in the twenty-first century.
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